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I. INTRODUCTION: AN UNCONVENTIONAL KIND OF MIND?  
A. BACKGROUND 
If a certain kind of mind or talent exists that predisposes people to succeed at 
irregular warfare (IW), the U.S. military needs to exploit it.1  Instead of planning for 
mediocrity, the military should be scouting for the talent that already exists within the 
ranks and better utilizing it, or maybe even seeking out people with desired talents and 
recruiting them.  The analogy in sports would be fielding the first string of a football 
team.  The first string consists of the regular players, not the substitutes.  The first string 
consists of the players who have talent for the game.  They are the players in whose 
minds events on the field slow down and take on a special clarity, allowing them to 
exploit opportunities and disrupt opponents—to effect strategy.  These players intuitively 
adapt to the changing circumstances on the field and make plays that win the game.  In 
contrast, the second, third, and fourth string players do not typically have the same level 
of talent, skill, or feel for the competition and cannot “know” what the other team is 
doing or how the other team will react.  Arguably, the military too should focus less on 
the playbook, and more on finding, developing, and using the right players. 
The irregular nature of the Long War, coupled with contemporary warfare 
experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, are forcing the Department of Defense (DoD) to 
reexamine its institutional ability to compete in the irregular warfare arena.  The subject 
has become a major area of focus for the defense establishment.  A number of scholars 
have proposed that the American military establishment is culturally and structurally 
predisposed to conduct regular warfare; other experts submit that America’s failures are 
simply due to a failure to apply counterinsurgency principles tactically and operationally.   
Regarding counterinsurgency (COIN), these diagnostic assessments have given 
way to a prognostic frame that stresses inculcating our troops with doses of cultural 
                                                 
1 Irregular warfare—A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence 
over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may 
employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, 
and will. Also called IW.  Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms: April 2001. 
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sensitivity and empathy in order to moderate troops’ ethno-centric biases and enhance 
their cross-cultural perceptions and communication.  The new prognostic frame also 
prescribes that correct tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and specific methods 
that represent the solution in counterinsurgency warfare, irrespective of local conditions. 
This thesis offers another perspective to correcting America’s irregular malady 
and builds on a currently unpublished paper by Professor Anna Simons.  It argues that the 
power of “Who” is more important than “How,” or “What,” when it comes to succeeding 
in irregular warfare.2 
B. THEORY OF AN UNCONVENTIONAL MIND 
Simons suggests that succeeding in irregular warfare, especially when operating 
in foreign cultures and with “Others,” requires something that cannot be taught—or 
trained.  The right “kind” of mind is necessary.  She makes it clear that this is an 
important distinction.  It is not temporal, like a frame of mind.  It is a permanent kind of 
mind. 3  It’s an unconventional kind of mind.  
To understand what an unconventional kind of mind is, it is important to first 
understand what a conventional kind of mind is.  Given a conventional kind of mind, an 
individual’s ability to evaluate, process, and contend with new or different situations is 
bounded by domain and wedded to past actions.  An individual with an unconventional 
kind of mind is not bound by these constraints.  Someone with an unconventional kind of 
mind is capable of synthesizing across domains or innovating in order to solve problems 
while orienting and adapting to new circumstances or changing conditions.   
This thesis posits that success in an irregular warfare environment requires 
individuals with an unconventional kind of mind; some individuals naturally think 
unconventionally, or irregularly, compared to everyone else.  These individuals have a 
natural ability to, as Simons writes: 
 
                                                 
2 Anna Simons and Mike Weathers, “Anthropology and Irregular Warfare – India,” (Unpublished 
paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 20.  
3 Simons and Weathers, “Anthropology and Irregular Warfare,” 20. 
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...intuitively think in terms of branches and sequels, and therefore don’t 
need to ask themselves what the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order effects of an action 
might be–they’ve already factored that in without consciously factoring it 
in.  Or they have the ability to see angles from angles that remain obtuse to 
others.4   
These are the first-stringers that America should be seeking to employ in irregular 
warfare. 
C. APPROACH 
Since COIN is a subset of IW, and since COIN is at the center of the current 
national security debate thanks to Iraq and Afghanistan, COIN will be used as the vehicle 
for examining this notion of unconventional minds.  This thesis drills down into the 
stories of two United States Army Special Forces team sergeants and their 
counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq.  The stories behind their success will be examined 
in depth.  It is the intent of this thesis to get past TTPs and see what the real factors were 
that led these two men to be so successful, because in many cases, they did not conduct 
COIN in accordance with doctrine or popular convention and, even when they did, they 
had to adapt the methods they applied to their particular situations.  In unpacking their 
stories, this thesis attempts to illuminate how unconventionally minded these men were—
and are—and how their unconventional mindset contributed to their success. 
Chapter II lays out different schools of thought about COIN and poses the 
question: “what is missing from current perspectives about COIN?” 
Chapter III presents a general history of coalition counterinsurgency efforts in al 
Anbar province, Iraq from 2003 to 2008.  This chapter provides the backdrop for the two 
case studies and serves to illustrate what can and cannot be learned from conventional 
historical narratives.  The chronology offered is drawn from numerous sources: journals, 
magazine, and newspaper articles; books; and Web sites.   
Chapters IV and V, appropriately entitled “William’s War” and “Robert’s War,” 
trace the counterinsurgency experiences of William and Robert in Hit district, al Anbar 
                                                 
4 Simons and Weathers, “Anthropology and Irregular Warfare,” 20–21. 
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province, Iraq.  These chapters are written based on my experiences working with these 
men; extensive interviews with each as well as discussions with members of the 
Operational Detachments (ODA) they led; and personal notes and writings that William 
kept.  These chapters illustrate how inherently messy, serendipitous yet contrived, and 
context-specific success in counterinsurgency really is.  These chapters should 
demonstrate the importance of getting the background straight and appreciating the 
sequence and interrelatedness of events, the trial and error aspects of COIN, the 
importance of recognizing and exploiting unforeseen opportunities, the significance of 
the skills and abilities needed by counterinsurgents, and the fit of key individuals to their 
particular situations.  All of these factors are routinely absent from conventional 
narratives.  One typically only finds attention paid to these factors in biographical 
accounts, and usually only in passing as part of the larger story.  
This methodology was chosen for one primary reason: to be able to highlight 
what a conventional historical narrative does not tell us about the actual complex 
messiness of on-the-ground reality.  Team sergeants and their ODAs are the focus of this 
thesis for several reasons.  First, and foremost, I had access.  I specifically concentrate on 
older Special Forces soldiers because they brought with them to Iraq experience 
operating in other cultures and in ambiguous environments.  At the same time, ODAs did 
not own battlespace.  Therefore, they had to contend with interesting constraints.  On the 
surface, it may seem to the casual observer that constraints would have limited the 
ODAs’ ability to innovate and adapt; however, in reality, I found that by innovating and 
adapting to overcome these constraints, the ODAs ended up reshaping their environments 
in beneficial ways.  Lastly, studying team sergeants and their ODAs should also reveal 
the value of being able to mix talents within a small group and achieve supra-individual 
effects. 
Chapter VI draws on current theories about intelligence, naturalistic decision 
making, strategy, and other concepts, along with historic examples of unconventional 




This chapter will also raise questions about the role their backgrounds and experiences 
may have played in making them the right persons for the situations in which they found 
themselves. 
Chapter VII, the last chapter, does what must always be done; it generalizes the 
findings of this thesis to provide recommendations for how to improve Special Force’s 
effectiveness at irregular warfare.  Although this thesis concentrates on Army Special 
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II. PARADIGMS OF COIN 
A. THEORIES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) has received no shortage of academic deliberation in 
the last half-century given the frequency of revolutions, civil wars, and wars of national 
liberation or secession.  A profound new interest in counterinsurgency was inspired in the 
wake of America’s invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.  Different people have taken 
different approaches when studying these internal wars, and theories abound to explain 
both their causes and their resolution.  Despite various socio-political theories and 
theories about strategic interaction, such as Ivan Arreguin-Toft’s comparison of direct 
versus indirect strategies, two major views about counterinsurgency dominate the 
discussion.  One school of thought favors a population-centric approach.  A second 
promotes an enemy-centric approach.  A third is emerging which pushes a leader-centric 
focus.  Each of these three schools of thought differs over where to place the greatest 
emphasis when it comes to directing counterinsurgents’ attention and energy. 
Population-centric counterinsurgency is sometimes referred to as classic 
counterinsurgency and as “winning hearts and minds.”  Population-centric COIN most 
notably traces its roots back to David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 
Practice.  Population-centric COIN maintains that the population is the center of gravity; 
the population’s support is essential to victory.5  Galula says that use of the population 
enables insurgents to counter-balance the state’s natural advantages.6  In cases where 
insurgents try to make use of the population, the state needs to try to separate the 
population from the insurgents by addressing legitimate political and social grievances, 
and by improving the quality of life through economic development and modernization.  
                                                 
5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication: Joint Operations, 13 February 2008 ((Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2006), IV-10.  “A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, 
and resistance — what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything 
depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.” A COG comprises the source of 
power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight. COGs exist in an adversarial 
context involving a clash of moral wills and/or physical strengths.” 
6 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Westport: Praeger Security 
International, 2006), 4.   
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The American military has ostensibly folded these aspects of population-centric COIN 
together under the larger umbrella of nation-building.  Security forces are not used to 
destroy the insurgents, only to secure the population from insurgent influence, and protect 
them from harm.7  According to FM 3–24, the population’s “protection and welfare is the 
center of gravity for friendly forces.”8 
In contrast, enemy-centric COIN holds that defeating insurgents requires 
attacking or destroying them, their strategy, their will, their capabilities, and/or a 
combination thereof.  Enemy-centric COIN is often considered an attrition-based 
strategy.  Although attrition typically calls to mind “a tangible, linear decrease in men 
and material,” and can be said to have defined America’s involvement, and failure, in 
Vietnam, enemy-centric COIN does not necessarily have to make killing paramount.9  
Strategic, or moral, attrition consists of wearing down an adversary’s will to fight.10  This 
can be achieved by being creative and even accommodating.  History has shown that 
violence often hardens an opponent’s resolve.  As Sun Tzu noted, attacking the enemy’s 
strategy is of supreme importance in war.  Next in importance is disrupting an enemy’s 
alliances.11  Enemy-centric COIN can thus lead one to target other potential centers of 
gravity, to include the insurgents’ strategy, leaders or elites, alliances, image, etc. 
Leader-centric COIN, meanwhile, posits that the successful outcome of 
counterinsurgency rests on a counterinsurgent leader’s ability to best his insurgent 
counterparts, period.  Mark Moyar, in his new book, A Question of Command, defines 
leader-centric COIN as, “a contest between elites in which the elite with superiority in 
certain leadership attributes usually wins.  The better elite gains the assistance of more 
people and uses them to subdue or destroy the enemy elite and its supporters.”12  In 
                                                 
7 Mark Moyar, A Question of Command (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 3. 
8 United States Army & United States Marine Corps, U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual, FM 3–24 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1–24. 
9 James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 
2006), 61. 
10 Ibid., 61. 
11 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 77–78. 
12 Moyar, A Question of Command, 3.  
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situations like Iraq and Afghanistan, the counterinsurgent elites consist of American 
military and civilian leaders, as well as their indigenous counterparts.  If the host nation 
(HN) government cannot produce leadership equal to or better than that of the insurgents, 
then it cannot sustain successes obtained by third-party participants, such as the United 
States.  Moyar further maintains that people, no matter how aggrieved, do not turn to 
insurgency on their own: “…they become insurgents only by following an elite that has 
decided to lead an insurgency, and only if that elite appears to be more virtuous and 
capable than the governmental elite.”13  Moyar does not explicitly say so, but one may 
infer from his book, that insurgent elites are the center of gravity in an insurgency.  
B. WHAT’S MISSING FROM THESE THEORIES? 
From a certain angle, one could say the military’s current infatuation with 
population-centric COIN is no less a function of the bureaucratic nature of the armed 
services than was its previous obsession with tactical, attrition-oriented, enemy-centric 
COIN.  The basic premise of population-centric COIN is that applying the right methods, 
or TTPs, is the key to success in counterinsurgency.  That is why proponents of 
population-centric COIN continually try to cull transferable solutions from past and 
recent successes.  Because it is a bureaucracy, the military assumes that mechanistic 
processes can replace wisdom, experience, and good judgment and compensate for 
potential incompetence and lack of discipline or experience.  However, the problems of 
incompetence, inexperience, and/or incompatibility for the most part will go away if you 
have the right people in place.14 
Perhaps COIN and IW as a whole are so complicated, or each case is so unique, 
that there is no overarching theory that can adequately deliver on the promise of victory 
and a corresponding framework for how to achieve it.  If so, then Dr. Moyar has a point 
in addressing leadership, although his “theory” explains little.  He argues, somewhat 
simplistically that certain attributes matter most.  If one were to follow this argument to 
its logical conclusion, one would only focus on leadership when looking at war, which 
                                                 
13 Moyar, A Question of Command, 3. 
 14 Jim Collins, Good to Great (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 121.    
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leaves out too many other factors.  For instance, he never mentions the importance of 
cross-cultural insight, which is different from empathy.  Cross-cultural insight means 
knowing something about the enemy—something that matters in war.15 
This thesis agrees with Dr. Moyar that leaders and having the right leaders 
matters, but disagrees that the right leader can be determined simply by recognizing 
individuals with a certain set of leadership attributes.  For one, this suggests that leaders 
possessing the qualities of leadership that Moyar lists can succeed anywhere.  But can 
they?  Would T. E. Lawrence have been as wildly successful anywhere other than 
Arabia?  Or General Joseph Stillwell somewhere other than the Chinese, Burma, and 
India theater?  Perhaps, but it is not likely.  When one looks at individuals like these in 
the round, it is apparent that each was uniquely fit for the role they played and where they 
played it.  The point is, there is much more to what makes an individual the right leader 
or the right “Who” than leadership attributes alone. 
 
                                                 
15 Anna Simons, “Unity of Vision: What it is and Why it Matters,” Presentation, Inter-University 
Seminar on Armed Forces & Society Biennial Conference, October 2009. 
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III. THE WAR IN AL ANBAR: A CONVENTIONAL HISTORY 
A. A ROUGH BEGINNING 
To begin at the beginning in al Anbar, the war started slowly.  The invasion all 
but bypassed the province.  Army Rangers seized the hydroelectric dam over the 
Euphrates in Haditha, and Army Special Forces fanned out across the desert searching for 
SCUD missile launching sites, but there were no climatic battles or “thunder runs.”  The 
Sunni of al Anbar were, in a sense, never defeated prior to occupation, not in a way that 
they acknowledged or recognized. 
The Marines assumed responsibility for al Anbar in early 2004 after relieving 
elements of the 82nd Airborne Division and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.16  This 
transition incurred a bit of notoriety because the Marines publicly vaunted that they 
disapproved of the Army’s methods, which they considered too heavy-handed, and 
promised that they would attack the problem with a more measured approach.  The 
Marines never really had a chance, however.  Tensions that had been simmering for 
nearly a year warmed to a rolling boil in March after a mob killed four Blackwater 
security contractors in Fallujah, their bodies mutilated, burned, and hung from a bridge 
across the Euphrates.17   
The Blackwater incident was simply one of many indicators that Fallujah, and al 
Anbar, were slipping out of coalition control.  The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
chose to try to reassert its influence by ordering the Marines to assault Fallujah, resulting 
                                                 
16 A Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) commanded by a Lieutenant General serves as the deployed 
higher headquarters for Marine Corps forces in theater.  A Marine division (MARDIV) commanded by a 
Major General is the ground combat element for the MEF; it is further composed of regimental combat 
teams (RCT). The U.S. Marine Corps, represented by a Marine Expeditionary Force, is responsible for 
Multi-National Division-West in Iraq. 
17  Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 
2006), 331. 
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in Operation Vigilant Resolve, launched on April 5, 2004.18  The Marines effectively laid 
siege to the city until the CPA ordered a ceasefire at the behest of Sunni members of the 
governing council.  But American forces failed to capture the Blackwater killers and 
reestablish law and order; insurgents continued to control the city.  This battle turned into 
a physical and moral victory for the enemy and only added fuel to the fire of what was 
becoming a complex and amorphous insurgency. 
The Sunni tribesmen of al Anbar perceived that they had very little reason to 
support the coalition.  In addition to dishonor and indignity suffered because of coalition 
forces’ cultural ignorance and, at the time, insensitivity, the Sunnis’ world was turned upside 
down through the loss of income, status, and influence with the fall of Saddam’s regime.19  
Nevertheless, there were attempts early on by tribal leaders to reach out to the Americans.  
For instance, Sheikh Bizea al-Gaaoud of the Albu Nimr tribe offered a force of several 
hundred tribesmen to guard tribal areas if the U.S. would arm and support them.20  The CPA 
rebuffed Bizea; in its view, working with the tribes was antithetical to democratization and 
the development of Iraq.21  Additionally, towns such as Fallujah were regarded as Baathist 
bastions.  Ironically, the CPA’s decision helped ensure that al Anbar became a place of 
transit and refuge for foreign jihadists who entered Iraq from Syria and Jordan along 
traditional smuggling routes.  Geography and demographics thus destined al Anbar 
province to become the heart of the insurgency.  Yet, the coalition presence was reduced 
to an economy of force mission, leaving the Marines under-resourced and under-manned.   
                                                 
18 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco, 333.  According to Thomas Ricks’ account, both the MEF commander, 
Lt. Gen James Conway, and the MARDIV commander, Maj. Gen. James Mattis, advised against this 
course of action and instead recommended that the Marines be allowed to continue with their measured 
approach of pacification, confident that supporting operations would expose the perpetrators of the 
Blackwater killings for future targeting.  The order to assault the city likely originated from either the 
White House or the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
19 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p. 244. 
20 West credits Bizea with reaching out; a recent article by David Rose in Vanity Fair offers a very in-
depth account of similar outreach by Talal al-Gaaoud.  It is unclear whether the two authors are speaking of 
the same or separate incidents.  Talal was Bizea’s son and most likely the key broker in any attempted 
outreach to the coalition; Talal died of heart failure several years ago.  The author is well acquainted with 
the al-Gaaoud family, having met with Bizea several times (but not Talal); the Vanity Fair article is 
consistent with other overtures that Bizea made personally to the author and members of ODA 504.   
21 Bing West, The Strongest Tribe (New York: Random House, 2008), 24. 
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B. DESCENT INTO CHAOS 
One product of the ceasefire negotiations in Fallujah was an auxiliary unit formed 
from local inhabitants known as the Fallujah Brigade.  The Fallujah Brigade was 
ostensibly created to police the city as a sort of surrogate force for the Marines.  
However, according to Ali Allawi, former Iraqi Minister of Defense for the Governing 
Council, the Fallujah Brigade quickly, “began to act as the core of a national liberation 
army.”22 Fallujah thus remained a violent insurgent stronghold until November 2004.  At 
that point, General George Casey, having replaced General Ricardo Sanchez as the 
commander of forces in Iraq, decided that Fallujah would be one of the first insurgent 
safehavens he would reduce before Iraq’s parliamentary elections in 2005.23  Journalists 
and historians have described the Second Battle of Fallujah as the site of the fiercest 
fighting that the United States Marine Corps had faced since the Battle of Hue City in 
1968.24  In contrast to the First Battle of Fallujah, there was no ceasefire.  The Marines 
and U.S. Army surrounded the city and cleared it house-by-house, block-by-block. 
Meanwhile, the remainder of al Anbar continued its descent into chaos.  Killings 
and kidnappings of government officials, police, and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps/Iraqi 
National Guard members proliferated across the province.25  Local and regional 
government ceased to function, crippled by the violence.  The insurgency evolved into 
what John Robb calls “open-source warfare.”26  Groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), 
Ansar al-Sunna, the 1920th Revolutionary Brigade, Jaish Mohammad, and others tapped 




                                                 
22 Bing West, The Strongest Tribe, 279. 
23 Ricks, Fiasco, 398. 
24 The Free Library by Farlex, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Second+Battle+of+Fallujah--
urban+operations+in+a+new+kind+of+war.-a0145698933 (accessed August 9, 2009). 
25 The coalition formed local national guard type militias early on in the war.  These units were 
originally known as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps before the name was changed to Iraqi National Guard. 
26 John Robb, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (Hoboken, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2007), 116. 
 14
were working for, motivated instead by earning enough money to put food on the table.  
Al Anbar’s greater than 70 percent unemployment rate helped fuel the blossoming 
insurgency.27   
Al Anbar rates second only to Baghdad in the total number of Coalition casualties 
incurred over the course of the war, and is a very close second at that.28  This is 
significant given the much higher concentration of U.S. troops in Baghdad throughout the 
war.  As Bing West points out, “Although Anbar was the setting for almost half the 
fighting and dying in Iraq and the sanctuary of foreign fighters, the province in 2005 had 
20 percent of the coalition forces and 5 percent of the Iraqi Army.”29  Anbar was so 
dangerous that American Marines and Soldiers dubbed it, “The Wild West;” the only law 
and order to be had was through the barrel of a gun.  A Sunni tribesman from near Hit 
summed it up this way, “There is no governance west of Baghdad, and there is no god 
west of Ramadi.”30   
The Marines, admittedly lacking resources, did not have an effective 
counterinsurgency strategy.  Instead, they conducted large search and destroy and cordon 
and search operations to try to meet with and destroy the enemy.  The Marines would 
temporarily marshal forces in operations like New Market, Rivergate, Spear, and Matador 
in order to clear an area.  Afterwards, however, the insurgents would seep back in.  Bing 
West quotes Colonel Stephen Davis, commander of the 2nd Marine Regiment (RCT 2) 
and responsible for the Euphrates River Valley from Hit to al Qaim in 2005, as saying 
that the goal was to find insurgents, not seize territory.31   
The Marines also placed little emphasis on developing the fledgling Iraqi National 
Guard (ING) and Iraqi police (IP).  Both organizations were thoroughly infiltrated; 
                                                 
27 K. L.  Vantran, “Security Situation in Al Anbar Improving Says 82nd Airborne Commander,” Armed 
Forces Press Service,  http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=27761 (accessed August 14, 
2009). 
28 “Iraqi Coalition Casualty Count,” ICasualties.org, www.icasualties.org/Iraq/ProvinceMap.aspx 
(accessed August 14, 2009). 
29 West, The Strongest Tribe, 74. 
30 William, interview by author, Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, July 5, 2009. 
31 West, The Strongest Tribe, 98. 
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honest members were forced into silence and acquiescence through threats and 
intimidation.  In some places, their demise was quite violent.  Insurgents overran the IP 
station in Haditha in the fall of 2004.  Many IPs who surrendered were murdered on the 
town’s soccer field.32  The IPs thoroughly disintegrated throughout the province after 
succumbing to insurgent forces, and by 2005, there were only a few left in Ramadi.  The 
ING was also a failure and was disbanded in June 2005.  The only successful coalition 
effort to stand up an indigenous force in Anbar, prior to 2005, was a provisional unit of 
Albu Nimr tribesmen that Army Special Forces, working with the direct support of 
General James Mattis, created in 2004.  Unfortunately, after the transfer of authority to 
the interim Iraqi government in June 2004, funding was withdrawn for the unit and it was 
disbanded.  Unit members were given the option of joining the ING, but most refused. 
Ultimately, AQI’s fundamentalist religious views did not sit well with the people 
of Anbar, whose tribal mores long predated Islam.33  AQI had gotten by early on by 
reaching out to the tribes and convincing them that, as Sunnis, they had a mutual interest 
in opposing the Americans and the Shia.  This mutualism did not last, however.  The 
Sunni tribes, in light of the Second Battle of Fallujah and after having boycotted the 
January 2005 constitutional assembly elections, began to reconsider the political process, 
which promised more opportunity than simply fighting.34   
AQI’s violent campaign of intimidation leveraged against tribal leaders is often 
said to be the catalyst for the tribes’ later decision to align with coalition forces.  But this 
is not so; it was a consequence, not a catalyst.  AQI lashed out with a fearful campaign of 
                                                 
32 Michael R. Gordon, “Wary Iraqis are Recruited as Policemen,” The New York Times, July 24, 2006.   
The story was related to this author on multiple occasions during a tour in Anbar in 2005.  Gordon reports 
that the policemen were shot.  In every accounting that I heard of the incident it was said that at least some 
of the policemen were beheaded.  Although I did not personally interview anyone who had witnessed the 
incident first-hand, I heard the story in various places along the Euphrates River Valley between Ramadi 
and Haditha, and all accountings were essentially identical. 
33 Recent journal articles and books have provided several reasons why the tribes eventually came into 
conflict with AQI.  Some have said that  AQI demanded that the tribes provide women for marriage, others 
that AQI began taking over the tribe’s illicit activities such as smuggling, and still others that the tribes 
rejected AQI’s extreme interpretation of Islam.  These can all be considered ancillary to the fact that AQI 
began overturning the natural order of tribal authoritative structures and targeting tribal leadership once the 
tribes decided to rejoin the ongoing political process in Baghdad. 
34 Austin Long, “The Anbar Awakening.” Survival  50, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 77.  
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed August 14, 2009).  
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repression to try to force the tribes to re-align with it.  Fortunately, as time went on and 
AQI’s tactics became ever more violent and repressive toward the tribes, the coalition 
became more accommodating and inclusive.  This eventually led to the al Anbar 
Awakening.  However, much had to happen prior to this. 
The first rounds of open tribal warfare against AQI occurred in the al Qaim 
region.35  There, a small tribe called the Albu Mahal, fought with AQI at the end of 2004 
and into the spring of 2005.36  The Mahal, needing help, reached out to the larger and 
more influential Albu Nimr tribe.  Faisal al Gaaoud, a member of the Albu Nimr’s most 
prominent family, and a former governor of al Anbar, sought the Marines’ assistance.37  
Instead, RCT 2, led by Colonel Davis, launched a pre-planned offensive in May called 
Operation Matador that was directed against the string of towns along the Upper 
Euphrates that included al Qaim, near the Syrian border.  As John McCary recounts, 
“...indiscriminate U. S. forces came crashing down on al Qa’im near the Syrian border, 
killing and capturing insurgents, al Qaeda, and al-Gaoud’s [sic] tribesmen alike.”38  The 
Marines did not attempt to coordinate with the Mahal’s Hamza battalion and, inevitably, 
some Hamza forces were mistaken for AQI and other hostile tribal forces.39   
Ironically, the Combined-Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), the 
headquarters responsible for overseeing Special Forces and Navy SEAL elements in Iraq, 
and manned by 10th Special Forces Group at the time, had withdrawn its operational 
                                                 
35 The term “al Qaim region” is used to signify the string of towns and villages along the upper 
Euphrates near the Iraq-Syrian border that includes al Qaim, Husaybah, Karabilah, Rumana, Ubaydi, and 
others. 
36 The confrontation between the Mahal and AQI has most often been attributed simply to the AQI 
treading over the Mahal’s cross-border smuggling operations into Syria; the Mahal also resented the large 
influx of AQI into their area.  The Mahal had initially contested coalition forces for some of the same fears 
at the beginning of the war.   
37 Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” 78.  
38 John. A. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” The Washington Quarterly, 
32, no.1: 48.  Al-Gaaoud refers to Faisal al-Gaaoud, former governor of al Anbar in 2003 and 2004.  Faisal 
is of the Albu Nimr tribe and has been credited with reaching out to the coalition on behalf of the 
beleaguered Mahal in al Qa’im. 
39 The Mahal tribe’s armed contingent battling AQI was called the Hamza battalion. 
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detachments from Anbar in the fall of 2004.40  Detachments operating out of al Qaim and 
al Asad had had tribal connectivity with the Mahal and Nimr tribes previously.  These 
detachments would have known about the impending conflict between the tribes and 
AQI, and would have been positioned to exploit it.  Since Special Forces were no longer 
positioned in al Anbar, there was no one to coordinate between the Marines and the 
tribes, or to prevent “friendly fire” incidents.  
Matador was similar to previous operations: the Marines cleared the towns of 
Karabila, Rumana, and Ubaydi near al Qaim and then moved on.41  Afterwards, AQI and 
its tribal allies, chiefly the Kharbouli, overwhelmed the Mahal and forced them to retreat 
to the town of Akashat, roughly 100 kilometers southwest of al Qaim and deep in the 
desert.  Coalition forces were extremely slow to assist tribes like the Mahal, whose 
attitudes toward AQI were clearly changing.  For instance, tribal sheikhs in Ramadi 
approached the Marine Commander there, Colonel Dunford, and offered to provide local 
men to secure tribal areas within the city, hunt AQI, and stop improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) from being emplaced.  Dunford’s response to them was that the sheikhs 
could support the Iraqi government by having their men enlist in the new Iraqi Army.  
The sheikhs rejected this option because it did nothing to alleviate the violence plaguing 
their city.  It would have pulled men from the tribal areas and committed them to serving 
a national government in which the Sunnis had yet to develop a meaningful stake.42  
Furthermore, it made no sense to the Sunni sheikhs to give up their men when the tribes 
were living under the gun, fearful of violent AQI retribution. 
                                                 
40 Thomas Searle explains in an article entitled “Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: The Critical 
Role of Special Operations Forces” that the decision to reduce SOF presence in Anbar was due to concern 
over whether the tactical gains of working with the tribes were, at the time, worth the operational and 
strategic risks and thus the best application of scarce SOF resources.  It was also most likely a decision 
influenced by personal perceptions of the war by various commanders.  As an organization, 5th Special 
Forces Group felt it was a mistake to reduce the SOF presence in Anbar and increased the SOF presence 
there after resuming control of the CJSOTF in June, 2005.    
41 Kevin Flower, Enes Dulami and Kianne Sadeq, “Hunt for insurgents near Syria ends,” CNN.com 
(May 14, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/05/14/iraq.main/index.html (accessed August 
11, 2009).  
42  West, The Strongest Tribe, 97. 
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Other tribal sheikhs likewise tried to take a stand against AQI in late 2005 and 
early 2006.  The most noted was Sheikh Nasr al-Fahdawi.  Sheikh Nasr encouraged his 
tribe, the Albu Fahd, to begin distancing itself from AQI.  AQI retaliated by assassinating 
Nasr and other prominent tribal members.  A captured AQI document declared, 
“....cousins of Sheikh Nasr came to the Mujahidin begging, announcing their repentance 
and innocence, saying, we’re with you, we’ll do whatever you want.”43   
Clearly, then, opportunities existed in 2004, 2005, and early 2006 that coalition 
forces could have exploited, had commanders on the ground—with license from higher—
had the foresight to do so. 
C. TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT 
Tribal engagement has been defined as, “overt activities between coalition 
military and foreign civilian personnel for the purpose of obtaining information, 
influencing behavior, or building an indigenous base of support for coalition 
objectives.”44  Tribal engagement has since been credited with playing a prominent role 
in the reversal of fortunes in al Anbar.  However, tribal engagement was rejected early on 
as a viable methodology by the coalition.   
The coalition was reluctant to engage the tribes for several reasons.  The CPA, 
under Paul Bremer, deemed the tribes to be vestiges of the past, and working through 
them was considered contrary to the creation of a modern, democratic state.45  This 
attitude persisted.  The coalition failed to appreciate the timelessness and importance of 
tribal social structures in places like Anbar.  There were also myriad concerns that 
engaging the tribes could potentially empower them to resist the national government.  
These particular fears were being fanned at the same time tribal leaders were blamed for 
lacking the ability to sway their tribal constituents to quit the insurgency.  No one seemed  
 
 
                                                 
43 Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” 79–80. 
44 Michael Eisenstadt, “Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned,” Military Review, September–
October 2007, 16. 
45 McCary, “The Anbar Awakening,” 45. 
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to notice this discrepancy in logic.  The coalition’s decision making was also complicated 
by the fact that the Iraqi government was initially hostile to any attempts to arm the tribes 
against AQI.   
D. THE DESERT PROTECTORS: A FIRST GO AT SANCTIONED TRIBAL 
ENGAGEMENT 
By the fall of 2005 MNF-I authorized the CJSOTF and Marines to stand up an 
indigenous tribal force called the Desert Protectors.  Both commands realized that the 
decimation of the Mahal tribe at the hands of AQI and tribes aligned with AQI presented 
an opportunity, one that should have been exploited as early as Operation Matador in 
May 2005.  The Desert Protector initiative was the first unified effort at tribal 
engagement sanctioned and supported by both the Iraqi government and MNF-I.  As 
Thomas Searle writes, “The initial vision was that the Desert Protectors would bridge the 
gap between the government’s forces and tribal militias by creating a government-
sanctioned tribal force.”46   
The first iteration of Desert Protectors consisted of two cohorts, approximately 85 
tribesmen recruited out of the Albu Mahal in Akashat and the al Qaim region.47  
Recruitment of this force was a joint venture undertaken by an Army Special Forces 
Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA), Marines, and a team from the Iraqi Ministry of 
Defense.  The Desert Protectors received an initial 30-day basic training from Navy 
SEALs and members of the ODA at Camp Fallujah.  Other members of the ODA 
established a base of operations at the train station in al Qaim and prepared to train, 
advise, and assist the Desert Protectors full time upon their return from basic training. 
After the Desert Protectors returned to al Qaim, the ODA oversaw their 
integration in Operation Steel Curtain.  Steel Curtain was the last major operation of 
Colonel Davis’ Upper Euphrates campaign.  Steel Curtain was a singular success, less for 
the operation itself than for what came afterwards.  Lieutenant-Colonel Dale Alford, 
                                                 
46 Thomas R. Searle, “Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: The Critical Role of Special Operations 
Forces,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 50, 3rd Quarter, 2008.  Retrieved from 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i50/16.pdf  Accessed on August 12, 2009, 64–65. 
47 ODA member 1, interview by author, Clarksville, TN, July 8, 2009. 
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commander of 3-6 Marines, directly responsible for executing Steel Curtain, concluded 
the operation by collaborating with an Iraqi Army Battalion to establish combat outposts 
throughout the cleared areas.  In gaining and maintaining control this way, Lieutenant-
Colonel Alford was effectively utilizing the inkblot approach to pacify al Qaim.  The 
Desert Protectors were instrumental in identifying known insurgents, caches, and safe 
houses.  More importantly, the Desert Protectors served as a bridge to the Albu Mahal 
tribe, which, led by Sheikh Kurdi, joined with Lieutenant-Colonel Alford’s Marines in 
maintaining stability and security.  AQI suddenly had nowhere to hide.  Unfortunately, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Alford has never enjoyed the same level of public credit for his 
efforts as Colonel McMaster in Tal Afar or Colonel Sean MacFarland in Ramadi. 
E. AL ANBAR SPINS OUT OF CONTROL 
Although the Marines made progress in al Qaim, the rest of Anbar continued to 
spin out of control.  AQI controlled Haditha right under the noses of the Americans based 
at the Haditha Dam complex.  Insurgents instituted sharia law and publicly executed 
Iraqis accused of being American agents on the Haqlaniya Bridge.48  RCT 2 conducted 
several clearing operations such as Operation Quick Strike and Operation Rivergate, but 
these operations were temporary in nature and insurgents reemerged to retake control of 
Haditha at the conclusion of each operation.  Coalition forces maintained two firm bases 
and a combat outpost in Hit, but did not and could not control the town simply by 
mounting patrols out of those bases.  Hit was a battleground.  Ramadi was equally a no 
man’s land.  Insurgents, not coalition forces, controlled the city.  AQI cowed the tribes by 
executing a campaign of assassination and intimidation against tribal leaders.  In August 
2006, the I MEF G-2, intelligence section, released an official report essentially declaring 
that al Anbar was lost.  According to this report, “The social and political situation has  
 
                                                 
48 Omar Mahdi and Rory Carrol, “Under U.S. noses, brutal insurgents rule Sunni citadel,” The 
Guardian, (Monday, August 22, 2005), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/aug/22/iraq.rorycarroll1 
(accessed October 22, 2009).  
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deteriorated to a point that MNF [Multi-National Forces] and ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] 
are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar.”49 
But, in fact, all was not lost.  The war in al Anbar was already taking a different 
turn before the release of this report.  Conditions were being set in Ramadi and elsewhere 
that would facilitate the Awakening. 
F. THE AWAKENING 
The First Brigade Combat Team (BCT), First Armored Division (AD), led by 
Colonel Sean MacFarland, was attached to the Marine Expeditionary Force in June 2006 
and given responsibility for Ramadi.  When First BCT assumed control of the Ramadi 
battlespace in June, it found its predecessors operating like most Army and Marine forces 
at that time—from large bases where they dispatched routine patrols to drive through the 
battlespace.  First BCT’s predecessors did not even patrol some areas because it was 
deemed too dangerous.  Colonel MacFarland adopted an approach similar to that of 
Colonel McMaster’s Third Armored Calvary Regiment in Tal Afar and Lieutenant-
Colonel Paul Alford’s in al Qaim.  First BCT had initially deployed to Tal Afar before 
receiving a change of mission to move to Ramadi and work for the Marines.  McMaster’s 
accomplishments and methods served as a very fresh and very functional model for 
Colonel MacFarland.  Colonel MacFarland dispersed his forces throughout the 
battlespace, placing them in small outposts, and providing a 24-hour presence.  Colonel 
MacFarland made identifying and protecting tribal elites, and potential allies, a priority.  
This decision, and First BCT’s actions, signaled to tribal elites eager for an opportunity to 
rally against AQI that an opportunity to do so was opening. 
                                                 
49 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 331.  I absolutely agree with 
Colonel Devlin, the author of the report—however, from a different perspective.  I do not believe that 
American forces were ever capable of defeating the insurgency in al Anbar, only the Anbaris were capable 
of defeating the insurgency in Anbar.  This is a very particular and nuanced point which will become more 
dramatically evident further on in the thesis.  This point highlights a dichotomy in counterinsurgency 
theory.  There are those who believe that an insurgency can be defeated by outside forces, and there are 
those who believe that an insurgency can only be defeated by the host nation population.  In other words, 
the United States is only capable of winning a counterinsurgency fight on its own soil; anywhere else it can 
only help empower the host nation to do so. 
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AQI retaliated.  First BCT had to fight its way into many neighborhoods and fight 
to hang on through the construction phase of its outposts.  AQI also tried amping up its 
campaign of repression against the tribes to keep them in line.  In August, AQI 
assassinated Sheikh Ali Jassim, one of the first tribal leaders to publicly side with 
MacFarland.50  This story has become central to the popular narrative of how the 
Awakening was conceived.  After killing Sheikh Ali Jassim, AQI hid his body for four 
days, intentionally preventing his family from following Islamic traditions and burying 
him by nightfall the day he died.  Local tribal elites were enraged by AQI’s deliberate 
violation of such a sacrosanct tradition.  Sheikh Sittar Albu Risha convened a council of 
sheikhs.  The sheikhs called this the “Awakening Council,” and it marked the beginning 
of the Awakening movement that would eventually spread through al Anbar and beyond. 
Marine Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Hobbs, a staff officer with RCT 2 in 2005, 
best summarizes the common perception of why coalition forces failed in al Anbar prior 
to the Awakening.  With the notable exception of 3–6 Marines in al Qaim, “We tallied 
insurgents killed as victory . . . We targeted insurgent cells, versus separating the people 
from the insurgents.”51  If al Qaim was the harbinger of effective population-centric 
COIN, then Ramadi served as validation.  Coalition forces now had sufficient reason to 
question the old paradigm—enemy-centric COIN—and ask why things were the way 
they were before the Awakening.  The answer the popular narrative offers is that the 
coalition had not secured the population.  Ergo, population-centric COIN is credited with 
enabling the Awakening. 
G. ADAPTATION? 
The transformation of the war in al Anbar seemed to come together during the fall 
of 2006 and early 2007.  In 2006, all had been declared lost.  At the same time, al Anbar 
was the most dangerous province in Iraq.  But, by September 1, 2008, after experiencing 
a 90 percent decrease in insurgent attacks, the Marine Corps turned formal responsibility 
                                                 
50 Ricks, The Gamble, 66. 
51 West, The Strongest Tribe, 101. 
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for securing the province over to the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police.52  Unfortunately, the 
popular narrative, which appears in current accounts about the Surge and the Awakening, 
oversimplifies events.  Most accounts trace the fundamental changes in al Anbar to 
Colonel Sean MacFarland’s embrace of Sheikh Sittar, his application of the clear, hold, 
build approach in Ramadi, and a supposed cascading effect that events in Ramadi had on 
the remainder of the province.  Linda Robinson exemplifies this notion in her book, Tell 
Me How This Ends: “The sheikhs felt disrespected and the population was treated like the 
enemy for three years, until a joint army-marine force finally turned the province by 
adopting an entirely different approach.”53 
It is true that coalition forces adapted, making significant organizational changes 
in choosing to embrace the tribes and the al Anbar Awakening, and by shifting from large 
clearing operations to a population-centric, inkblot approach.  Interestingly, the premise 
of Nagl’s book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Malaya and Vietnam, is that only learning organizations can adapt to the exigencies of 
counterinsurgency warfare.  Similarly, in a recent interview, David Kilcullen stated that 
the United States took the historically standard period of time—three to four years—to 
reorient itself to the war in Iraq.  This is in comparison to the British in Malaya and the 
U.S. in Vietnam who, Kilcullen said, also took three to four years.54  Kilcullen’s 
comment underscores Nagl’s suggestion that adaption occurs as a natural process of 
acclimation to the vagaries of counterinsurgency.  However, it does not take into account 
other potential explanations. 
The first, in the case of the United States Army and Marine Corps in Anbar, is 
that units were not able to adapt because leaders were still too affected by the risk-averse, 
zero-defect military culture that defined the U.S. military in the 1980s and 90s.  Only 
when confronted by the realities of prolonged conflict did our military leaders in the field 
                                                 
52 Dexter Filkins, “U.S. Hands Off Pacified Anbar, Once Heart of Iraq Insurgency,” New York Times, 
Sep 2, 2008.  A.1.  
53 Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of 
Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 272. 
54 Carlos Lozada, “A Conversation with David Kilcullen, “ The Washington Post, March 22, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2009/03/19/AR2009031903038.html (accessed 
September 16, 2009).  
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decide, perhaps, that staying alive, keeping their men alive, and winning, were worth 
more than promotion or other career enhancing moves associated with maintaining the 
cultural status quo.  The specter of certain loss doubtless helped boil away some of the 
previous risk aversion.  It thus seems more probable that adaption occurred as a result of 
both factors: a change in military attitude and desperateness at the U.S. position in Iraq in 
2006.   
But these explanations are only relevant when trying to understand the length of 
time it took the Army and Marines to adapt to the counterinsurgency fight in al Anbar.  
Looking deeper we see individuals like Lieutenant-Colonel Alford, or members of the 
Special Forces detachments who adapted far sooner than the larger organization, or even 
than their peers.  It could be that these individuals possessed such a different kind of 
mind, talent, or significantly astute feel for the culture and environment that they did not 
need to “evolve.”  Maybe they were able to analyze the specifics of their particular 
situations and figure out what to do without guidance from “higher;” maybe they require 
doctrine and TTPs.  However, conventional historical narratives ignore these 
possibilities.  There are hints that individuals mattered, but the natural tendency is to try 
to generalize events into replicable TTPs and regard the impact of individuals as a 
consequence of their utilizing proper TTPs or possessing the ‘right’ leadership attributes.  
Typically, no attempt is made to try to discern what impact key individuals—key 
individuals—had on success.  It could very well be that without having the right people 
with the right frames of mind and abilities in the right places at the right times, the 




IV. WILLIAM’S WAR55 
A. WILLIAM 
William’s story reflects a brutal commonsense approach to “presentation of self” 
characteristic of people from certain parts of Appalachia, especially West Virginia, where 
he was born and raised.  Well versed in American history, William has perfected the art 
of selling himself as “just a dumb hillbilly,” to borrow his words, though he is anything 
but.  When William returned to Iraq in January 2004 for Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF 
II), he was beginning his fourteenth consecutive year in the 5th Special Forces Group and 
had already chalked up four previous combat deployments in the first Gulf War, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  All told, William had accumulated over 
seven years’ time on the ground in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Africa over 
numerous deployments.  He also speaks Arabic.  Much of how William approached the 
war in al Anbar will now appear axiomatic in light of what has been written about the 
Awakening and the coalition’s subsequent embrace of tribal engagement, but it must be 
remembered, in 2004 such an approach was still novel. 
William’s first mission in 2004 was not counterinsurgency.  It was to identify and 
exploit opportunities to split al Qaeda elements from nationalist strands of the insurgency 
or, as it was called, the resistance.  The 5th Special Forces Group headquarters had 
theorized that this was possible in Sunni-dominated al Anbar early on.  The idea was that 
exposing and encouraging such a rift would reveal reconcilable elements of the 
insurgency that could be used to unmask and target irreconcilables.  Second Battalion, 
Fifth Special Forces Group tasked William and his detachment, ODA 505, to confirm this 
hypothesis and to look for opportunities to exploit.  William described this mission 
simply as “looking for guys to gun up against AQI.”  
What is important to note is the vagueness of ODA 505’s initial mission.  The 
command acknowledged that it did not have a complete enough picture of the situation in 
                                                 
55 This chapter is a narrative drawn from the author’s own experiences and interviews with William, a 
Special Forces Master Sergeant.  The quotes contained in this chapter are William’s unless specifically 
cited as otherwise.  Interview conducted by author at Ft. Campbell, KY, July 5, 2009. 
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Anbar to further refine a mission statement for ODA 505.  William, in turn, understood 
that he was going to have to be patient and take time to orient the team to the local 
situation before determining a more explicit course of action.  This sequence ultimately 
led William to craft a concept of operations, or a plan, that was specifically contoured to 
the conditions on the ground. 
B. OIF II 
ODA 505 operated from al Asad Airbase during the OIF II rotation.  Al Asad was 
centrally located in the ODA’s area of operations (AO), which extended along the ERV 
for approximately 150 miles from Rawah, southeast to the Highway 10/12 split near 
Mohammedi, and included vast swathes of desert on either side of the river corridor.  
Third Armored Cavalry Regiment (Third ACR) was initially responsible for the 
battlespace that encompassed 505’s AO when the team arrived in January 2004, but Third 
ACR was replaced by RCT 7 in February. 
 
 
Figure 1.   ODA 505’s Area of Operations, 2004 
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1. First Contact 
Police forces and city councils were the institutions that American commanders in 
Anbar first worked through in order to influence local populations.  This was an 
automatic response for coalition forces told to build and support local governance by the 
CPA.  American commanders also likely defaulted toward these institutions because they 
seemed familiar.  Few American units vetted the local police and city councils in the 
aftermath of the invasion; police and council members were assumed to be legitimate.  It 
was as if Americans assumed that armed men wearing blue shirts were police just 
because they were armed men wearing blue shirts. 
William and ODA 505, on the other hand, took a different approach.  William’s 
thoughts were: 
We [the coalition] just completely changed out a whole government!  
Who’s to say who’s a good cop, or who’s a bad cop?  We did not know 
what or who was considered legitimate by the people in Anbar at that 
point, although we made an assumption that the tribes were still a 
legitimate source of power that held influence.  Saddam, after all, had had 
to manage the tribes, not police forces and city councils.  
William knew, based on experience in the Middle East and a basic understanding of 
tribalism in Anbar, that legitimacy emanated from power and prestige, not titles and 
uniforms, and his assessment of the situation indicated that the intersection of power and 
prestige lay with the tribes.56   
William decided that if he was going to make any real progress toward his 
mission, then it would have to be along tribal lines.  He learned in Somalia and 
Afghanistan that tribes could be very powerful mobilization structures and very necessary 
ones when it came to forming a consolidated indigenous front against AQI.  William also 
assumed that he would be competing with AQI and other insurgent groups for the support 
of the tribes and their intrinsic mobilizing structures.  Reflecting on this, William and 
ODA 505 formulated a basic plan for tribal engagement that could be refined as more 
                                                 
56 Power being defined as the ability to compel people to follow, and prestige as the ability to impel 
people to follow.   
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information became available.  The plan was simple: identify the most powerful tribe in 
the AO and co-opt it.  How exactly cooption would be executed would depend on what 
the ODA could learn, how relationships developed, and what the situation permitted or 
suggested. 
ODA 505 soon learned that a significant population of Albu Nimr, one of the 
largest tribes of the Dulami Tribal Confederation that dominates al Anbar, resided in its 
AO.  William also discovered that one of the informants that ODA 505 inherited from the 
previous ODA was from the Albu Nimr tribe.  William nicknamed this informant Nubs, 
and Nubs became William’s entry point into the Nimr.  Nubs was from the poor Shamal 
clan.  Nubs was, by profession, a fisherman, but he supplemented his income during 
Saddam’s reign through smuggling.  According to Nubs, and others who knew him, he 
had survived numerous regime attempts to arrest or kill him.  One story held that Nubs 
had mailed the hand of a would be assassin back to the authorities.  True or not, Nubs 
was exactly the type of individual William wanted to “gun up.”  Nubs was competent, 
wily, and resourceful.   
William, working with the direct support of the CJSOTF and General Mattis, used 
Nubs as a starting point to create a provisional company of Shamal-Albu Nimr tribesmen 
from the town of Tal Aswad in the al Phurat area, Hit district.57  This Nimr unit 
successfully conducted operations for the Marines in Rawah and other places.  Most 
significantly, the provisional Nimr company ensured that Route Uranium was cleared of 
IEDs, allowing Marine reinforcements to flow from al Asad to Fallujah in support of 
Operation Vigilant Resolve (the First Battle of Fallujah) unimpeded.     
 
                                                 
57 General Mattis was the 1st Marine Division Commander, and responsible for operations in Anbar 
under the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force commanded by Lieutenant General Conway.  William’s company 
headquarters, the AOB worked closely with General Mattis and his staff.  Iraqis have local names for small 
geographic areas that often encompass several towns or villages.  Al Phurat was one such area.  It consisted 
of the villages of Jubayl, Zuwayyah, Tal Aswad, and the areas between. 
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Figure 2.   Hit District and Al Phurat 
William solidified his rapport with the Nimr provisionals by conducting small 
civil affairs projects in Tal Aswad.  These projects were never about winning hearts and 
minds.  They were instead designed to reciprocate trust, respect, and commitment in a 
positive reinforcement of tit-for-tat.  William shaped events to orchestrate a meaningful 
first contact with Nimr tribal elders so that they would approach him on his terms, but in 
accordance with their customs and traditions.  In doing so, he deliberately adopted an 
indirect approach designed to gain the confidence of Albu Nimr tribal leaders. He 
calculated that the ODA’s infusion of money and power into the Tal Aswad community 
would attract the attention of influential sheikhs since Tal Aswad was a poor Shamal 
community consisting of farmers and fishermen.  William understood that patronage was 
a significant aspect of how sheikhs maintained power and influence over their tribal 
constituents.  The sheikhs could not allow the residents of Tal Aswad to prosper 
independently of their patronage system because this would undermine them.  Sheikh 
Reshad, the paramount sheikh of the Albu Nimr, called William by telephone and asked 
for an introductory meeting.  William invited Sheikh Reshad to meet him at al Asad 
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Airbase, and Sheikh Reshad accepted.  Not only did William succeed in maneuvering 
Sheikh Reshad into making the initial approach—meeting on William’s terms—but also 
on William’s ground.  William thus began their relationship from a position of 
dominance.   
ODA 505 traveled extensively throughout its AO in the opening days of its 
rotation and had local informants in almost all of the major populated areas.  Nonetheless, 
the Nimr opening presented the most viable opportunity for sustained exploitation.  
William did not hesitate.  He knew he could accomplish more by focusing his efforts on 
the Nimr piece, and designated tribal engagement with the Nimr as ODA 505’s main 
effort.58   
2. A Conventional Foil 
The following is an attempt to condense William’s description of what his ODA 
did.  William’s approach may seem strikingly commonsensical, almost as if he did not 
think it through.  Yet, William continuously assessed and reassessed the ODA’s plan and, 
again, did so well in advance of the Awakening and the development of the Sons of Iraq. 
Listen, we didn’t start out to conduct counterinsurgency.  We [ODA 505] 
started out trying to find a way to get good guys to kill bad guys.  That 
meant that we could not waste our time looking for bad guys, we needed 
to find the good guys first.  Find the good guys, help them secure their 
lives and prosper, and they will find the bad guys for you because they 
want to protect what they have. 
There are different ways to go about this.  We did it by organizing a 
provisional unit based on tribal and geographic cohesion.  That way, once 
guys committed to the unit, they had a stake in protecting each other and 
their town.  We also didn’t assume that we had the right guys.  We 
constantly looked for indicators that either confirmed or denied that what 
we were doing was working.  Threats and attacks against the Nimr were a 
very good sign that we were being successful.  The key event occurred in 
May 2004, when someone threw a bomb over the wall into Sheikh 
Reshad’s compound.  That not only was an indicator that our efforts were 
a threat to AQI, it also pushed Sheikh Reshad further in line with the 
coalition. 
                                                 
58 Michael Eisenstadt, “Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons,” 16.  Tribal engagement: “. . .overt 
interactions between coalition military and foreign civilian personnel for the purpose of obtaining 
information, influencing behavior, or building an indigenous base of support for coalition objectives.” 
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We also listened to the Nimr’s concerns.  Their primary concern was 
safeguarding their families and property.  They wanted to do it 
themselves.  In that respect, it was no different from colonial militias in 
our country before the Revolutionary war. They were not interested in 
serving in any other area in Anbar, or chasing bad guys if it meant leaving 
their homes unguarded.  We reached a compromise with them where one 
third of the provisional company would conduct offensive operations for 
me as long as we left the other two-thirds to guard the home front.  Our 
wasta went up by finding a way to work within their concerns.59  In 
counterinsurgency, you have to give in to the reasonable demands of the 
population, if you can, if you want to get their support.  
The Marines, on the other hand, didn’t take this approach.  The Marines 
were technically correct in their approach, but intuitively wrong.  The first 
thing is that they [Marines] never worked with the right people while I 
was there.  I will use Hit district as an example.  2–7 Marines focused their 
engagement efforts on the city council and police who were controlled, 
influenced, and/or manipulated by the insurgents.  There were plenty of 
indicators.  One was that the police would call the Marines up, within 30 
minutes usually, after a mortar attack on Camp Hit, where 2–7 was based, 
and say they knew who was responsible.  But the police never, ever caught 
who was responsible.  How’s that?  The police were just providing throw-
away names to appease the Marines. 
The city council members were also not the right people to be dealing 
with.  They were under insurgent control and were not the most powerful 
entity in the district to begin with.  The Nimr were.  I remember some 
representatives from 2–7 Marines telling me about a Hit city council 
meeting they attended.  This meeting occurred two days after Sheikh 
Reshad’s family compound in Zuwayyah was bombed.  The Marines said 
that Sheikh Reshad strode in like he owned the place and told them [the 
council] that if any Nimr were hurt, he would level the city.  The Marines 
said that some of those council members shook in their boots.  This event 
told me two things.  One, Sheikh Reshad knew that the council had 
extremist or AQI ties.  They were someone’s puppets through whom he 
was sending a message.  If not, he wouldn’t have chosen to direct his 
threat towards them.  Second, being told of the visceral reaction of many 
of the council members, I knew they feared organized tribal retaliation by 
the Nimr.  These two observations proved to me that I had chosen to back 
the right player.  That being said, 2–7 Marines continued trying to work 
through the police and city council.60 
                                                 
59 Wasta—an Arabic word whose meaning is an amalgamation of the terms: influence, clout, and 
prestige. 
60 William and members of ODA 505 spoke with Sheikh Reshad’s nephew who was in attendance at 
the city council meeting.  His version of events matched the story related to William by the Marines. 
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The Irregular Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) were also a mess.  The reason 
was, again, they were not the right people, and they were not properly 
employed.  The name Irregular Civil Defense Corps, or even the later 
name, Iraqi National Guard, suggests a local militia, which it was not.  
The ICDC recruits were not vetted through the tribes.  Neither were the 
police or the city council.  The tribal structures were the only ones 
available that could do three things we needed: 1) vet recruits, 2) provide 
leverage to keep recruits in line, and 3) provide community leaders who 
could be held accountable for the actions of the recruits.  The other major 
factor in the ICDC’s failure was that ICDC units were not employed in 
safeguarding their own tribal and community areas. 
For example, ICDC recruits from Hit were used in Haditha.  This action 
also had a number of negative consequences.  ICDC members had no 
incentive to safeguard someone else’s hometown.  Employing the ICDC 
outside of their communities also negated the tribe as a mechanism for 
maintaining accountability.  It was thought that employing ICDC 
elsewhere would limit corruption and graft.  The truth was this action 
encouraged extortion and pilfering.  We removed the Iraqis’ own system 
of social accountability by employing tribesmen in tribal areas other than 
their own.  There was also another fundamental flaw in employing 
Anbaris, who are tribesmen, in other tribesmen’s areas.  The local 
populace does not consider them legitimate.  Think of the Texas Rangers.  
They were Texans, working in Texas.  The Rangers didn’t hire men from 
Oklahoma, and they didn’t try to enforce the law outside of Texas.  What 
is so hard to understand? 
It’s funny, the Marines said that the ICDC were disbanded because they 
failed to meet expectations.  Everyone blames the Iraqis.  No one pays 
attention to the fact that the Marines were responsible for running the 
program, training and advising the ICDC.  The Marines failed because 
they made mistakes in how they recruited and employed the ICDC. 
3. Figuring It Out 
William spent an extraordinary amount of time just trying to understand exactly 
how AQI and other extremist elements were functioning within ODA 505’s AO; he 
complained that almost every intelligence officer (S2) he met with or heard brief only 
described the enemy’s actions.61  An S2, for example, might brief that the enemy was  
 
 
                                                 
61 S2— intelligence officer and corresponding intelligence section of a commander’s staff. 
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planting IEDs in a particular area or that the enemy was using violence and coercion to 
influence the population, but never include assumptions as to why that might be or for 
what purpose it was being done. 
No S2, that William remembers, ever presented a concept of what AQ or the 
insurgents’ goals were, how they were trying to achieve those goals, and what resources 
they needed to achieve them.  This conversely meant that conventional operations were 
mis-focused and, sometimes, operations simply had nothing to do with the enemy 
situation at all.  William likened it to boxing.  A boxer has to know what his opponent is 
doing before he can counter it.  A good boxer does not keep trying to block the jab while 
right crosses are pounding him.  
William summarized this very pointedly by recounting a briefing he sat in on with 
2–7 Marines: 
I sat in on one brief in which the S2 said that the enemy was using 
violence and coercion to influence the population.  The S3 [operations 
officer] then got up and explained how the unit was going to conduct a 
patrol in order to hand out soccer balls and demonstrate a presence.  What 
part of the S2’s brief did he miss?  How is handing out soccer balls going 
to defeat coercion?  It can’t.  At no time did anyone provide an explicit 
plan for how to defeat the enemy.   
William very consciously avoided conducting operations simply for the sake of 
conducting operations.  William avoided the operations-intelligence trap that many 
operational detachments and units fall into, when units conduct direct action operations to 
capture or kill insurgents.  In theory, these operations are said to produce more 
intelligence that leads to more operations, and so on, in a perpetual cycle.  But this cycle 
can become a trap if not coordinated to support a greater end-state.  Instead of focusing 
on individuals, William instead concentrated on trying to define what it was that AQI was 
trying to achieve in ODA 505’s AO, and how it was trying to achieve it.  William, armed 
with that knowledge, then sought to counter AQI’s efforts. 
William and ODA 505’s assistant operations sergeant developed a model, 
depicted in Figure 1, to explain how AQI and other anti-coalition groups were operating 
in Anbar.  They developed this model drawing on facts accumulated from observation, 
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reporting, confidential informants, and information obtained from locals.  The model 
illustrates some key points.  First, AQI attempted to dominate or co-opt the tribes; and 
second, these groups made use of civic leaders and civic institutions to support their 
operations and to misdirect coalition forces.   
 
Figure 3.   Counterinsurgency Model and Enemy Course of Action Template for Special 
Operations Area West-Juliet (January–July 2004) 
This model illustrates how AQI and others used IPs in a counterintelligence role 
to impede coalition progress.  An IP force consists of three types of individuals: active 
insurgents or supporters, passive supporters who simply ignore insurgent activity, and 
honest policemen.  The active insurgent component of the police force collects valuable 
intelligence by observing and coordinating with coalition forces.  The active insurgent 
component conducts counterintelligence by providing disinformation to the coalition, to 
the population, and to honest cops with the aim of subverting coalition stabilization 
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efforts.  The active insurgent component also makes use of unwitting, honest policemen 
by using them to misdirect police efforts in support of insurgent activity.   
In short, William’s model depicts an insurgent framework designed to control the 
coalition’s use of its preferred connective nodes, chiefly the police and city councils, with 
the intent of destroying coalition efforts to gain the local population’s support and trust.  
The insurgents thus completely controlled the tempo of the fight in Anbar, and effectively 
parried coalition efforts to contain it.  The insurgency, as amorphous as it was, had few 
difficulties shaping coalition perceptions and affecting coalition forces’ reactions to 
events.62   
However, by refusing to work with the IPs or Hit city council, and by conducting 
tribal engagement, William disrupted AQI’s ability to control the tempo of the 
counterinsurgency fight in al Phurat and Hit district.  Even though William started small, 
with just one Nimr tribesman from Tal Aswad, his influence grew throughout the Nimr 
population of al Phurat.  William developed excellent relations with Sheikhs Reshad, 
Bizea, Faisal (governor of Anbar), and others, while simultaneously developing a loyal 
following among the many members of the general Nimr population.  In fact, William 
was competitively challenging AQI and other jihadists and salafists for dominance of the 
Phurat area. 
4. Dirty Tricks 
William additionally conducted other deliberate operations in support of his main 
effort with the Nimr and to disrupt AQI.  He created events, either to shape the 
battlefield, or just to see what would happen in order to test assumptions and improve his 
understanding of how the enemy was operating and influencing the locals. 
William did not consider Hit or other surrounding areas ripe for fruitful tribal 
engagement during his OIF II tour, but he also did not ignore them.  ODA 505 still had to 
react to intelligence leads on known insurgents and requests from “higher,” but William 
always tried to ensure that he conducted operations in ways that helped shape the 
                                                 
62 Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Washington D. C.: 
Smithsonian Institution, 2001), 147. 
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battlefield toward facilitating accomplishment of his overall mission.  He cleverly 
developed and executed concepts to impact insurgent decision cycles and their 
perceptions.  William largely did this by mirroring the insurgents’ tactics.   
ODA 505 conducted some operations in ways that masked its identity as the 
sponsor.  These operations presented an image to local insurgents that there were other, 
unknown Iraqis living around them in their communities who supported coalition 
objectives.  These operations, combined with overt operational displays by the Nimr 
provisional company, enhanced insurgents’ fears about the threat of coalition and tribal 
cooperation.  ODA 505 also choreographed dissemination of disinformation through 
informants to amplify the perception that Iraqis were rejecting AQI and the resistance.   
These operations effectively created doubt and uncertainty within the ranks of the 
insurgents.  In one incident, a man turned his son over to the ODA.  The son had been the 
target of a recent raid that failed to capture him.  In another incident, the ODA observed 
two groups of Iraqis engage in a frenetic firefight with one another after the ODA had 
departed its target.  ODA 505 received information from informants about other intra-
Iraqi violence as well.  Some of the violence was between competing insurgent factions, 
and some resulted from local Iraqis defending themselves against AQI.  In this way, 
ODA 505 introduced something far more dangerous and threatening to the insurgents 
than coalition forces; it created the idea that there were local Iraqis, who the insurgents 
didn’t know and couldn’t identify or control, targeting AQI and elements of the local 
resistance. 
Sadly, despite ODA 505’s best efforts, its OIF II tour did not end as expected.  
After the Transfer of Authority on June 30, 2004, ODA 505 no longer had the authority 
to continue to pay the Nimr provisional company.  The only option left was to absorb the 
provisional company into the 503rd ICDC Battalion at Camp Hit.  William knew the 
provisional unit members would reject this overture because the 503rd was corrupt; it had 
also been penetrated.  The Nimr were aware that they would be forfeiting their tribal 
security net if integrated into heterogeneous platoons as a Nimr minority.  ODA 505 
protested the disbanding of the provisional unit, but to no avail.   
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William and his men had cultivated a close enough relationship with the Nimr 
that they were beyond Nimr reproach, but the disbandment of the provisionals 
unquestionably affected the Nimr’s view of the coalition and the Shia-dominated Interim 
Iraqi Government.  It cost the coalition loss of rapport with a pro-coalition tribal 
community.  Worse, the withdrawal of Special Forces from Anbar in the fall of 2004 
cemented a sense of abandonment among the Tal Aswad Nimr. 
C. THE INTERIM: PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
While William’s original mission had been to exploit fissures in the insurgency in 
order to encourage Iraqis to reject AQI, William had, in effect, conducted 
counterinsurgency.  William himself acknowledges that he did not mentally make the 
paradigmatic shift to counterinsurgency until after the end of his OIF II tour.  But all this 
really means is that he did not step back to consider his approach analytically, so as to 
give it a label.  It was only when he realized the magnitude of the loss of the Nimr 
provisional unit that William began reassessing the events of his OIF II tour in a broader 
context.   
Once home, William’s battalion commander asked him to activate and train a new 
ODA.  In doing so, William resolved to prepare his new ODA for a counterinsurgency 
role in Anbar.  William sincerely believed the key to defeating AQI and managing the 
national resistance lay in al Anbar, despite its relegation to an economy of force effort.  
He desperately wanted to return to al Anbar.  In the interim, he formulated a plan based 
on his experiences, observations, and analysis, which he shared with me. 
I met William in August 2004 when our battalion commander told me that we 
would be teaming up with to activate ODA 504.  William and I had many long 
discussions as he recounted his experiences in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and 
described how he was drawing from all of them to develop a tribal engagement-based 
counterinsurgency strategy should 504 go back to Anbar.  William explained his strategy, 
beginning with three simple models.  
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1. Model I 
The first model William described is an extension of William’s counterinsurgency 
model.  William borrowed the framework for this model directly from U.S. Army 
doctrine.  The Army utilizes the term Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) to refer to the 
physical means by which a force executes its concept of operations.  The Army classifies 
these physical means into seven operating systems: intelligence, maneuver, fire support, 
air defense, mobility/countermobility/survivability, combat service support (CSS), and 
command and control.63  The U.S. Army utilizes its own operating systems to target the 
enemy’s.  William simply applied the BOS overlay to insurgent forces to identify what 
constituted their systems, and what was thus targetable.   
Figure 2 depicts what William determined to be AQI’s operating systems in 
Anbar, and what he deemed targetable.  The figure shows that William regarded AQI’s 
combat service support as the only viable BOS worthy of targeting that could decisively 
lead to AQI’s defeat in Anbar.  The term “combat service support” refers to all of the 
essential activities necessary to sustain AQI and the insurgency.64  In Iraq, CSS came 
from the population either freely or through coercion and intimidation. Classic 
counterinsurgency theory maintains that isolating insurgents from the population is 
necessary to defeat the insurgency. 
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Figure 4.   AQI Battlefield Operating Systems in Iraq 
William reasoned the same thing, but from an enemy-centric perspective for how to 
defeat the enemy.  The remaining six systems were not untargetable, but targeting them 
would be insufficient and would not inflict lasting damage to AQI or the insurgency.   
2. Model II 
William used his second model when explaining to others how to target the 
population.  William always says that this model is not based on his observations, but he 
borrowed from something a State Department staffer told him years earlier.  William’s 
own experiences throughout the Middle East, however, confirmed the validity of the 
staffer’s observations.  This model captures how people identify themselves within the 
Arab psyche.  According to this model, Arab identity begins with the immediate family 
and then proceeds along the following trajectory: Family, Clan, Tribe, Muslims like me, 
Muslims not like me, national identity. 
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Figure 5.   Trajectory of Arab Identification 
William used this model to explain to others that the most effective way to non-
kinetically target Anbaris was through tribal engagement.  Anbaris’ identity begins with 
the family and tribe.  That is why Anbaris often attach an adjectival form of their tribal 
name to their given name.  By doing so, they are informing others about their familial 
lineage and tribe.  From William’s point of view, because family and tribe were so 
central to Anbaris’ identity, tribal engagement would continue to be the most viable 
means by which to influence local populations in Anbar. 
3. Model III 
William gained valuable insights from his time in Somalia and Afghanistan.  
From these experiences, William determined that there are three conditions AQ needs if it 
is to succeed in establishing an Islamic state.  These conditions are: 
 1.  A predominantly Muslim population 
 2.  Social chaos (breakdown of normal societal structures) 
 3.  Economic failure or near failure 
When these conditions persist, they create a climate in which the populace becomes so 
worn down that it will accept whatever form of government prevails, even if this is 
Taliban-like Islamic government, so long as it brings some form of stability.  Because it 
is also crucial that traditional societal structures be broken down to the point that their 
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influence becomes subordinate to that of AQI and religious authorities, these conditions 
can really only be created by war or through some other catastrophic event.   
William used this model to explain the importance of not allowing Iraq to devolve 
into civil war and to demonstrate the importance of reinforcing existing social structures.  
Reinforcing existing social structures was also necessary to prevent AQI from 
undermining them for its own purposes.  Otherwise, AQI could hijack social structures to 
serve as mobilizing structures to support its goals, while undermining or destroying 
structures it couldn’t hijack.  William determined that AQI was doing both.  For example, 
AQI used Kharbouli tribal structures to mobilize in al Qaim, but in Ramadi AQI 
assassinated senior sheikhs of the Albu Fahd in order to undermine tribal leaders and 
make the tribe more pliant.  
If coalition forces could out-compete AQI to obtain the support of tribal 
structures, then that would force AQI to have to rely on violent coercion and repression to 
force tribal acquiescence.  According to William, “You want AQ to become like a cancer 
and start attacking the body [the population, its own base of support, or CSS].”  For 
William, AQI-inspired violence against the tribes implied three things.  First, it was an 
indicator that coalition and government forces’ actions were threatening AQI.  Second, it 
signaled an opportunity to align tribal needs with coalition goals if those tribes could be 
helped to secure themselves.  And third, it indicated that the population’s goals were 
divergent from AQI’s. 
4. The Model City Approach 
William took his ideas and synthesized them into what he termed the “model city” 
approach.  This is a form of the famous inkblot or oil-slick approach to 
counterinsurgency, the basic premise of which is to gain access to a village or town by 
creating jobs and security through the establishment of a local security force and using 
selective humanitarian or civil affairs projects to improve residents’ quality of life.  Once 
a successful initiative is underway to secure and stabilize local life from within, the 
locality then serves as a model for surrounding tribal populations.  The surrounding 
populations can, in turn, improve their own security and economic prospects by 
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mimicking the model city and joining broader stabilization efforts.  Any tribal leader who 
refuses to cooperate is denied economic and security benefits until he or his constituents 
choose to align themselves with the coalition and the host nation government on the side 
of stability.65 
With this approach, it becomes possible to empower local leaders and enhance 
their credibility in the eyes of the local community.  This creates leverage over local 
leaders as their expanding status becomes ever more tied to support of coalition 
objectives.  In order to facilitate long-term sustainment of their objectives, coalition 
forces must gradually tie support for local leaders back to the local, regional, and/or 
national government.  However, sometimes, local leaders can be indirectly pressured into 
aligning themselves with pro-government forces.   
William cites the western tribes as an example.  Tribal leaders do not possess 
sovereign powers.  They are largely “big men,” relying on prestige to influence their 
constituents.66  William describes it in this way: 
Picture a sheikh as if he is sitting atop of a pyramid.  If the base of the 
pyramid moves, and the sheikh wants to remain on top, then he has to 
move with it.  This is a natural democratic aspect of the tribes that not all 
people understand.  
This is why William spent a great deal of time developing relationships and influence 
among the general Nimr population.  It was his way of using them to manipulate the 
sheikhs. 
A benefit of William’s model city approach is that it requires very few resources.  
In fact, gross over-spending on civil affairs projects or any entitlement-like contributions 
immediately undermine the entire effort.  The key is to start small, spending little by 
under-promising on simple projects and over-performing in their completion.  William’s 
model city approach can also succeed with limited application of manpower if the 
situation isn’t too far gone.  If the environment is as violent as al Qaim was in 2005, then 
                                                 
65 Searle, “Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province,” 64. 
66 “Big Men” is a term borrowed from anthropology to describe leaders who rely on prestige rather 
than power to lead. 
 43
external forces are needed to create and maintain stability until the local population is 
capable of doing this themselves.  In areas where the violence is somewhat less, however, 
then even as small an element as an ODA can create security from within, working with 
the local inhabitants.  Tal Aswad represents a prime example.  
D. OIF III 
I returned to Iraq in June 2005 for my OIF III rotation.  I had deployed with 2nd 
Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group previously during OIF II, but this was my inaugural 
trip as a team leader.  William and I were at the helm of ODA 504 and eager to get to 
Anbar.  We had to spend two months in Baghdad, though, waiting for the CJSOTF, 
composed of a 5th Group headquarters, to coordinate with MNC-I and II MEF to re-
introduce Special Forces into Anbar.   
One of the noteworthy things about William was the absolute faith that everyone 
up and down the chain of command had in him to go to al Anbar and succeed.  William 
had a vision of what success looked like and a theory for how to get there.  His vision 
looked remarkably like the Awakening, the main difference being that in William’s 
vision, coalition forces were smart enough to create and manipulate conditions to inspire 
Awakening-like events.  William shared his vision and his ideas with anyone who would 
listen.  The battalion commander and the operations officer so believed that William 
could deliver that they pressed the CJSOTF to reintroduce teams back into al Anbar; they 
were as determined as William was to get him back there. 
While waiting to get to al Anbar, one of the things I did was scour intelligence 
reports and other documents for current information about the situation there.  I was 
intrigued by reporting that indicated that nationalist groups such as Mohammed’s Army 
and the 1920th Revolutionary Brigade were fighting with AQI and other jihadist salafist 
organizations.  This information substantiated what William discovered during his OIF II 
mission.  Leveraging such fissures thus played a big part in our plans.  The 1920th 
Revolutionary Brigade represented the reconcilable side of the resistance, an entity that 
could be politically ‘vented off’ and redirected against irreconcilable groups like AQAM.  
William also met some Iraqi soldiers serving in Baghdad who were Nimr from Tal 
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Aswad.  They told us that they would soon desert because AQAM threatened to harm 
their family members back home because they had joined the army.  This information 
validated the logic behind William’s model city approach. 
When William, 504, and I finally made it to Anbar in August, we chose to 
establish our teamhouse at Camp Hit due to its close proximity to al Phurat.  Ideally, we 
would have established a teamhouse in al Phurat, but we did not know how receptive the 
Nimr would be to our presence given William’s absence and Sheikh Reshad’s death.  
Marines mistakenly killed Sheikh Reshad while he was fleeing a kidnapping attempt in 
early 2005.  We thus did not know exactly where we stood and, in any event, if we were 
to have simply driven to Zuwayyah to meet with the Nimr sheikhs they would have 
presented us with a long list of grievances.  Instead, William once again engineered a 
way to bring the sheikhs to us, working with the battlespace owners, 3-25 Marines.67  3-
25 Marines, a Marine Reserve Battalion from Ohio, were responsible for the Euphrates 
River Valley (ERV) from Hit to Haditha. 
3–25 Marines conducted a combat patrol shortly after we arrived to Hit in which 
they detained several members of the Burgess family, cousins to the al Gaaouds.68  
Several members of the al Gaaoud family, including the late Sheikh Reshad’s brother, 
Sheikh Anis, came to Camp Hit to inquire about the Burgesses.  This is when William 
made a demonstration of his former cordial relations with the Nimr and protested the 
Burgess’ detainment on their behalf.  He had worked this out in advance with 3–25 so 
that the 3–25 operations officer, who would be present, would relent, but not without 
protesting first.  This event re-established William as an important advocate for the Nimr 
and a person of influence. 
1. Ghost Patrols 
Hit district was much more violent at the time of our arrival in August 2005 than 
it had been in OIF II.  There were no police.  The 503rd ICDC/ING had disintegrated 
earlier that year, and several of 3-25’s combat patrols were attacked with Suicide Vehicle 
                                                 
67 Appendix 2 lists the various coalition units that were responsible for Hit from 2003 until 2007. 
68 The Burgess family resided in Jubayl, a town that lay in al Phurat and our area of operations. 
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Born Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED) prior to our arrival.69  The ODA received 
grim reports from multiple informants that the entire situation in al Anbar was 
deteriorating rapidly.  AQAM blew up the Telecom cell tower servicing Hit district and 
the surrounding areas in the latter part of August and the Albu Nimr reported an increase 
in threats, night letters, and attacks against Nimr tribesmen.  The majority of the Albu 
Nimr tribe in the Hit district lived on the northeastern side of the Euphrates where there 
was no permanent coalition presence.  It appeared that AQAM was conducting shaping 
operations to isolate the Nimr side of the river. 
On the morning of September 4, 2005 AQAM conducted a multi-pronged 
SVBIED attack against a Marine firm base in Hit.70  AQAM also simultaneously 
detonated an SVBIED on the Hit Bridge.  The Hit Bridge was the only trafficable bridge 
over the Euphrates between Ramadi and Haditha.  The SVBIED rendered the bridge 
impassable to vehicle traffic and effectively isolated the only pro-coalition tribal 
communities in the area, all of whom resided on the far side of the Euphrates from the 
Marine bases.  Effectively, the Nimr were now on their own.  The Nimr tribe’s last line of 
defense was a loosely organized home guard militia that patrolled the tribal area looking 
for outsiders.   
The Hit Bridge remained closed to vehicular traffic for three months, and for three 
months coalition forces were absent from the Nimr tribal areas on the far side of the river.  
ODA 504, during this time, drove down through Ramadi where we could cross the 
Euphrates and back up the river to al Phurat.  We lived in the desert for a week at a time, 
traveling across the “jazeera” between Thar Thar Lake and the Euphrates River where we 
could avoid IEDs and ambushes, and maximize the range of our weapons.71  We 
“ghosted” out of the jazeera at different times and along different vectors to visit villages 
and towns along the river and maintain relations with the Nimr tribe.  Each time we did 
so we traveled with elements of the IA battalion also stationed at Camp Hit.  
                                                 
69 Carter Malkasian, “Evidence from al Anbar,” Joint Force Quarterly 46: 3rd Quarter (2007): 123. 
70 Firm Base—The Marine term for a permanent company-sized operating base. 
71  “Jazeera” was the local name, in Arabic, given to the desert area lying between Thar Thar Lake and 
the Euphrates River. 
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We also conducted numerous combat patrols north along the river to maintain 
some sort of presence.  Communities outside of the Nimr tribal area in al Phurat were 
mostly small and tribally heterogeneous.  The people in these communities lacked a 
significant tribal security net that could protect them and, as a result, they were very 
cautious when the ODA patrolled through.  A school principal from Dulab finally 
admitted to us that the coalition would never receive any cooperation without providing 
constant security to the villages.  The people, he said, would support the insurgents 
because the insurgents were there constantly, whereas coalition and Iraqi security forces 
only patrolled through occasionally.   
William modified his model city approach based on this information and other 
observations.  We concluded that the most important thing we could do during this trip 
was to establish a solid base of support among the Albu Nimr in al Phurat.  Our goal was 
to establish al Phurat as our base of support to prevent AQAM from using it for the same 
purposes.  Al Phurat was the largest, most powerful, homogeneous tribal area between 
Ramadi and Haditha.  After securing a base of support in al Phurat, we planned to 
methodically spread our tentacles through the smaller, tribal communities surrounding 
Hit, thereby choking it off before finally securing it with indigenous support.   
This method ran opposite to typical western counterinsurgency practice, which 
often starts with the urban centers and spreads out.  The situation in Hit district dictated 
otherwise.  Hit became an alternate safe haven for insurgents fleeing Fallujah in 
November 2004, though it had actually been a sanctuary long before that.72  Hit’s tribally 
heterogeneous population made the city vulnerable to incursions by AQAM.  Outsiders 
could hide in Hit much more easily than they could in the rural tribal areas.  Beginning a 
counterinsurgency effort in Hit would have been pitting our weaknesses against the 
enemy’s strengths.  The enemy had the informational advantage, combat service support, 
was hidden among the population, and had the strength of position.  Coalition forces did 
not have enough troops to commit to a classical counterinsurgency approach in Hit.  
Starting an under-resourced counterinsurgency effort in Hit would have resulted in 
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coalition casualties, civilian casualties, and collateral damage that would invariably have 
contributed to AQAM’s information operations (IO).  As William noted, every coalition 
or Iraqi Security Force (ISF) casualty was an IO victory for the enemy.  
William’s plan to circumvent Hit and work through the tribes redounded to our 
credit.  Once we were in the area it was clear that the model city/inkblot approach starting 
with Tal Aswad—not Hit—was the only way to proceed.  The model city approach let us 
control the tempo, use the desert to avoid casualties, avoid collateral damage, target the 
enemy’s CSS, and gain the informational advantage within our base of support.  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, our biggest obstacle subsequently turned out not to be AQAM, but the 
fact that the bridge remained closed for three months and the coalition neglected to assist 
the only tribal communities that were somewhat pro-coalition.   
2. The Albu Nimr Desert Protectors 
In October 2005, shortly after the Desert Protector program was begun in al Qaim 
with the Albu Mahal, MNC-I and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense decided to stand up an 
Albu Nimr cohort in al Phurat.  ODA 504 was tasked through command channels to 
support this initiative and recruit 200 Desert Protectors from the tribe.  2–114 Field 
Artillery of the Mississippi National Guard, the Hit battlespace owners at the time, were 
tasked to support the recruitment as well.73   
The environmental situation near Hit was vastly different from that of the Mahal 
in al Qaim.  The Albu Nimr were not suffering a perceived existential threat from AQI as 
were the Mahal.  The Nimr were also very cognizant of the implosion of the Iraqi 
National Guard and IPs along the upper Euphrates River Valley.  They did not trust the 
coalition, and often cited the murder of the IPs on the Haditha soccer field as the 
consequence of working with coalition and government forces.   
Matters were made worse because the coalition and Iraqi government would not 
reopen the Hit bridge or station troops on the Albu Nimr side of the river.  The 
                                                 
73 2–114 was responsible for the area of operations (AO) that included Hit at that time.  2–114 was 
subordinated to RCT 2.  The Hit area of operations was a revolving door for coalition units.  Between 
August 2005 and January 2006 there were five units responsible for the Hit AO: 3–25 Marines, 3–6 
Marines, 2–114 FA, 13th MEU, and 22nd MEU. 
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government and the coalition wanted the Nimr to trust the state with their menfolk and 
send them off for training, but with no show of faith or demonstration of support by the 
government and the coalition.  William and I were caught in the middle.  We wanted to 
recruit a tribal force and use it as a mechanism for building confidence between the Nimr 
and the government, but we were essentially being told to do so with no quid pro quo 
from the government and the coalition.  Kasam, Sheikh Reshad’s twenty-something year-
old son and heir trusted us.  But even he was reluctant to commit to the Desert Protectors. 
It took some deft cajoling, but ODA 504 eventually received Kasam’s blessing 
along with 200 recruits.  The original plan put forth by MNC-I called for rotary-wing 
aircraft from the Marine Air Wing (MAW) at Al Asad to transport the recruits to Camp 
Fallujah for training once recruitment was complete.74  RCT 2 tasked 2-114 FA to 
establish the landing zones (LZs) and provide security for both the LZs and the recruits.  
As 2-114 waited for the helicopters to arrive it received word via radio that the MAW 
would not be able to send aircraft until the following day, due to scheduled maintenance.  
That night insurgents operating on the far banks of the Euphrates mortared several of the 
Nimr villages.  In response, the Nimr decided that they could not afford to lose 200 able-
bodied fighting men by allowing them to travel to Fallujah for 30 days of basic training.  
In the end, the Nimr gave up 30 men while the rest returned home where they could be 
called upon to defend their villages if necessary.  Unfortunately the Marines and MNC-I 
interpreted this incident to mean that the sheikhs were unable to rally support for tribal 
units and/or that the people were unwilling to follow their sheikhs.   
3. Keeping It Together 
It amazes me that the people of al Phurat remained friendly to our ODA.  This 
was all due to William’s efforts and his legacy.  William established a remarkable 
reputation as a friend of the Nimr, a man of his word, and a warrior during his OIF II 
tour.  William’s reputation grew during those three trying months of living in the desert, 
out of trucks, which he insisted we do to maintain relations with the tribe.  This act of 
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commitment was vital to countering a growing sense of despair regarding the coalition.  
The Nimr were well aware of the situation of their beleaguered Mahal cousins in al Qaim, 
the murder and intimidation of the IPs and ICDC/ING along the ERV, and the growing 
levels of violence in the province.  The disbandment of the Nimr provisional company in 
OIF II, the coalition’s inability to reopen the Hit Bridge, the lack of coalition presence, 
and growing unemployment colored the Nimr’s perspective.  In September 2005, the 
Nimr’s perspective was that the coalition was losing.  We found it a continual challenge 
to maintain a positive counter-narrative to AQAM. 
The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) temporarily reinforced RCT 2 in 
November.  RCT 2 tasked the MEU to secure Hit in preparation for the December 2005 
parliamentary elections and to repair and reopen the Hit Bridge to coalition vehicle 
traffic.  The 13th MEU, following our recommendation, sent some of its forces around 
through Ramadi and back up the river to clear the far side, instead of repairing and 
punching directly across the bridge.75  On December 2nd, we led these clearing forces in, 
and by doing so guided them around the Nimr areas so that they could begin clearing 
operations in the town of Hai al Bekr, the local name for the town directly opposite Hit, 
just across the Euphrates.  The 13th MEU, fresh from the fight in al Qaim, where fighting 
had been house to house in some areas, took no chances.  AQAM had booby trapped 
some houses near al Qaim with IEDs and dug fighting positions into others.  The MEU 
ordered residents to vacate their homes and to leave their doors open to facilitate the 
Marines’ clearing efforts.  Marines escorted citizens to holding areas until the town was 
cleared.   
William convinced Sheikh Kasam that it was only the ODA’s influence that 
finally prompted the Marines to reopen the bridge.  We also told Sheikh Kasam the 
truth— that it was the ODA that determined that the MEU’s clearing operations would 
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months to prepare an IED belt for when coalition forces eventually did repair the Hit Bridge. 
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begin in Hai al Bekr, and that only his tribe’s friendly relations with us had spared the 
Nimr the inconvenience of being turned out of their homes.  We designed the operation 
this way to deepen the trust between the ODA and the Nimr, as well as to communicate 
to the surrounding areas that it was best to work with the us and the coalition, and 
through their Desert Protectors (DPs).   
The 30 Nimr DPs returned from their training in Fallujah a week before the 13th 
MEU’s operation to clear Hai al Bekr and reopen the bridge.  In addition to implementing 
William’s tribal engagement, ODA 504 had begun training and advising the 30 Albu 
Nimr DPs during this timeframe.  All of the DPs knew William from his OIF II rotation; 
he had instant rapport and it didn’t take the rest of the ODA long to develop a 
relationship with the DPs.  William and I made every effort to use our influence to tie the 
Nimr to the national government in as many ways as possible.  As William advised, the 
more we could do to align the Nimr with the government, the more fruitful our 
counterinsurgency efforts would be.  In this regard, we spent our last two months in Iraq 
pursuing three different lines of approach. 
First, we began soliciting Sheikh Kasam, Kasam’s influential family members, 
and other tribal leaders to support the December 2005 elections.  Fortunately, the Sunni 
community, aware that boycotting the January 2005 elections had been a grave misstep, 
and freed by encouragement from the Association of Muslim Scholars and by Sunni 
nationalists to vote, were enthusiastic.  Also, with the bridge open and the 22nd MEU 
providing security, the residents of Hit district felt much more secure going to the polls.76  
Sheikh Kasam’s cousin, Hasan, arranged a convoy of approximately twenty vans at 
William’s behest to ferry rural Nimr voters to the Hit bridge so that they could walk 
across and vote.  ODA 504 and the DPs provided security at the loading point in al Phurat 
and escorted numerous convoys carrying approximately 1,500 voters all-told to Hit.   
Second, we attempted to capitalize on the popular goodwill that was surging due 
to the Nimr-DP connection, the security environment established by the MEUs, and 
Sunni participation in the December 15 elections.  The DPs were our information 
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operations.  They let it be known that “they” helped the ODA guide the 13th MEU 
around, instead of through, their home villages, which built instant credibility for the DP 
program and illustrated the benefits of working with the coalition and the Iraqi 
government.  The DPs also could take credit for securing the al Phurat city council 
building that was used as the loading/off-loading point for the election convoy.  The DPs 
did a security sweep and secured the building the night before the elections.  ODA 504 
remained out of sight, in the desert, ready to act as a quick reaction force if necessary.   
It was our intent that the Nimr community see the DPs acting unilaterally, and 
they did.  The DPs also engaged in a firefight the night before the elections with 
insurgents trying to make their way across the river from Mohammedi into al Phurat.  In 
the eyes of the local Nimr, the Desert Protectors lived up to their name.  The election 
hype together with positive public perceptions of the DPs resulted in an out-pouring of 
public support and potential security force volunteers.  In the weeks after the election, 
crowds of hundreds of young Nimr men clamoring to be DPs besieged the ODA 
whenever we went to al Phurat.77   
William negotiated intensely with Sheikh Kasam, Sheikh Anis—Kasam’s uncle, 
Sheikh Bizea, and others to arrive at an amenable means of channeling the post-election 
wave of sudden popular support.  The Nimr and other tribes wanted to form an Army 
division consisting solely of Sunnis, preferably Anbaris, to operate in al Anbar.  Sheikh 
Kasam and Bizea reported to us that they, and a coalition of other sheikhs, approached 
the Iraqi government through Sadun Dulami, the Minister of Defense, on this matter.  
However, it was obvious to us that the Iraqis would not be able to address local desires in 
a sufficiently timely manner.  The Nimr sheikhs also recognized this and told William 
that if the Iraqi government conducted a recruiting drive in al Phurat that it was likely to 
be successful; however, they warned us that it was too dangerous for Nimr from al Phurat 
to travel to recruiting centers in Ramadi.  We reported these facts and requested a mobile 
recruiting team.  We knew such things were possible because the Ministry of Defense 
had dispatched one to al Phurat to recruit the Desert Protectors.  However, no mobile 
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recruiting team was sent.  Worse, the sheikhs’ prediction came to pass and they 
disappointedly rebuked us when nine Nimr were killed on January 5, 2006 during Iraqi 
police recruitment at the glass factory in Ramadi.78   
In short, we were unable to capitalize on the surge of popular support that 
materialized in December 2005. 
4. End of the Tour 
We were able to see indicators of our success during the last two months of our 
tour in December 2005 and January 2006.  William predicted that we would see 
increased threats, violence, and intimidation inspired by AQAM and directed towards 
Iraqis working with us.  One of the DPs who lived on the outer edges of Tal Aswad along 
a tribal border area quit because unknown insurgents, coming from outside the tribal area, 
threatened his family.  Several night letters listing names of some of the DPs surfaced in 
Tal Aswad.79  Despite these threats, and despite being unpaid for the months of 
December and January, the DPs continued to work.  It was unfortunate that arrangements 
for paying the DPs were apparently undermined from within the Ministry of Defense, or 
simply broke down thanks to ineptness and inefficiency.   
Both the Nimr and the Mahal DP programs in al Qaim suffered from pay 
problems.  Even so, in both locations most DPs continued to serve with distinction.  We 
did what we could, within our means, to help provide for the DPs.  The DPs, in turn, 
never publicly let on that they were not being paid.  Several of the DPs approached 
William and explained that they had unanimously elected not to reveal the problem or 
their frustrations because they would have been ridiculed for working with coalition 
forces.  This was not necessarily a reflection of the Nimr’s support of us, but instead 
revealed a deep-seated mistrust of the coalition and the Iraqi government.  Unfortunately,  
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often this mistrust was warranted, and we made every effort to counter it.  The DPs also 
stated that their actions were, in part, founded on preserving the unit.  They were proud of 
being Desert Protectors.80 
William was the first to notice and articulate another trend that we believed was 
an indicator of our successful efforts to undermine AQAM.  Increased community 
support from the Nimr, and increased cooperation with the Gaaouds’ leadership during 
the months of December 2005 and January 2006 corresponded with increased negative 
reporting about certain individuals working with us.  We had no doubt that some of the 
individuals identified had direct links to segments of the national resistance, and possibly 
indirect links to AQAM through past associations, but that was the very reason we 
worked with them.  Other individuals were simply our patrons within the Nimr who were 
indispensable to our tribal engagement activities.  Our association with all of these 
individuals was by design.  However, spikes in negative reporting against some of them 
seemed to indicate that AQAM was waging a counterintelligence effort aimed at 
derailing our tribal engagement activities. 
The enemy was well aware of coalition forces’ practice of using informants.  It is 
naïve to think that by late 2005 coalition information-gathering networks were intact and 
had not been compromised.  Legitimately or not, we were forced to redirect time and 
energy to protect some of our people from coalition targeting in response to the reports 
against them.  We had to do this to protect our sources of information, but mostly to 
preserve our relationship with the tribe.  Though these events created greater problems 
for us, they were, in accordance with William’s assessment, indicators that we had 
successfully targeted AQAM’s CSS system and disrupted their operations. 
The last positive thing to come out of our deployment was the sanctioning of the 
Zuwayyah police department.  We made a determined effort to get an unpaid police force 
maintained by the Nimr in Zuwayyah sanctioned by the government.  There were 
multiple reasons we sought to do this.  First, was the simple fact that police, because of 
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their relations with the local populace, were the most appropriate force for conducting 
counterinsurgency, as opposed to the army.  Second, was to provide jobs.  The police 
economically tied a segment of the Nimr to the local, regional, and national governments.  
Third, a tribally homogenous police force, if carefully developed, would be resistant to 
insurgent intimidation and infiltration.  At the time, we strongly believed that any attempt 
to recruit police in Hit, or any other location in Hit district, would fail.  Lastly, a local 
police force would have legitimacy in the eyes of the local populace whereas the 
predominantly Shia Iraqi Army battalion in Hit did not.   
The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) was a subordinate 
command of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).  CPATT 
was responsible for the development of civil police within Iraq and we learned that they 
were going to open two new police departments in al Anbar.  These would be the only 
departments outside of the coalition’s heavy concentrations of forces in Ramadi and al 
Qaim.  My team’s warrant officer, Chief Pitt, formed a valuable relationship with the 
regional International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) office at Al Asad.  The IPLOs 
were policemen contracted by the State Department to work with CPATT.  Chief Pitt 
identified the IPLO administrator responsible for assessing prospective locations for 
establishing the new police departments and invited him to our teamhouse.  We escorted 
the officer to Zuwayyah to observe ongoing security efforts and to meet some of the 
sheikhs.  Our efforts resulted in al Zuwayyah being nominated as one of the two new 
departments in al Anbar.  This was good news because it ensured that our replacement 
ODA—ODA 102—and coalition forces would have to commit time and resources to 
Zuwayyah, al Phurat, and the Nimr, thus locking them into furthering William’s model 
city concept, and diverting them away from wasting all their resources on pursuing a 
losing strategy in Hit.   
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V. ROBERT’S WAR81 
A. ROBERT 
William was nearing retirement when we returned from OIF III.  He was a team 
sergeant for more than five years, impressive given the fact that noncommissioned 
officers in Special Forces are managed much like officers.  Master Sergeants typically 
serve as team sergeants for two years with the intent not to develop depth of experience, 
but breadth of experience before promoting them to be sergeants-major or moving them 
on to other positions.  None of this appealed to William, so his retirement paperwork 
went in after we returned and he retired in October 2006.  Robert was William’s 
replacement.   
Robert had 12 consecutive years serving in 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group 
when he replaced William and had completed three previous tours to Iraq, as well as 
having visited every country within CENTCOM’s area of responsibility.82  Robert spoke 
excellent Arabic and had an unusually good sense of the Iraqis.  ODA 504 members often 
joked that Robert could “out-Iraqi” an Iraqi.  Robert most likely acquired this ability 
during his previous three tours.  Robert had spent much of OIF II and III working directly 
for the battalion conducting intelligence-gathering activities, which required him to live 
and work with a small group of trusted Iraqis.  Robert was promoted to Master Sergeant 
at the end of OIF III, which made him eligible for a team sergeant position on an ODA.  
Both the battalion commander and the battalion operations officer, the same two who had 
such high confidence in William, specifically picked Robert to be William’s replacement 
as the team sergeant of ODA 504. 
First impressions suggest that Robert is almost William’s diametric opposite 
personality-wise.  William has a direct, in-your-face quality about him, whereas Robert is 
                                                 
81 This chapter is a narrative drawn from the author’s own experiences and interviews with Robert, a 
Special Forces Master Sergeant.  The quotes contained in this chapter are Robert’s unless specifically cited 
as otherwise.  Interview conducted by author at Clarksville, TN, August 20, 2009, follow-up interview 
conducted via email November 3, 2009. 
82 CENTCOM: Central Command, the geographic combatant command with responsibility for the 
Middle East and Southwest Asia. 
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much more subtle.  William taught the young guys on the team by example.  Robert was 
much more Socratic.  William was brusque, confrontational, and always shot straight to 
the heart of an issue or problem.  He could instantly assess a situation, discard all 
irrelevant information, and then define the problem and its solution in irrefutable and 
simple terms.  Like William, Robert had a “third eye” that enabled him to mentally strip 
away the nonessentials and effectively solve problems, but his approach with people was 
much different.  Robert is a master of “mental-jujitsu.”  Rather than confront people with 
an irrefutable answer, Robert instead leads them in conversations, manipulating their own 
arguments and logic to help them arrive at conclusions he has already formed. 
B. OIF IV 
Robert, ODA 504, and I returned to Hit in August 2006 for our OIF IV rotation.  
We found, much to our relief, that ODA 102 and the current battlespace owners, an army 
battalion—1–36 Infantry—had continued to work with the al Zuwayyah police.83  When 
we left Iraq, we had only a promise that CPATT would commit resources and IPLOs to 
open the Zuwayyah IP station.  CPATT fulfilled that promise, sanctioning the Zuwayyah 
IPs, and providing the authorization and resources to activate the station.  ODA 102 took 
ownership of the fledgling force and acted as the Police Transition Team (PTT) until an 
official PTT arrived to take 102’s place.  This coincided with our arrival. 
PTTs are the police version of Military Transition Teams, or MiTTs.  MiTTs are 
groups of 12–15 Soldiers or Marines assigned to advise Iraqi Army units.  PTTs do the 
same, but with the police.  One difference is that PTTs usually work with civilian 
counterparts.  These civilians are law enforcement professionals from the United States 
working under contract for the State Department’s IPLO program.  These civilians 
provide necessary real-world expertise about how to develop and run functioning police 
departments.  Unfortunately, the relationship between MiTTs, PTTs, the Iraqi units, and 
conventional forces is convoluted and bears explaining.   
                                                 
83 ODA 102 relieved us at the conclusion of our OIF III deployment. TF 1–36 was 1st Battalion, 36th 
Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division.  TF 1–36 replaced 22th MEU in February 2005, RCT 
7, having replaced RCT 2 was TF 1–36’s operational headquarters. See Annex 2. 
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1–36 was the battlespace owner for Hit district.  This meant that 1–36 was 
responsible for managing all aspects of the war within that battlespace.  Units such as 
ODAs 102 and 504, or Marine Force Recon, who are outside entities, are required to 
coordinate their activities in the battlespace with 1–36.  This arrangement exists to 
harmonize units’ activities, synergize efforts, and prevent fratricide.  1–36 is also 
responsible for supporting and partnering with Iraqi security forces operating within its 
AO, whether these are Iraqi Army (IA) or Iraqi Police.  And here is where it gets 
interesting.  The MiTTs and PTTs belong to separate chains of command within 
MNSTC-I, which is who they report to and take orders from.  However, the MiTTs and 
PTTs are responsible for coordinating their activities with 1–36 because 1–36 is 
responsible for the Iraqi security forces as their coalition partners. 
ODA 102 did well getting the al Phurat IPs started, but it was 1–36 that 
aggressively expanded the IP program.  1–36 opened an IP station in Tal Aswad, another 
in Hai al Bekr, and a third one in Kubaysa.  1–36 followed William’s tribal model for 
recruitment, using the Albu Nimr, and followed William’s model city scheme, 
establishing stations in coalition-friendly tribal areas.84  Kubaysa was a weird exception.   
Kubaysa is a small town that sits alone in the desert, about 20 kilometers west of 
Hit.  Kubaysa was long considered an insurgent haven but, unlike Hit, it wasn’t very 
violent.  William and I intentionally neglected Kubaysa during OIF III because the people 
weren’t very friendly and we did not have adequate contacts through whom to facilitate 
building a meaningful relationship.  The IPs in Kubaysa were far less reliable than the 
Nimr IPs, but 1–36, like William, wanted to do everything possible to isolate Hit.  
The situation in the city of Hit at the time of our arrival was grim.  Parts of Hit, 
once a small teeming city along the Euphrates, were devastated.  The following passage, 
taken from a letter by Captain Robert Secher, a Marine advisor to the IA, bluntly portrays 
Hit and the Iraqi people at the time: 
Hit is a lawless town with most of the fight in the north (the insurgents 
control/influence the southern part) as we convoyed at high speeds thru 
                                                 
84 This was uncoordinated; a natural result of ODA 504’s efforts to get the Zuwayyah IPs sanctioned 
before rotating back to the U.S. at the end of its OIF III tour. 
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the town (speed is the best defense against IEDs) you could clearly see the 
look on [sic] the eyes of the people: sick and tired.  First, a generation of 
Saddam, now insurgents and occupiers.  Everyone makes promises and no 
one keeps them.85  
Captain Secher was killed by a sniper on October 8, 2006, while patrolling in Hit. 
Route Mavericks runs through the northern part of Hit referred to by Captain 
Secher.  Route Mavericks is the main thoroughfare from the highway, known as Route 
Bronze, through the city and across the Hit Bridge to Hai al Bekr village.  Route 
Mavericks is anchored on one end, at Traffic Circle 1 where it intersects Highway 12 
(Route Bronze), by a permanent, company size combat outpost known as a firm base.  
This one was called Firm Base 1.  Mavericks is anchored on the other end, at the 
bridgehead, by a small combat outpost called COP 3, whose job it is to protect the 
approach to and from the bridge.  The road itself, once made of asphalt, was ground to 
dust by tracked vehicles and was constantly flooded, creating sewage filled goo 
sometimes three feet deep.  Insurgents repeatedly opened or blew up water mains to keep 
the street flooded in order to conceal IEDs and landmines.  
When we arrived in August 2006, convoys moving down Mavericks had to be 
escorted by armor because of the ever-present threat of attack or IEDs.  Armor not only 
provided firepower to deter any attacks, but thermal imaging devices useful in detecting 
IEDs.   All of the buildings and shops along Route Mavericks and the riverfront near 
COP 3 were abandoned, most of them damaged by fighting, and some destroyed.  These 
areas had once comprised the main commercial center of the city.  It was now as William 
previously predicted: an insufficient counterinsurgency effort in Hit had ended in 
violence, destruction, and death, all reinforcing an image of strength for the insurgency 
and weakness for the coalition.  To be fair to 1–36, it did not create the situation so much 
as inherit it.  Five different units had been responsible for the Hit area of operations in 
just the six months prior to 1–36’s arrival.86 
                                                 
85 Dan Ephron and Christian Caryl, A Centurion’s Emails, Newsweek, November 6, 2006. 
86 Appendix 2 lists the various coalition units that were responsible for Hit from 2003 until 2007. 
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Figure 6.   Hit 
Things were not just bad in Hit, however.  The situation appeared bleak all across 
al Anbar.  The MEF G-2 released a now famous intelligence report the month of our 
arrival that declared the province lost to the insurgency.  The personnel we encountered 
at RCT 7 headquarters in al Asad and 1–36 headquarters at Camp Hit did not necessarily 
echo or share this assessment, but it was evident to us by their demeanor that the situation 
in the AO was grim, and they were tired. 
This was the situation in Hit that confronted Robert and the ODA.  Like William, 
Robert had spent many nights before the tour mulling over the situation.  William had 
shared all of his thoughts and theories with Robert, and Robert conducted his own 
extensive preparation, studying reports about the individuals and personalities who we 
would be dealing with once on the ground, and strategizing how best to counter the 




Figure 7.   Looking Down Route Mavericks at Traffic Circle 2, Hit 
This road had been paved prior to our OIF IV tour.  It was reduced to mud 
and rubble by constant use of coalition tracked vehicles and constant 
IEDs.  Insurgents deliberately blew the water mains to flood the street in 
order to conceal land mines and IEDs.  Sometimes the insurgents were 
patient enough to slowly drag land mines into place utilizing string or 
twine in order to avoid being compromised. 
  
 61
C. ROBERT’S SPIN 
As we saw in Chapter IV, William approached the counterinsurgency problem in 
Hit in his own way.  So, too, did Robert.  Robert used William’s concept of targeting 
AQI’s combat service support—the population—to target third party neutrals.  ‘Third 
party neutral’ was the term that Robert used to describe segments of the population that 
were not ideologically committed to the insurgency.  Third party neutrals consisted of 
tribal elites and common people alike who remained guarded and were fence sitters 
waiting to commit to the winning side—they made their choice based on who seemed 
most able to ensure their survival.   
The following diagram is my attempt to graphically depict Robert’s thoughts and 
ideas at the time.  Robert used this diagram to brief our battalion commander about our 
concept for counterinsurgency in July 2006 prior to our August deployment. 
 
 




Robert explained the diagram this way: 
Our bottom line is to influence the third party neutral, the fence sitters.  
We believe, based on experience and conversations with Iraqis during the 
last tour, that the third party neutral makes up the majority of the 
population, even in Anbar.  We have to somehow mobilize these people to 
support our goals. 
Notice the bullet at the bottom center of the slide.  It begins with the 
phrase, “…the destruction in a given area of the insurgent forces and their 
political organization…” Destruction isn’t necessarily kinetic; it is by any 
means possible.  Some insurgents will have to be killed, but most others 
have to be brought to the table.  We have to redirect their energies towards 
something useful for us.  A lot of these guys have legitimate grievances 
that we need to let them air out.  If we do this and sway the third party 
neutral, then we can isolate the irreconcilables.  The Iraqis will do it for 
us. 
The first row depicts the assets available to us.  We have indigenous assets 
such as the different security forces and our informants.  The diamond in 
the center represents an office that doesn’t yet exist.  It doesn’t really have 
a real name yet.  OBC stands for “Office of Bitches and Complaints.”  
This is an idea we have to provide an opportunity for the reconcilables to 
address their grievances.  
In an ideal world, we get them to use litigation to pursue their goals as a 
peaceful process of contesting the government.  But Iraq isn’t there yet.  
Instead, we want to open a local office where people can formally declare 
their grievances and engage in an open dialogue.  Realistically, this will 
start with us, the ODA, spending hours at a time sitting in the diwaniya 
[meeting house] hearing out the sheikhs and other mouthpieces for the 
insurgency.  But eventually, we’d like to formalize the process.  The 
remaining third of the row depicts the assets available to us through the 
coalition. 
The second row depicts our ways or methods of engaging the population.  
Simple and straightforward.  We want to maximize use of all available 
ways.  The tribes named below are the tribes that we initially plan on 
engaging, but, of course, as opportunities arise we will branch out to other 
tribes. 
The third row depicts our physical target environment, the towns and 
villages where these tribes predominantly live. 
The bottom row requires explanation.  Gaining the support of the 
population, isolating insurgents, and killing the really bad ones isn’t going 
to unfold in a neat, linear way.  It’s going to occur at different times in 
different places.  Some populations, like the Nimr, will be an easier sell  
 
 63
than other populations.  These four circles represent some abstract goals 
that we seek to achieve that are both a part of the process and indicators 
that we are succeeding. 
Gray Ghost refers to John Mosby.  Mosby did his best to accord himself 
with honor.  He built a tremendous reputation in the south, and when 
Union soldiers came looking for Mosby, he and his men just blended in 
among the people.  No one turned them in.  People respected him, but they 
also feared him because he was a man of action, a characteristic 
inseparable from his sense of honor.   
How does this translate to us?  We will be like the gray ghost.  We will 
treat people fairly and honestly.  We want Iraqis everywhere, even in the 
most virulent anti-coalition communities, to know us, and to say, “You 
know what, I hate Americans, but those guys have always been fair and 
honest with us.”  We want friendly communities to openly support us and 
we want fence sitters to come to our side.  However, it must be clear to all 
that we are men of action.  We will resort to violence and kill people when 
the situation calls for it.  We are dangerous. 
Fort Apache.  There may be places where we need to force the insurgents’ 
hand.  We do this by establishing a security presence.  We do it ourselves, 
in partnership with ISF, or through tribal surrogates, but we emplace 
ourselves where it disrupts the insurgents.  They now have to factor us into 
their calculations.  No matter how bad it gets, if we do this, we have to 
stick it out.  We stay, we win.  If we leave, the insurgents win. 
Samurai.  We’ll do this through ISF, the tribes, or both.  The bottom line: 
we want Iraqis to start helping themselves and taking the fight to AQI and 
other irreconcilables on their own.  We are going to make our own 
samurai who do this.  
Waterloo.  We want to create conditions and shape the battlefield so that 
we cannot be defeated.  We want to bring the reconcilables to our side and 
isolate the remainder of the insurgency so it can be defeated.87 
Probably the most important thing that Robert did, or did not do, was to not reject 
William’s ideas.  Robert recognized the validity of William’s ideas, especially William’s 
model city approach.  Robert also recognized that in spite of the “badness” all around al 
Phurat and Hai al Bekr, all the “goodness” in those areas could be attributed to 
consistency of effort over several years.  Robert’s concepts weren’t new; nor did they 
change anything.  Robert’s concepts were his way of relating to the situation and 
                                                 
87 Waterloo: Robert admits it is not a perfect analogy, but the correlation meant to be drawn is that if 
we could use amnesty and reconciliation to bring insurgents to our side it would put an end to AQAM, like 
Waterloo put an end to Napoleon’s reign. 
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continuing the general scheme that William had outlined in 2004: we would continue 
utilizing tribal engagement to create secure and stable communities that could be 
expanded over time, thereby squeezing out the insurgents. 
D. ROBERT’S ASSESSMENT 
Friendly: 
Some commanders are so caught up in what they are doing that they 
cannot see the situation for what it is.  They rely on whatever they’ve been 
trained.  They forget what makes them a human being and how they do 
everything else in their life.  They don’t think problems through. 
Enemy: 
AQAM thought the Sunni population was ripe for exploiting against the 
Americans.  They took them for granted and began violating or 
disregarding tribal and social norms and traditions, like influencing the 
young people against the sheikhs. 
AQ didn’t believe creating chaos would bring the people to them, but 
creating chaos for the Americans, by hitting the Americans, they were 
bringing the people to them. 
Robert is fond of reminding people that in the Army’s five-paragraph operations 
order, situation precedes mission.  In Robert’s opinion, too many units determined a 
course of action, or mission statement, without fully grasping or understanding their 
situation or the operational environment and, worse yet, continued to execute the decided 
upon mission statement with complete disregard for the situation. 
Robert did not presume that he or anyone on ODA 504 fully understood the 
situation in Hit district even though the team had operated there just six months prior, 
with many team members on their third and fourth tours in Iraq.  Under Robert’s 
guidance, we therefore spent the first month reorienting.  We drove all over the AO.  
Robert wanted to see every part of it, and meet with and get a sense of the locals in each 
area.  Robert and I spent hours reacquainting ourselves with the Nimr; talking to and 
getting advice from 1–36’s commander, operations officer, and staff; and observing 1–
36’s activities.  When we weren’t doing this, Robert and I dug through past reporting and 
made our team do the same. 
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Our honest appraisal of the situation was that the insurgents were winning in Hit.  
Coalition forces maintained a base of support in the Nimr tribal area of Phurat, but 
everywhere else, things were bad.  1–36 ended its tour with 24 soldiers killed in action, 
and a great many more wounded, not counting ISF or civilian casualties.88  1–36 was 
losing M1A1 Abrams and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles to huge IEDs.  Civilians who 
cooperated with or provided information to coalition forces were killed.  The sniper threat 
was so dangerous that after Captain Secher was killed, 1–36 and the IA stopped 
conducting cordon and searches in daylight.   
When an insurgent sniper killed an American, an ISF member, or any Iraqi 
cooperating with the Americans, reporting often attributed it to insurgents’ intimidation 
efforts or random violence directed against coalition and Iraqi forces.  Robert’s 
assessment was that the insurgency had reached a point where insurgents were 
committing violent acts against the coalition not by design, but simply because they were 
cocky.  Robert was infuriated that 1–36 continued to engage Hit’s civic leaders.  It was 
obvious to Robert that the insurgency owned Hit’s civic leaders.  Robert questioned, why, 
after years of making no progress in Hit, coalition forces thought they should keep 
working with the same civic leadership.  In Robert’s estimation, coalition forces were 
empowering the very people who had already been fighting them far too long. 
Robert’s most direct criticism of 1–36 was that the commander did not divide the 
insurgents into those who were reconcilable and those who were irreconcilable.  His 
failure to do so led him to continue dialoguing with entities who were reportedly, and in 
some cases known to be, irreconcilable people like Sheikh Yassin who was consistently 
alleged to have salafist ties to Ansar al Sunna.89  As Robert said, “You can’t be friends 
with everyone, that’s not how you win counterinsurgency.”  In our experience, coalition 
commanders were too unwilling to cast unfavorable characters aside, to treat 
irreconcilables as obstacles, or bypass hard-core insurgent communities.  We would run 
into this reluctance when we tried to cut the insurgent-controlled Hit city council out of 
                                                 
88 “Hit, Iraq,” Absoluteastronomy.com, http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Hit,_Iraq (accessed 
September 16, 2009).  
89 Sheikh Yassin wasn’t a tribal sheikh, but a religious leader residing in Hit.  We considered Sheikh 
Yassin to be irreconcilable.  Appendix 1 shows four general categories for Sunni insurgent groups.  We 
considered jihadist salafist groups such as Ansar al Sunna irreconcilable.   
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the picture.  Robert called people with such inflexible attitudes Ameri-can’ts; in Robert-
speak, there was nothing worse than being an Ameri-can’t. 
In August 2006, the insurgency was definitely stronger than the 
counterinsurgency in Hit.  The enemy owned the city and the city council.  The enemy 
owned the roads.  They took away the coalition’s freedom of maneuver in town through 
the use of snipers and IEDs.  And, thanks to IEDs, the enemy also took away the 
coalition’s freedom of maneuver on all the major lines of communication (LOC).  The 
police were not being properly funded and resourced by the Iraqi government.  And the 
IA battalion in Hit was vastly under-strength. 
E. EXECUTION 
1. Getting into Their Decision Cycle 
Get into their decision cycles by finding places where you can make 
contact and engage, whether it’s kinetic or not kinetic, then maneuver 
from there.  You don’t know exactly where you are going to maneuver to, 
but you know towards what.  Keep doing this to maintain forward motion 
and stay ahead of the enemy.  Disrupt them.  Don’t develop such a grand 
plan that you constrain yourself.  Free flow.  Be like water.  Maintain 
contact constantly and stay in their decision cycle.  Make them react. 
During OIF IV, we consistently pursued three interrelated lines of operation, 
which often overlapped.  Our main effort, as with previous rotations, was tribal 
engagement.  We still had a Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission to train, advise, and 
employ the local IA scout platoon.  The platoon of Desert Protectors that we trained and 
advised during OIF III was fully integrated into the IA during our absence; the platoon of 
DPs was designated the battalion scout platoon. Later, our advisory mission transitioned 
to creating a Special Weapons and Tactics unit for the Hit district IPs.  The last line of 
operations we pursued was kinetic.  This consisted of targeted raids, comprised mostly of 
combat patrols and some clearing operations.  I will tell Robert’s story within the 
framework of these three lines of operation, but it is necessary to keep in mind that the 
tour unfolded in a non-linear, sometimes circular manner as we navigated towards our 
end state. 
 67
So, what was our end state?  Truth be told, William always had a mental picture 
of something exactly like the Awakening happening.  I can say this because I and 
everyone else on the team listened to him describe this during the latter half of 2004 and 
through all of 2005.  It didn’t take much for William to transmit this vision to Robert.  
Thanks to William, the rest of the team had already thought in Awakening-like terms.  
We had come to believe in this even before we deployed for OIF III, after hearing 
William constantly preach it.  It was this belief that helped us stay the course during OIF 
III.  We put out of our minds the idea that we were in Iraq to chalk up statistics: raids 
conducted, enemy killed or captured, etc.  Our goal was to facilitate a tribal awakening.  
If we didn’t fully accomplish this on that trip, then so be it.  We would come back and try 
again, picking up where we left off.   
Robert already possessed his own version of William’s vision.  One can see it 
outlined in Robert’s operational concepts, which we articulated when briefing our 
concept for the deployment.  There were persons present at the briefing who thought we 
were being overly optimistic.  They failed to understand that we weren’t being optimistic.  
Rather, based on our accumulated experiences on the ground we recognized what was 
possible in al Anbar.  Ironically, our conviction—that the situation in Anbar was 
recoverable—put us in good stead with the RCT 7’s chain of command when we met 
them for the first time.  They were tired of hearing bad news and pessimistic 
assessments.90 
Robert, very early on in his assessment, decided that William had initiated an 
appropriate course of action in bypassing Hit.  Frustrated that coalition forces continued 
to engage the Hit city council, to include Sheikh Yassin, a local religious figure with 
known ties to Ansar al Sunna, we decided to cut the Hit city council out of the picture by 
no longer empowering them.91  We also decided that Hasan, Sheikh Kasam’s cousin, 
should be mayor.  He was close to us.  He was intelligent and had the right political, 
business, and other connections.  He also had the Nimr behind him.  Hasan was not eager 
                                                 
90 RCT 7 commanded by Colonel Blake Crowe was responsible for al Anbar north and west of 
Ramadi when we returned for OIF IV. 
91 Ansar al Sunna, considered a salafist group, was on our list of irreconcilables. 
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to fill this role, however.  Robert spent countless hours with him and with his father 
(Anis), talking, listening, and no doubt using his mental jujitsu abilities to shape their 
thoughts.  Over time, both Hasan and Anis came to accept that Hasan was the best choice 
for mayor.  Over time, too, Robert developed a close enough personal relationship with 
Hasan that Hasan probably would have honored Robert’s request no matter what.   
Once we had selected a mayor, we now had to find a legitimate way to put him in 
position.  Our worry wasn’t that he would be rejected by the Iraqis, but that coalition 
forces would not accept his appointment.  Over so many tours, no one bothered to 
question the legitimacy of those professing to be mayors or city council members and, in 
any event, it was virtually impossible to ascertain who had been what before the invasion.  
Yet, when we proposed our idea of making Hasan mayor to coalition forces, they scoffed.  
What we did next exemplified how we operated our entire deployment.  When we met an 
obstacle, we went around it.  If there was something that we could not effect, we effected 
it through the Iraqis, almost every time. 
We made Hasan mayor by convening a council of sheikhs from the district who 
were friendly to us and encouraging them to establish a new mayor and city council, one 
that we could work with.  And they did.  Twenty-seven sheikhs and muktars nominated 
Hasan to be mayor and signed a declaration confirming their decision.  Coalition forces, 
particularly RCT 7 and 1–36, were slow to accept this change of representation as we 
suspected they would be.  However, after we persistently referred to Hasan as mayor at 
every opportunity and in every community engagement with coalition forces, and after 
pushing him to begin coordinating with the provincial government in Ramadi, coalition 
forces accepted Hasan as mayor.   
Zahid, a Nimr from the Shamal clan, was hired as the district police chief during 
ODA 102’s tenure.  Zahid was to become a vital, yet problematic figure for us.  Zahid 
hated the al Gaaouds.  He claimed he hated them for their illicit relations with al Qaeda 
and other insurgents, but this was most likely exaggerated.  We were told by older 
members of the tribe that the Shamal clan had once been a principal Nimr family, more 
important even than the Gaaouds, but that fortunes had changed and the Gaaouds 
supplanted them.  This happened at least a century ago as recounted to us.  But, whatever 
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the reason for Zahid’s enmity toward the Gaaouds, it constituted both his greatest 
weakness and his greatest strength.  His desire to undermine the Gaaouds, combined with 
his desire to avenge the death of his eldest son at the hands of AQAM, gave him the 
necessary willpower and fortitude to be a proactive police chief.  The intra-tribal rivalry 
this spurred was difficult to manage at times, especially since Hasan was an al Gaaoud.  It 
wasn’t our design to have the two most powerful offices in Hit split between bickering 
clans, but we worked with what we had.  Ironically, the overall situation ended up 
lending the ODA more leverage than it would have had otherwise over both clans. 
Current doctrine, as per FM 3-24, recommends that forces be used to secure an 
area, facilitating the ”clear, hold, build” approach, and that deterrent patrols be utilized to 
keep the enemy off balance, disrupt enemy attempts to dislodge counterinsurgent forces, 
and reassure the population.92  “Clear, hold, and build” and subsequent deterrent patrols 
were not options available to us.  We did not own battlespace or forces.  It did not seem 
likely that coalition forces would be able conduct adequate “clear, hold, and build” 
operations in Hit given the lack of resources and troops available, coupled with 
established commitments to protect infrastructure, the IPs, etc.  We instead guided our 
operations around these constraints, maintaining the model city approach.   
To continue to build situational awareness and to begin pressuring insurgents who 
were hiding and operating in rural areas, we began conducting combat patrols with the IA 
Scouts (formerly the DPs).  Conventional forces often patrolled the roads, but we 
patrolled by dismounting, which enabled us to prowl around, talk with locals, and 
thoroughly investigate areas.  Our patrols served several purposes.  One was to initiate 
Robert’s Gray Ghost concept.  We consistently strove to project the image that we were 
good, decent people, although a bit mischievous; we were not scared of anything; and we 
wanted to underscore that we believed in people.  We also sought to emphasize our 
solidarity with the DPs.  We integrated them into our guntruck crews and all aspects of 
our patrols.  The intent was to plant seeds in people’s minds that would make them more 
amenable to us as we strove to shift the balance with the insurgents. 
                                                 
92 Field Manual 3–24 Counterinsurgency (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the 
Army, 1997), A–5. 
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Another calculated aspect of our patrols was to demonstrate strength.  Our early 
patrols led to several direct-fire engagements and attempted IED strikes.  The combined 
ODA/ DP force aggressively counterattacked or pursued our attackers and, in each 
instance, the insurgents fled, often abandoning vehicles to escape across the Euphrates by 
boat or skiff.  On these occasions, we conducted battlefield recovery, taking weapons and 
ammunition left behind, and giving them to the police.  Cars and other materials we 
destroyed.   
As these patrols continued, we also visited Colonel Sha’ban, of the al Obeidi 
tribe, and the police chief in Baghdadi.  We wanted to establish a relationship with 
Sha’ban because he and his police embodied our Fort Apache concept and because we 
hoped to eventually harmonize his efforts with ours in Hit.  Colonel Sha’ban and his 
police did not control Baghdadi.  They lived in a stronghold of their own making at a 
military housing complex that formerly served the al Asad airbase under Saddam.  
Insurgents feared Colonel Sha’ban’s influence and targeted his police and their families 
for kidnapping or murder if they left the compound.  Thus, it only made sense for us to 
address Sha’ban’s immediate needs.  At the time, insurgent bandits were operating illegal 
checkpoints on Route Bronze between Hit and Baghdadi.  The insurgents shook people 
down, stole goods and money, and also killed known coalition sympathizers – family 
members of the Sha’ban’s IPs.  Coalition forces never could catch the insurgents at their 
checkpoints because the insurgents established effective early warning nets.  They would 
depart the area as soon as coalition vehicles were reported coming down the highway.  
We told Sha’ban that we could do something about this.  We also conducted a three-day 
medical civic action program for Sha’ban’s community and adhoc training for his IPs. 
Sha’ban sent four of his most street-savvy IPs back to Hit with us.  They stayed a 
week.  During that time ODA 504, Sha’ban’s IPs, and the Desert Protectors conducted 
numerous combat patrols and encountered several insurgent checkpoints.  We sent IPs 
and Desert Protectors up the road in civilian vehicles to penetrate the insurgents’ early 
warning net.  The IPs and DPs shot up several checkpoints this way.  This stopped them 
for a period, but we had to be careful because we couldn’t keep replicating our Trojan 
horse tactic.  Sha’ban’s IPs were some of the most situationally aware Iraqis we worked 
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with.  We took them on several other patrols.  On one night patrol, one of our vehicles 
broke down.  While we were repairing it two men rode up on motorcycles with their 
headlights off, unaware we were there.  Sha’ban’s IPs immediately identified them as 
insurgents on the Marines’ target list.  Sha’ban continued to help us throughout the tour.  
He even provided us with some IPs during Shurta Nasir, our culminating operation.  
Much of that was due to Robert.  Robert was able to forge solid bonds with almost every 
Iraqi we worked with and this ability repeatedly paid dividends throughout our tour. 
We also partnered with 1–36 and General Zahid to conduct larger clearing 
operations.  Understandably, clearing operations have negative connotations in the COIN 
lexicon because they are associated with attrition-based strategies, but we found them 
useful when incorporated with our model city approach.  Communities that actively 
supported reinstatement of the IPs and suppressed violence were exempt.  Clearing 
operations conducted at night, coupled with our daytime combat patrols, afforded 
insurgents little rest.  Effort that insurgents had to expend on early warning and relocating 
was effort that they could not spend on targeting coalition forces, ISF, or friendly 
populations.  What we didn’t do was what Robert called “Cop Rock:” we didn’t raid for 
the sake of amassing statistics of enemy killed or captured, and materials destroyed. 
2. Shaping 
It’s about navigating people.  Most guys forget that and ignore the human 
aspects that influence the plan. They try to concretely execute planning 
concepts regardless of what the will of the people involved is.  You have 
to change their will or adjust to it. 
We treated each area and the people in it differently, yet consistently.  We were 
always considerate, spoke Arabic, and were thorough without being culturally invasive, 
even when using coercive methods.  We did everything in conjunction with local Iraqis.  
Robert stayed consistent throughout the entire tour, adhered to specific talking points he 
used, and made sure the team abided by them as well.  He always told people that the 
situation in al Anbar was going to get better.  Robert’s intent was to plant mental seeds so 
that once conditions did improve, continued improvement would become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy as people turned out to assist the coalition and ISF.  The only group Robert 
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condemned was AQAM.  He did not condemn the resistance, but he did oppose its use of 
violence.  In keeping with the idea of an Office of Bitches and Complaints (OBC), Robert 
publicized that we were willing to talk with members of the resistance at any time and 
listen to their grievances as well as forgive anyone willing to denounce continued 
participation in insurgent activity, so long as they did so in the presence of their local 
sheikh or imam.  Even if we couldn’t prove it, we knew that many of the sheikhs and 
police we talked to were direct or indirect conduits to national resistance groups like the 
1920th Revolutionary Brigade.  Robert crafted the following talking points to not only 
sway third party neutral segments toward our side, but to engage the resistance: 
• The situation will improve 
• AQAM is out to destroy your way of life 
• More can be gained from political participation than violent contention 
• The insurgency against the Iraqi government was strengthening Iran’s 
influence in Iraq 
• We were willing to sit down with any representatives of the resistance and 
hear them out 
• Acts of insurgent violence were criminal acts against the Iraqi people. 
 
In time, several older tribal sheikhs and imams began to vent to us.  They 
lamented the social wreckage that AQAM was inflicting on traditional tribal society in 
Anbar.  The older sheikhs voiced concern that they had lost control over the younger men 
in their tribes, the young twenty-somethings and teenagers.  Sheikh Anis told us that 
AQAM manipulated young men by framing insurgent life as romantic and heroic, but 
also by giving meaning to their young lives.  Robert instantly saw what was happening.  
Young men, dismayed by the lack of opportunity in their lives and, at a more basic level, 
needing to feel like men, were drawn in by AQAM’s overtures.  AQAM was able to 
fulfill psychological and physical needs in ways the sheikhs could not.  AQAM was 
unraveling traditional social structures and replacing traditional nodes of influence: 




and this provided us with opportunity.  Robert used this vulnerability to build solidarity 
with the sheikhs, and we used AQAM’s own framing devices to build internal support for 
the IPs with the sheikh’s consent and partnership. 
There was choreography to Robert’s deep discussions with tribal sheikhs and 
other elites.  Robert called it the tarot card analogy, but it really was a means by which to 
initiate an honest dialogue.  Robert would lay out the general situation then walk the 
person through what would happen if nothing changed.  Robert would next walk the 
person through the second and third order effects and potential outcomes that would 
result from positive change and actions taken by the person to facilitate reconciliation.  
This approach represented a combination of war-gaming, counseling, and listening.  
Robert engaged in a conversation, not a lecture.  The dialogue always evolved into a two-
way discussion of potential issues, complaints, and solutions.  In describing it, Robert 
said, “It came down to a discussion of the future as we saw it together.  I got them to 
trouble-shoot solutions with me.” 
A significant turning point occurred for us in October 10-12, 2006.93  We 
struggled as we tried to integrate the Nimr DPs into the local IA battalion as the scout 
platoon.  Petty jealousies, the DPs’ unique relationship with the ODA, and the DPs’ own 
intransigence created animosity between the DPs and the IA battalion commander.  The 
situation required our constant attention.  The IA battalion commander, eager to 
demonstrate his authority over the DPs, instigated confrontations through unfair 
treatment of them.  The DPs, in response, behaved flippantly and threatened to desert.  
The Marine MTT, responsible for advising the IA battalion, held a battalion formation to 
rehearse a memorial service for Captain Secher, a MiTT member who was killed on 
October 9.  The formation was struck by three incoming mortar rounds, which killed five 
Iraqi soldiers, wounded 34, and wounded one of the Marine advisors.94   
We heard the explosions of the incoming rounds from our compound adjacent to 
the Iraqi camp.  Being mortared at Camp Hit was a regular occurrence and we didn’t 
                                                 
93 The dates are approximate.  It occurred a day to a few days after Captain Secher was killed. 
94 Robert remembers evacuating 53 people; 34 wounded is the number that required extended 
hospitalization for their wounds and were not returned to duty after treatment. 
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think anything of it until two of the DPs, wounded, came staggering into our compound.  
ODA members immediately jumped in trucks and rushed to the impact site in the Iraqi 
camp to begin treating the wounded.  The remaining ODA members went to 1–36’s 
battalion aid station where we knew the wounded would be brought and triaged for 
medevac.  We assisted with medical treatment and translation.  All of the members on 
ODA 504 could speak at least passable Arabic.  Some of the wounded were screaming 
and others, not wounded, wandered around looking for their comrades.  We helped the 
battalion surgeon and medics by translating, brought order by calming down the 
unwounded Iraqis, and comforted some of the more seriously wounded.  This really 
helped the ODA later on.  The Iraqis saw our “Iraqiness,” and came to see us less as 
outsiders.95 
The attack happened just as night was falling.  Of the 28 Nimr DPs in the scout 
platoon, two were killed and six wounded.  Robert and I were quick to take control of our 
two dead Nimr soldiers, so we could deliver them to their families for burial.  Early the 
next morning, Robert, the ODA, and I escorted the bodies of our fallen Nimr to Tal 
Aswad, so that their families could bury them before sundown in keeping with Islamic 
tradition.  The surviving Nimr DPs were outraged.  They were not upset over the losses 
per se, but over the useless nature of their losses.  Even illiterate farmers and fishermen 
recognized the stupidity of holding a large troop formation in a camp that was regularly 
targeted by mortar and rocket fire.  We knew word about the casualties would spread 
quickly, like a contagion.  That is why Robert and I decided to take the bodies to the Tal 
Aswad police station and ask the police chief, Chief Ghanim, to contact the families and 
escort them to the station to receive the bodies.  Family and friends quickly descended on 
the police station, openly grieving and railing at coalition and Iraqi forces because of the 
senseless nature of the deaths.  There was no point in trying to allay their grief.  We had 
brought the surviving DPs with us.  We released them on leave and left. 
                                                 
95 On ODA 504, we had developed a list of 600 key Arabic words that every detachment member had 
to learn.  We conducted all of our FID training without the aid of interpreters, were able to intermix Iraqis 
into our truck crews, and conduct combat operations without interpreters if they were not available.  We did 
this deliberately because once a unit become reliant on interpreters, the host nation forces turned to the 
interpreter for guidance because he was the communicator.  We always wanted the Iraqis to turn to us first 
in any situation, thus we implemented intensive language training on ODA 504. 
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Before doing so, we traveled to Sheikh Anis’s to pay our respects and personally 
tell him what had happened before he heard a distorted version from the grieving 
relatives.  We expressed our sympathies for the families and acknowledged that we 
understood their frustrations.  Most importantly, we asked for his advice about how to 
handle the situation.  Sheikh Anis, in a very grandfatherly manner, counseled us about 
what to do.  Then, as we prepared to leave, he took me by the arm and whispered, “Do 
not worry.  You will soon receive the help that you need.”   
One of our goals had been to form a Hit district SWAT using the DPs.  We had 
repeatedly requested that RCT 7 work to get the DPs released from the Iraqi Army to 
serve as the foundation for SWAT.  We cited the persistent poor treatment of the DPs by 
the IA battalion commander and explained that he had alienated the DPs to the point that 
they would never be fully integrated into the predominantly Shia battalion.  Our requests 
were continually denied.  After the mortar attack, it was clear that the DPs would desert.   
We tried to get the DPs hired into the local IPs after they quit the army.  Some went to 
work as security for the al Gaaouds. 
In the weeks that followed, we spent more and more time in non-kinetic 
engagement.  Robert dedicated hours to listening and talking with sheikhs, with General 
Zahid, and with others.  We often invited General Zahid, Hasan, and members of their 
inner circle to stay the night at our team house.  The ODA members spent the evenings 
entertaining and conversing with our guests, always guided by Robert’s talking points.  
Robert also developed specific talking points to guide ODA members when we wanted to 
influence our guests in a particular direction.  Robert had endurance for marathon 
dialogues that far surpassed what anyone else on the team was capable of.  He would talk 
long into the night with our guests, without the aid of an interpreter.96   
Words, though, are meaningless without action.  We lived General Mattis’s 
dictum: “No worse enemy, no better friend,” which was both calculated and sincere.  In 
terms of non-kinetic engagement with the sheikhs, with friendly populations, and with 
                                                 
96 We had to frequently invite Zahid to stay.  Because of his initial willingness to fight AQAM and 
because of his stature among the Shamal, who made up most of the police, Zahid was an important figure.  
However, his erratic behavior, narcissism, and contempt for the Gaaouds required continued care so that he 
didn’t instigate intra-tribal conflict or make irresponsible decisions regarding the IPs just to serve his 
personal purposes. 
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third-party neutrals we, in Robert’s words, “…slowly delivered on everything like a girl 
dating a guy, and wanting to ensure the relationship ends in marriage, not just a one night 
stand—slowly.”  In other words, we did not promise or quickly deliver on large civil 
affairs contracts or other significant projects; we did not reduce our leverage.97  We also 
demonstrated that we would respond swiftly and decisively when engaged, and would 
just as quickly come to the defense of our Iraqi allies.   
In time, both the Shamal and Gaaouds acted as gateways through which we 
expanded our tribal engagement.  In some cases we reached out, in others the tribes 
approached us.  Sheikhs from Ramadi to Haditha requested audiences with us, and 
Robert used these contacts to actualize his Waterloo concept.  It was our goal to facilitate 
cooperation among the tribes against AQAM and, in the process, siphon off the 
reconcilable segments of the resistance.   
We knew about the Awakening in its early days as it coalesced under the banner 
of Sawar al Anbar (SAA).  We followed events in Ramadi through reporting, but also 
learned much from our Iraqi friends.  In late summer/early fall 2006, the coalition 
believed the Awakening was a localized event in Ramadi.  We assumed otherwise after 
noticing indicators that General Zahid was connected to Thawar al Anbar (TAA), the 
militant action arm of the SAA, Sheikh Sittar’s Awakening movement.  Robert handled 
this development in much the same way he did when trying to reach out to the 1920th 
Revolutionary Brigade via certain sheikhs and other intermediaries.  No Iraqi, save one 
contact, ever openly acknowledged that he had ties to the resistance.  Conversations 
always tap-danced around the issue with insinuations like, “I know that you know that I 
know…”  But our prodding resulted in an invitation, via Zahid, to meet with Sittar at his 
compound in Ramadi, an invitation we honored.   
By December 2005, we had developed good rapport with several Nimr sheikhs 
from Barwanna, the Obeidi in Baghdadi, the Albu Soda from Abu Tiban and Ramadi, the 
                                                 
97 This worked well for us until we were undercut by RCT 2.  RCT 2’s Civil Affairs element offered 
large civil affairs contracts to Sheikh Kasam, mostly as a method to buy cooperation.  We built 
relationships then very carefully used projects as subtle leverage in an escalating game of tit-for-tat, just as 
William had done in OIF II.  We also used dentcaps (dental civic action programs), humanitarian 
assistance, and medical assistance as tools in building our relationships with the tribes. 
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Mahal, the Albu Risha, and a smattering of other tribes.  Sheikh Kasam hosted periodic 
councils at his compound in Zuwayyah where we effected both the OBC and Waterloo 
concepts.  Leadership from RCT 7 (later RCT 2) and the MEF attended several councils.  
These meetings were especially important to us because we provided the sheikhs with 
talking points beforehand so that they could engage the Marine leadership in order to 
further our counterinsurgency concepts.98  Several sheikhs, to include Sittar on one 
occasion, asked us for advice in dealing with coalition forces.  Robert and Chief Pitt 
skillfully used these instances, combined with assessments sent via our daily situation 
reports, to influence all sides toward common goals. 
Sheikh Bizea was one of many older sheikhs who had sought refuge in Jordan 
after the invasion.  He and his sons, Talal and Jalal, along with other expatriate sheikhs 
and businessmen, maintained an on-again, off-again dialogue with the coalition.  Robert 
believed that Bizea and other expatriate sheikhs were maneuvering to stay relevant.  Prior 
to the Awakening, expatriates like Bizea maintained power and influence, and profited 
from the war by playing all sides: the coalition, the resistance, and AQAM.  Coalition 
forces helped exacerbate this situation when the CPA rejected overtures from Bizea and 
his son Talal in 2004 to create tribal security forces.99  The Awakening, which was an 
emergent grass roots movement, threatened to marginalize the expatriate sheikhs as the 
balance of power and influence started to shift to the sheikhs who had remained in Iraq, 
and now began aligning with the coalition.   
The complexity of all of these relationships was amazing.  Sheikh Bizea provided 
long distance counsel to Sheikh Kasam who was of the same family, but he sent an envoy 
to court General Zahid whose hatred of Kasam was no secret.  Sheikh Sittar initially 
communicated with Zahid through the SAA, but then established a direct link to Sheikh 
Kasam in accordance with tribal conventions, and assuaged Kasam’s concerns about 
Zahid by promising to manage Zahid via SAA channels.  The web of interactions and  
 
                                                 
98 In several instances, when we wanted to influence coalition forces in certain directions, we 
translated talking points into Arabic and had the sheikhs rehearse. 
99 West, The Strongest Tribe, 24. 
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duplicity went on and on.  What they signified was that even amidst the fight for survival 
against AQAM, there was intense inter and intra-tribal maneuvering, all aimed at control 
of resources, coalition support, contracts, IPs, etc.   
Whereas many other Americans would have picked a side, Robert worked all of 
them.  Robert recognized the value of acting as a central node among competing entities.  
We manipulated the competition and used resources to influence, enhance, and 
sometimes force cooperation toward our counterinsurgency goals.  For example, an astute 
Army Civil Affairs Major working for 504’s AOB realized that his team could enjoin the 
Albu Sadi near Baghdadi to support coalition goals if directed by their paramount sheikh, 
Sheikh Rad.  Unfortunately, Rad was incarcerated at Camp Bucca for allegedly 
participating in the killing of a Nimr man.  Rad was most likely the victim of an intra-
tribal power play and had been set up.  The AOB recommended his release, which the 
Marines also supported it. Although we were able to demonstrate that the charges were 
very likely false, we still had to make sure that the Nimr would be okay with Rad’s 
release.   
We also needed to gain Sheikh Rad’s friendship and support in the face of the fact 
that he had spent approximately two years in confinement for a crime he didn’t commit.  
To accomplish both we decided to take control of Rad upon his release and sequester him 
for three days with tribal allies who would follow a prearranged repatriation program 
designed to bring Rad up to date on the status of the Awakening and secure his support, 
and hence his tribe’s support.  We initially approached Sheikh Sittar with our repatriation 
idea, then told Sheikhs Anis and Kasam that we were going to work through Sittar to 
avoid conflict with the Nimr.  Anis and Kasam’s responses were to promise 
reconciliation between the tribes.  They then requested the opportunity to repatriate 
Sheikh Rad, which we happily agreed to.   
Even as we were training and advising the IA scouts (DPs), we and 1–36 put 
together a plan to create a SWAT element for the district IPs.  Our ODA goal was to 
create a local, legitimate band of samurai to go after AQAM, while 1–36 wanted the IPs 
to have a direct action capability.  The ODA and 1–36 collaborated to create the SWAT, 
which proved to be a significant logistical challenge.  The phenomenal expansion of the 
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Hit District IPs meant that 1–36 and the Marine PTT assigned to the IPs could not 
adequately equip the IPs they were already overseeing, let alone provide the necessary 
tactical gear to outfit the SWAT.  Consequently, Robert and Chief Pitt solicited support 
from Hasan al Gaaoud and the Gaaoud family.  The Gaaouds helped by purchasing and 
donating uniforms, plate carriers, AK-47 chest rigs, and other items.100 
We put the Hit SWAT through a mini selection and an intensive 30-day training 
regimen beginning in October.  By December 2006, we had two SWAT platoons capable 
of conducting unilateral operations.  On one of their first unilateral forays, the SWAT 
uncovered an impressive arms cache that included two SA-14 man-portable surface-to-air 
missiles.  The SWAT routinely mobilized and conducted unilateral patrols or raids based 
on walk-in informants.  The SWAT captured a Yemeni foreign fighter transiting the 
desert routes that lay between the Euphrates and Thar Thar Lake.  Not to be outdone, the 
Tal Aswad IPs responded by mounting their own aggressive patrols.  Led by Chief 
Ghanim, the Tal Aswad IPs captured several insurgents and foreign fighters along these 
routes and drove others off in running gunfights.  The SWAT’s success inspired 
emulation and jealousy within the rank-and-file IPs.  General Zahid constantly tried to 
undermine the SWAT because we would not allow SWAT to become his dedicated 
praetorian guard.  We conditioned the SWAT to serve the people and not cater to Zahid’s 
nepotistic wishes.  This would later come back to bite us.   
Robert had, by December 2006, realized all of his concepts to some degree.  The 
OBC existed, not formally, but in concept as we routinely held councils with sheikhs and 
other elites.  The Hit SWAT were our samurai and there was evidence that TAA was 
beginning to actively target AQAM in the Hit area, which also achieved our samurai 
concept.101  The Fort Apache concept existed in the communities that aligned with us: 
Barwanna, Baghdadi, Hai al Bekr, al Phurat, Abu Tiban, etc.102  The Gray Ghost concept 
                                                 
100 The items were purchased through business associates in Baghdad. 
101 As noted, the Tal Aswad and Baghdadi IPs became more aggressive as well. 
102 We did not work in Barwanna; the Marines and our sister ODA, 502 did.  The Barwanna Nimr 
sheikhs first approached us seeking to establish a relationship and to emulate the coalition-tribal 
collaboration in our AO.  We met with them routinely at our councils, but handed them off to ODA 502 to 
work with directly. 
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was manifest in these communities and in areas in between.  The Waterloo concept also 
began to materialize.  Several individuals began to attend our councils in Zuwayyah who 
I recognized from previously having been on our target list and we knew that every time 
we spoke with certain individuals our message was being carried to nationalist resistance 
groups like Mohammed’s Army, 1920th Revolutionary Brigade, Baathist entities, and 
others. 
We also had multiple indicators that the fruits of Robert’s endeavors were 
negatively impacting the enemy.  AQAM tried to disrupt our tribal alliances and target 
our tribal allies.  Robert, Hasan, and I were targeted with an IED after leaving a Hit city 
council meeting.  An SVBIED tried to strike the Zuwayyah police station.  A suicide 
bomber dressed in a burka attacked the IPs at the Hit Bridge, and the IPs and their 
families were targeted for murder or kidnapping if they departed our base areas.  
Additionally, we had indications that we, along with the emergent Awakening movement, 
were swaying third party neutrals.  The Albu Soda and other tribes living in Abu Tiban 
established an unofficial tribal police force to protect their community, but observed the 
legitimacy of the Hit district IPs by coordinating their actions with General Zahid.  Tribal 
leaders from areas outside of Hit district came to us at various points to seek advice on 
how to achieve the same level of collaboration with coalition forces that we had in Hit 
district. 
3. Culmination 
We were transparent to the people: ‘Here is what we believe is good and 
bad.  We believe in your way of life.’  We always made it clear that we 
worked with people; they did not work for us.  We never built resentment 
and we never made threats that we couldn’t keep. 
Despite our progress among the tribes outside of Hit, Hit continued to be a 
cesspool of insurgent activity.  The only Iraqi civilian medical facility in the area was the 
Hit hospital.  The Hit hospital lay deep in one of the insurgent-controlled neighborhoods.   
Coalition forces routinely came under fire in that area.  Pro-coalition civilians could not 
contemplate even going to the hospital.  Several people from the pro-coalition 
communities on the northeast side of the Euphrates died as a result of lack of medical 
 81
care.  The lack of access to good medical care began to weigh heavily on the minds of 
some of the IPs.  In response, we, working with a Civil Affairs team, initiated the 
building of a clinic in al Phurat.  Although the clinic was not finished before our tour was 
completed, the psychological effect of at least seeming to respond to the immediate needs 
of our tribal allies was extremely positive.   
We bypassed doing anything ourselves in Hit for reasons previously described, 
and because we did not want to be drawn into making Hit a battlefield, something that the 
insurgents sought.  However, beginning in November, we began making routine 
excursions into the city at night with the SWAT.  Sometimes we had targeted 
intelligence.  Most of our informants had made their final break with the insurgency and 
had come over to our side.  Through them, we knew where the families of some of the 
hard-core insurgents lived.  We treated these locations, along with their safe houses, like 
fishing holes, visiting them to put more pressure on the enemy.  We also prowled around 
to prevent the emplacement of IEDs; we reported or cut the wires on IEDs that we found; 
and, on one occasion, the night before a planned 1–36 daylight operation, we discovered 
an IED factory with IEDs ready to go.   
General Zahid also began sending nightly IP patrols through Hit.  The purpose of 
these patrols, besides making it more difficult for the enemy to rest, was to boost the 
confidence of the IPs and to enhance their sense that they had control over the situation, 
and over the enemy.  All of this was critical preparation for an eventual showdown and 
the “reconquest” of Hit. 
Robert envisioned an operation in which the IPs, supported by coalition forces, 
would sweep through Hit, driving out AQAM, and reclaiming permanent control of the 
city.  Robert planted the idea in Hasan’s and Zahid’s minds very early in our tour and 
routinely revisited the subject, sometimes subtly, other times more directly.  Robert 
played upon Zahid’s narcissism, manipulating his desire to be a revered public figure, 
equal to the sheikhs in stature and respect.  Hasan, because of his loyalty—or maybe his 
pragmatism, we will never truly know—was easier to work with.   
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The issue of when the conditions would permit a successful reconquest was a 
topic of intense debate within the team.  By November, we had developed sufficient 
contacts who had access to the 1920th Revolutionary Brigade and even some other fringe 
elements that we thought we could ensure a successful operation.  Without these contacts, 
the enemy owned the information, and without these contacts, we wouldn’t be able to 
turn the Hit population to our side to turn on additional spigots of information. 
The first break came in November when Zahid asked us to secure the release of a 
man named Ma’mun.  Ma’mun worked for Zahid as an informant and was detained by 
coalition forces.  We obtained Ma’mun’s release.  He subsequently had a falling out with 
Zahid and began providing us information directly.  Ma’mun came from an established 
family in Hit and was a “former” member of the 1920th Revolutionary Brigade.  The 
second break came when Ma’mun introduced us to an imam whom we called Abu 
Abdullah.  Abu Abdullah had extensive knowledge of the insurgency between Hit and 
Baghdadi.  He had operated a rural mosque and insurgents met there routinely to plan, 
pray, or hide.  He had abandoned his duty caretaking the mosque because both coalition 
forces and the insurgents were after him.  Each side suspected him of working for the 
other.  He finally came to us.  The Gaaouds provided Abu Abdullah with sanctuary and 
served as a go-between with Ma’mun.  This action led to an even deeper rift with Zahid, 
but could not be helped.103 
The last break came when Robert met with a man named Ibrahim Medani.  
Medani was an influential sheikh who resided in what is called the Teacher’s district of 
Hit.  Robert met Medani while the ODA and SWAT were supporting a 1–36 operation in 
Hit.  1–36 conducted a major daylight operation along Cherry Street in December.  We 
split the ODA into three cells and each cell teamed up with a SWAT element and 
patrolled into the city to cover the flanks of the 1–36 main effort.  Since he was patrolling 
through Medani’s neighborhood, Robert decided to drop in on Medani.  As Robert 
remembered it: 
                                                 
103 Reflecting back on Sheikh Anis’s statement, “You will soon receive the help that you need,” it 
appeared to Robert and I that the Nimr, and  really the Gaaouds, were facilitating the personal connections 
that later made our culminating operation, Shurta Nasir, possible. 
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Sheikh Medani was always portrayed as a sickly old man by the 1/36 Cdr, 
but when I met him he was a vibrant, wise, and interestingly intelligent 
older gentleman.  His tribal area was the Teacher’s district, nearly a third 
of the town.  It had a large number of personnel involved in JTJ and that is 
why they had no problems conducting attacks on Iraqis down by the 
hospital.  It was interesting that no big players resided in the area of town 
by the hospital, but all of the carnage occurred there.  The main thing with 
Medani was that innocent people were getting hurt and it was mainly the 
Americans doing the hurting after being shot.  He was the main venue for 
reconciliation prior to Shurta Nasir.  Medani cooperated by keeping his 
word and pushing for a 1920th ceasefire; he leveled the playing field for 
us.  He was all grins when I visited him later, during Shurta Nasir. 
Medani admitted that Robert impressed him by casually sitting with him and 
conversing in Arabic despite having an interpreter present.  Medani told Robert that he 
had never met another American like him, and wished they had met sooner.  Up until this 
point, Medani hadn’t really figured into our planning.  We had previously had only vague 
information about him.  Robert realized how influential Medani really was at this 
impromptu meeting and took the time to pull Medani in and obtain his cooperation. 
We finally agreed that by December 2006, conditions would be sufficient to 
retake the city, but the decision was ultimately settled by forces outside our direct control, 
the battlespace owners.  1–36 suffered a long hard tour in Hit, with many casualties.  It 
had built a 700 man district police force and opened four additional police stations, 
expanding far beyond the al Phurat police force in Zuwayyah.  1–36’s final major 
operation was to establish a permanent police station in Hit near Traffic Circle 2, in the 
vicinity of the market and astride Route Mavericks.  We would have liked to have 
convinced 1–36 to reconquer Hit with us, but we could sense that 1–36’s commander was 
unwilling.  Given the circumstances of 1–36’s tour and the unit’s imminent 
redeployment, this was perfectly understandable.  We began thinking about how to 
convince the incoming unit, 2–7 Infantry, to support our plan.104 
Task Force 2–7 assumed control of the battlespace from 1–36 in January 2007.  
We decided to try the same indirect approach with them that had served us so well 
throughout our tour.  Because of Sheikh Sittar’s growing stature and the incipient 
                                                 
104 2–7 Infantry: 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division. 
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Awakening, coalition forces were enamored with the idea of the Sunnis rising up against 
AQAM.  We took advantage of this fixation.  We coached Hasan and Zahid to present a 
unified plan to the 2–7 commander for reclaiming Hit.  It took considerable time and 
effort to bring these two together in a coordinated pitch to 2–7.   
Robert, Chief Pitt, and I sat with 2–7’s commander, Ma’mun, Hasan, and Zahid in 
Zahid’s office at the district IP station, and Hasan and Zahid presented “their” idea.    
Zahid, either due to his extreme narcissism, or maybe his confidence really was this 
unshakable, told the 2–7 commander that he could rid Hit of all “terrorists” in two days 
time, but required coalition support for logistics and to cordon off the city.  The 2–7 
commander looked to us for confirmation of Zahid’s ability to carry this out.  We 
affirmed that he could, but suggested four days might be better.  The resulting operation 
was named Shurta Nasir. 
Two popular, abbreviated accounts of Operation Shurta Nasir are found on the 
next two pages.  One is the official MNC-I press release and the other taken from 
Wikipedia.  These accounts, while never complete nor entirely accurate, nonetheless 
provide a sense of the scale of support that coalition forces provided the IPs.  2–7, in 
short order, developed a plan to completely isolate Hit by cordoning it off, but 2–7’s most 
impressive action, by far was in the realm of logistical support.  2–7 built and pre-staged 
logistical packages and assets so that as soon as the IPs had secured template locations 
for the establishment of additional IP stations, fortification and reinforcement of these 
sites could begin. 
Despite the significant logistical challenges, the most difficult part of the 
operation proved to be maintaining solidarity amongst the key Iraqi players.  
Unbeknownst to most observers, General Zahid almost derailed the entire operation.  The 
day before the operation Zahid decided to arrest Ma’mun, not for valid reasons, but 
because Ma’mun had somewhat out-shown Zahid during the planning for Operation 
Shurta Nasir.  Ma’mun was our resident “insider,” and therefore provided crucial advice 
about how to best execute Operation Shurta Nasir without alienating Hit’s citizens.  But 
Ma’mun had also made the “mistake” of developing a closer relationship with Hasan than 
with Zahid.   
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Zahid wanted more than anything to be thought of as the conquering hero, and in 
dramatic fashion typical of his behavior, threatened to not participate.  The whole point of 
the operation was to support an Iraqi-led, Iraqi-executed plan with minimal numbers of 
Americans in the background, and with the ODA and the PTT advising the IPs.  While it 
would have been possible to continue without Zahid, to do so would have undermined 
these efforts to reinforce and utilize the Iraqi chain of command.  Robert worked hard to 
keep Zahid on board.  He invited Zahid to stay at the team house and consequently stayed 
up all night talking Zahid in circles until Zahid convinced himself to be the “better man” 
and set aside his differences with Hasan for the good of the community. 
Task Force 2–7 began sealing off Hit on February 15, 2007.  On the morning of 
the 16th General Zahid, the IPs, IP SWAT, the ODA, and the PTT were to begin the main 
effort.  The operation was supposed to unfold in the following sequence: first, 2–7 would 
isolate the city, controlling all entry and exit.  Next, the SWAT would seize the main 
mosque in Hai al Bekr and the Green Mosque in Hit, located in the market 200 meters 
from the bridge.  Zahid would then begin broadcasting instructions from both mosques.  
He was to declare a 72-hour curfew, instruct all civilians to remain in their homes, and 
announce that any vehicles seen moving on the streets would be considered hostile.105  
After that, the SWAT would begin targeted raids in Hit, and clear neighborhoods 
considered insurgent sanctuaries. Robert and an ODA cell would accompany the 
SWAT.106  Robert was also going to use this opportunity to meet with key tribal and 







                                                 
105 Zahid took seriously the threat of SVBIEDs; he also concurred with us that previous sniper attacks 
had most likely been executed from a car. 










Figure 9.   MNC-I Press Release of Operation Shurta Nasir107 
                                                 
107 Multi-National Corps – Iraq, press release, “Iraqi Police Conduct Operation Shurta Nasir to clear 
Hit of Insurgents,” 
 http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10117&Itemid=128  
(accessed October 14, 2009).  
 87
 
Figure 10.   Excerpt from Wikipedia on Operation Shurta Nasir108 
Chief Pitt led an ODA cell, some SWAT, and IPs, and patrolled into Hit to 
establish a forward command post near the city center.  This provided direct over-watch 
along Cherry Street and Hit’s southernmost neighborhood.  Cherry Street had been Hit’s 
most dangerous street and the southern neighborhood was an insurgent sanctuary.  It was 
on Cherry Street and the approaches to this neighborhood that 1–36 had suffered the most 
catastrophic IED strikes.  The plan was to put a police station midway along Cherry 
Street and another in the middle of this neighborhood.   
                                                 
108 Wikipedia, “Hit During the War,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H%C4%ABt_during_the_Iraq_War 
(accessed October 14, 2009).  Reference the comment in paragraph two where the contributor states, 
“Before the operation the Hit Police were overrun while trying to establish new police station in the city”  
—neither I nor any of the persons I interviewed know what this comment refers to.  Insurgents did conduct 
a coordinated attack on the IP station at Traffic Circle 2 shortly after it was established, but the attack was 
beaten back.  There were no other sustained attempts to attack that IP station during ODA 504’s OIF IV 
tour.  
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As this was unfolding, I was supposed to take General Zahid and a large force of 
IPs to patrol the area between Hit and Mohammedi.  This area was comprised of palm 
groves, quarries, junk yards, and chicken farms that were commonly used by all manner 
of criminals and insurgents.  We knew that, despite pained efforts to maintain operational 
security, insurgents in Hit would have sensed “something” going on and fled to these 
areas.   
Lastly, after the SWAT had cleared and secured the proposed IP station sites, 
Robert would call in the PTTs who would arrive with IPs, logistical packages, and assets 
to begin building the IP stations.  We gave ourselves four days to conclude the entire 
operation and begin restoring a controlled normalcy to the city.109 
That was the plan.  Here is what happened: General Zahid was hours late 
marshaling his IPs, and then seemed to stall.110  We suffered the delay as long as we 
could, but finally launched the SWAT to seize the mosques and begin announcing the 
curfew.  This inspired several aggressive younger officers who worked for Zahid.  They 
rounded up IPs, manned IP pick-up trucks, and drove straight to all of the insurgent-
affiliated mosques in Hit.  They cleared the mosques and began announcing the curfew.  
Robert, his cell, and the SWAT seized the building on Cherry Street that was to become 
the Cherry Street IP station and turned it over to the IPs.    After that, Robert and his gang 
spent 96 hours clearing and raiding throughout the entire city, acting on information 
provided by Ma’mun and citizens who began to come forward.   
Robert cleared the whole city without a shot being fired.  It seemed evident that 
Medani had made good on his word, but we believed that Zahid also had something to do 
with the lack of insurgent resistance.  The 2–7 PTT commander—a young engineer 
captain and someone who excelled at working with Iraqis—and I, as patiently as we 
                                                 
109 Another challenging aspect of the operation was to keep the IPs working four straight days.   
Something so simple actually caused great consternation among many of the IPs.  There were no such 
issues with the SWAT. 
110 The IPs were predominantly Nimr and all came from the Tal Aswad, Zuwayyah, Hail al Bekr, and 
Hit stations.  The Kubaysa IPs did not want to participate and, at any rate, were less capable and certainly 
less reliable.  The PTT and Zahid had carefully worked out how many IPs would be left behind to man the 
IP stations in Tal Aswad, Zuwayyah, and Hai al Bekr, and patrol their jurisdictions. 
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could, worked on assembling enough IPs to perform our tasks.111  Zahid was still stalling.  
It was apparent that he did not want to conduct his patrol outside of Hit.  Instead, I 
redirected him to seize the IP station in the southern neighborhood along with the 
hospital.   
I could have “played hardball” and forced Zahid to help us conduct the patrol 
between Hit and Mohammedi, but then I wouldn’t have been confident about him if we 
made contact with the enemy.  It would have been me, two other members of 504, a Civil 
Affairs team, and a host of IPs whom we knew, but had not trained.  Zahid had 
handpicked many of these IPs for their loyalty to him.  Robert and I have since discussed 
these events at length, and we strongly believe that Zahid cut a deal that allowed him to 
take the city unopposed so that he could play the part of conquering hero, while the 
insurgents in turn avoided capture or death.  This would explain why he was so cocksure 
about being able to clear the city in two days.  Worth noting is that in a city that for 
months had been the nucleus of insurgent activity and violence—to the extent that 1–36 
had lost Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles to IEDs and foot patrols usually 
ended in firefights—we took the city without a shot fired.  Then there were Zahid’s 
stalling tactics, which prevented him from having to patrol insurgent havens south of 
town.   
We didn’t believe that Zahid’s motives were nefarious so much as they were 
designed to protect his image.  He had taken to carrying an ax handle and dispensing 
tough rhetoric, a caricature of Sheriff Buford Pusser as portrayed in the semi-biopic 
movie Walking Tall.  Why chance spoiling his image by potentially getting his nose 
bloodied in a fight with insurgents?  Besides, even Zahid understood that the tide in 
Anbar was turning, and that by letting the insurgents run away he could still win.  Of 
course, it could also be that he was able to win without fighting because with his 
connections to TAA, he would have constituted a credible threat in the insurgents’ eyes.  
He may have used this to his advantage and given the insurgents a way out without their 
having to fight, again because if they ran and he stayed, he won. 
                                                 
111 There were two PTTs, one a Marine PTT from CPATT, and the other a PTT constituted of soldiers 
from 2–7, led by this young captain. 
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William always said, “If we stay and they [insurgents] go, we win.”  Robert and I 
said it again during planning to remind ourselves not to become too fixated on 
statistics.112  After Operation Shurta Nasir, the coalition and ISF controlled Hit.  We had 
three IP stations in town, checkpoints at key locations, a permanent outpost at the 
hospital, and permanent checkpoints controlling the major roads into Hit.  We left the 
minor roads permanently blocked.  General Petraeus visited several weeks after the 
operation and he, 2–7’s commander, Zahid, and Hasan strolled down Cherry Street—
something that was inconceivable just a month before.  In a final bit of irony, Zahid and 
Hasan used an ODA tactic on General Petraeus.  They were supposed to be present at the 
Cherry Street IP station awaiting him and the 2–7 commander, but on the one and only 
occasion Zahid and Hasan willingly worked together, they slipped out and went for a 
walk.  They deliberately returned late, after General Petraeus’ arrival, so that he would 
have to stand to greet them. 
F. AFTERMATH 
Make them [enemy] wonder what’s going to happen next—this is hard for 
conventional forces.  Conventional forces tend to stay static after they 
secure an area.  They do not kinetically/non-kinetically continue to pursue 
the enemy, staying within his decision cycle.  They become too concerned 
with building the support of the population.  They assume the cancer is in 
remission when it may not be. 
The ODA, members of our company headquarters, the SWAT, and a handful of other IPs 
launched into the areas south of Hit on the last day of Shurta Nasir.  Our first stop was a 
chicken farm.  Chicken farms were notorious for their use by insurgents.  We went to this 
one because an IP had taken me aside that morning and told me he knew of a cache 
located at the chicken farm.  He took me right to it.  Each of the chicken houses had a 
water tank perched on a cinderblock pedestal; the pedestals were hollow, containing large 
caches of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other items.  We would have never 
                                                 
112 RCT 2, which had replaced RCT 7, was openly disappointed with the lack of detainees to come 
from the operation.  They were further frustrated that several detainees whom informants identified as 
known insurgents could not be processed because of lack of evidence.   
On a separate note, “we stay, they run,” must be reinforced with an aggressive IO campaign.  The 
public has to understand what had to happen so victory could be complete. 
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found them on our own.113  As my cell was uncovering the caches, Robert’s cell and 
some of the SWAT continued on to another nearby chicken farm.  There they were met 
by gunfire and in an ensuing firefight killed two Syrian foreign fighters.  This event 
seemed to confirm our suspicions that Zahid had brokered a deal.  We would continue to 
visit this area in the near future. 
After Shurta Nasir, we waited for the insurgents’ counterstrike.  We were sure 
that it was only a matter of time before SVBIEDs started coming our way, and that they 
would come from the south.  We worked hard to gather specific information that would 
help us stave off the inevitable, but we mostly encountered rumors.  It seemed that most 
people in Hit were thinking the same thing that we were and, as a result, the rumor mill 
was running full time.  Sure enough, within a few days an SVBIED traveling north on 
Route Bronze from Mohammedi struck an IP checkpoint that was established as part of 
an outer net to interdict just such an attack.   
Ma’mun told Robert that he heard there were at least two more car bombs 
prepped and hidden near Mohammedi.  The ODA conducted repeated combat patrols into 
this area, and Robert tenaciously ferreted out two VBIEDs hidden in a maze of desert 
recesses formed by quarries and wadis.  Almost any other person would have given up.  
But not Robert.  Robert also had the ability to patrol the same area that conventional 
forces had covered a hundred times and find something.  The difference was that Robert 
never simply “patrolled through” an area.  Robert investigated.  He talked, questioned, 
and poked around.  Robert knew Iraqis well enough that he could sense when something 
wasn’t right, and he would keep digging until he found out what it was.  Finding the other 
two SVBIEDs was important.  It signaled to the IPs that they weren’t just cannon fodder 
for checkpoints, but that we—and the SWAT—were trying to protect them. 
We only had six weeks left in our tour when Shurta Nasir concluded.  It was a 
busy six weeks.  Before Shurta Nasir, we had begun reaching out to a Mahal sheikh 
living in Mohammedi, who had brutally lost two sons to AQAM, to see what the 
possibility of flipping Mohammedi might be.  He was too intimidated to even speak with 
                                                 
113 I remember thinking that I was glad that this IP switched sides and gave up the goods.  There was 
no doubt that many of our IPs had done the same; that was the point of the whole exercise. 
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us.  After Shurta Nasir, however, people from Mohammedi contacted Zahid and 
requested help establishing a police force and IP station.  Mohammedi was on the verge 
of tipping, and Zahid, trapped by the image that he had created, did not want to say “no.”  
He asked the ODA for advice, knowing that any new IP stations or forces ultimately had 
to be sanctioned through coalition forces, the provincial government, and the Ministry of 
the Interior.  But, flipping Mohammedi was an opportunity not to be squandered, which 
would have happened had we left the opening of a new IP station to bureaucratic 
processes.  So we told Zahid to just do it, and he did.  He took a contingent of Hit IPs and 
stuck them in Mohammedi to get things going.  We reported it, adding that it would be 
foolish for coalition forces not to support communities openly defying the insurgency and 
aligning themselves with the Iraqi government.  2–7 was thus obligated to establish a 
presence in Mohammedi to support the new IP station.  Shortly thereafter, Zahid repeated 
his actions in Abu Tiban. 
The opening of IP stations in Mohammedi and Abu Tiban was fortunate because 
this automatically brought tribes other than the Nimr into the Hit District IP force.  Now 
that the district was secured, the Nimr advised us to begin integrating in these other 
tribes.  The Nimr intuitively understood that the IPs’ legitimacy in Hit depended on 
having Hit citizens on the force.  This was a matter that could not wait.  The immediate 
problem was that, until now, IPs were supposed to attend the Iraqi Police Academy, 
hosted in Jordan.  This meant subjecting recruits to an unnecessarily long process that 
didn’t meet situational requirements to quickly integrate the force.  The ODA presented 
an idea to 2–7 to instead recruit IPs from Hit and put them through an intensive 40-hour 
basic training course at Camp Hit with the SWAT acting as cadre.  The new IPs could 
then be rotated through the police academy at a later date.  We also presented a complete 
40-hour program of instruction (POI).114  Both 2–7 and RCT 2 supported implementation 
of this idea.  2–7 recruited 150 IPs from Hit proper, and the ODA oversaw the SWAT as 
it put the first 50 recruits through the 40-hour POI two weeks before we rotated home.   
Two PTT teams worked with the Hit IPs.  CPATT provided the official PTT that 
was responsible for overall administrative oversight of the IPs, to include their pay.  The 
                                                 
114 This was an idea we had tried to implement at a much earlier date, but could not get accepted. 
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second PTT team was organized by 2–7, taken out of hide, to supplement the CPATT 
PTT due to expanding requirements associated with growing the IP force.  The CPATT 
PTT’s tour ended shortly before Shurta Nasir.  We later learned from their replacements 
that our SWAT was not on the IP payroll. Managing the payroll had produced constant 
problems for the preceding PTT because Zahid continually tried to hire and fire IPs.  
Evidently, he had at some point stricken the SWAT from the roll.  The previous PTT had 
consistently paid the SWAT, but had not adjusted the books.  The new PTT refused to 
pay the SWAT. 
This is what we were left with: the SWAT, the least corrupt element of the district 
IPs, an element that was capable of unilateral action, and had borne the brunt of the heavy 
lifting during Shurta Nasir—had helped locate SVBIEDs intended to strike the IPs and 
coalition forces, and was now running the forty-hour IP basic training—was being left high 
and dry.  The legitimate process of reinstating SWAT members as official IPs and getting 
them back on the payroll was, according to the PTT, a difficult process because the district 
was already over-strength for IPs.  We implored the 2–7 commander and RCT 2 to intervene 
and find a way to reinstate the SWAT, or at least find the necessary funds, but we received no 
support.  No one was willing to say that the system was broken, acknowledge that the right 
thing to do was to take care of the SWAT, and then make an effort to do that.  We were 
stonewalled by “Ameri-can’ts.” 
Robert was furious.  2–7’s reputation was built on the SWAT, but 2–7 failed to 
acknowledge this truth and now chose to look at the issue in black and white terms.   The 
SWAT consequently worked for us for two months without pay.  We did what we could 
to help them.  Even Hasan provided what he could to financially help support the 
SWAT’s families.  Zahid, meanwhile, cleverly convinced the SWAT that Hasan was at 
fault for their situation, not him.  Even more frustrating, this situation came to a head 
during our changeover with the ODA replacing us.  We weren’t able to see it through, 
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VI. ANALYSIS: HOW TO MAKE SENSE OUT OF WHY 
WILLIAM AND ROBERT DID WHAT THEY DID 
A. WHERE DOES AN UNCONVENTIONAL MIND COME FROM? 
Howard Gardner, in Frames of Mind, challenges the common assumption that 
intelligence is a single general capacity that every person possesses to varying degrees.  
Instead, Gardner presents the idea that there are multiple intelligences and that each 
person has his or her own unique cognitive profile, which is a result of natural proclivities 
and undergoing the right experiences to develop those proclivities.  Gardner posits that 
there are at least seven different interdependent frames of intelligence, which may be 
combined in adaptive ways if a person has the right acumen.   
One of the intelligences Gardner identifies is “personal intelligence.”  Personal 
intelligence is essentially an acute sense of self, the ability to read people and situations, 
and adapt one’s self to them.  There is also an inward aspect that involves understanding 
one’s own emotive and cognitive functions.  Together, these skills enable individuals to 
read particular social situations correctly, determine the likely behavior of others and the 
consequences of their own behavior, and subsequently execute the right sequence of 
moves to achieve their goals.115  Psychologist Robert Sternberg calls this practical 
intelligence, because it involves possessing knowledge not for its own sake, but for 
specific, practical purposes.116  In many instances, people with this ability know how to 
do something without knowing why they know how to do it or being able to explain how 
they know what to do.   
A person’s proclivity for practical intelligence is biological, but application of 
intelligence requires knowledge and knowledge is learned.  In his book Outliers, 
Malcolm Gladwell demonstrates through several short case studies that practical 
intelligence amounts to social savvy that is part attitude, part skill, and part knowledge.  
Gladwell contends that the basis for practical intelligence is genetic, but social savvy is 
                                                 
115 Howard Gardner, Frames of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 254. 
116 Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2008), 101. 
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mostly learned from those around a person when he or she is growing up.  In most cases, 
this is family.  Furthermore, culture matters.  For example, a person growing up in the 
heart of the Appalachians of West Virginia and a person growing up in eastern 
Washington State will share fundamental similarities determined by a common American 
culture, but with added local wrinkles, since “on top” of personality “are tendencies and 
assumptions and reflexes handed down to us by the history of the community we grew up 
in…”117  In other words, some individuals’ development places them to the far right of 
the spectrum, eclipsing most others in terms of their capacity in a particular intelligence 
or skill. 
Malcolm Gladwell asserts that natural gifts and hard work are not enough to 
explain extraordinarily successful individuals.  Outliers, those who deviate from the 
mean, are the result of individual proclivities and “hidden advantages and extraordinary 
opportunities and cultural legacies that allow them to learn and work hard and make 
sense of the world in ways others cannot.”118  He additionally proposes that, “It makes a 
difference where and when we grew up.  The culture we belong to and the legacies 
passed down by our forbears shape the patterns of our achievement in ways we cannot 
begin to imagine.  It’s not enough to ask what successful people are like, in other words.  
It is only by asking where they are from that we can unravel the logic behind who 
succeeds and who doesn’t.”119   
Gardner also identifies several higher-level cognitive operations that some 
individuals seem to possess to an unusually high degree.  These are: common sense, “the 
ability to deal with problems in an intuitive, rapid, and perhaps unexpectedly accurate 
manner;” originality, “the skill of fashioning an unfamiliar and yet worthy product;” 
metaphorical capacity, the ability “to perceive analogies and to cut across various 
intellectual domains in the process of forging illuminating connections;” and wisdom, 
“general synthesizing power.”120  More than anything else, these higher-order cognitive 
                                                 
117 Gladwell, Outliers, 204. 
118 Ibid., 19.  
119 Ibid., 19. 
120 Gardner, Frames of Mind, 286–293. 
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abilities, because they are rare, and even more difficult to explain, may be indicative of 
an unconventional kind of mind.  Again, as Gladwell suggests, the only way to 
understand why someone possesses one or more of these higher-order abilities is to 
unpack that person’s experiences, relationships, and development. 
B. HOW DO PEOPLE WITH UNCONVENTIONAL MINDS THINK? 
In his book, Sources of Power, Gary Klein observes that most studies in decision 
making have focused on human limitations—why people make poor decisions—and what 
type of systems can be employed to help people make better decisions.  This, he points 
out, is the conventional approach.  Klein labels the abilities that people draw on to help 
them make decisions “sources of power.”  For Klein, deductive logical thinking, analysis 
of probabilities, and statistical methods represent conventional sources of power.  In 
contrast, Klein’s research focuses on naturalistic decision making.  Naturalistic decision 
making is decision making in a field environment, and draws on different sources of 
power: the power of intuition, metaphor, mental simulation, and storytelling.121    . 
People often misconceive intuition as a ‘gut’ feel or reaction.  But in fact, each of 
the unconventional sources of power Klein describes depends on a person’s experience 
bank.  Experts naturally have deeper experience banks than non-experts.  Current 
conventional wisdom holds that it takes ten years or 10,000 hours of practice to make an 
expert, and the conventional perspective is that experts have more facts or rules at their 
disposal as result of their practice or experience.  However, according to Klein, facts, 
knowledge, and rules are incidental to becoming an expert; what really defines an expert 
is being able to perceive.  Yes, experts have refined their ability to perceive through 
practice and experience, but they can still perceive more; they can see different shades of 
black.122  They can see more shades of black thanks to their ability to think across 
seemingly unrelated domains.    
                                                 
121 Klein, Sources of Power, 4. Cue learning: the need to perceive patterns and make distinctions 
(identify mismatches in the situation and/or environment)  Intuition is the ability to size up situations 
quickly.  Metaphor means using experience to draw parallels between current situations and past 
experiences or other domains.  In mental simulation individuals imagine how a course of action might be 
executed and what its effects will likely be.  Storytelling is consolidating one’s experiences to make them 
available to others or one’s self in the future  
122 Klein, Sources of Power, 168. 
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Klein’s recognition-primed decision (RPD) model illustrates this.  Klein explains 
that there are three variations to the model.  Variation 1 is the basic model, applied in the 
simplest situations.  A decision maker recognizes a problem is typical, understands what 
he wants to achieve, which cues are important to pay attention to, what to expect, and 
therefore pursues a course of action that is likely to succeed.123  Klein notes, “The 
recognition of goals, cues, expectancies, and actions is part of what it means to recognize 
a situation.”124 
Variation 2 occurs when more time is required to diagnose the situation.  The 
decision maker gathers information until he is able to make a diagnosis.  Mentally, this 
requires identifying specific features of the problem and comparing them to past 
experiences.  Once a decision is made and a course of action implemented, the decision 
maker watches to see where there is a mismatch between what he expects to occur and 
what occurs.  Many people fall into a trap at this point.  Rather than recognizing signs 
that a strategy is failing, people often try to explain them away; they build a story to 











                                                 
123 Klein, Sources of Power, 25. 





Figure 11.   Recognition-Primed Decision Model125 
                                                 
125 Klein, Sources of Power, 27. 
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Variation 3 occurs when a decision maker mentally evaluates a single course of 
action and its possible outcomes.  He mentally simulates the entire process to determine 
whether the course of action needs to be modified or replaced before it is even 
implemented.  
Another model that many people in the military are familiar with represents a 
higher order of the RPD model—the OODA loop.  John Boyd, creator of the OODA 
loop, believed that operating within an opponent’s decision cycle was the key to success 
in combat.  At its simplest the key to the OODA loop’s success lies in executing the 
observe, orient, decide, act loop at a higher speed than one’s adversary.  For our 
purposes, the OODA loop is helpful for synthesizing Klein’s and Gladwell’s ideas. 
The modified OODA loop illustrates that a person’s thinking is organic to him or 
her.  A person’s ability to think conventionally or unconventionally is a function of his or 
her cognitive profile, which is largely determined by factors beyond his or her control 
like genetic heritage, social and cultural legacies, hidden advantages, extraordinary 
opportunities, and intrinsic personality traits.  Ultimately, it is hidden advantages, 
extraordinary opportunities, and intrinsic personality traits affect an individual’s ability to 

















Figure 12.   The Modified OODA Loop126 
Note how orientation shapes observation, shapes decision, shapes action, 
and in turn is shaped by the feedback and other phenomena coming into 
our sensing or observing window.  Also, note how the entire “loop” (not 
just orientation) is an ongoing many-sided implicit cross-referencing 
process of projection, empathy, correlation, and rejection.127 
 
                                                 
126 Defense and the National Interest, “Boyd’s OODA Loop,” http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/strategy-and-
force-employment/boyd-and-military-strategy/ (accessed November 15, 2009). 
127 Ibid. 
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C. UNCONVENTIONAL WARRIORS128 
Now that we have examined different theories and explanations for why some 
people are able to think and act unconventionally, we will look briefly at four 
unconventional warriors, all of them excelled at a certain form of irregular warfare.  
Three of these four unconventional warriors acted in counterinsurgent roles at differing 
times in American history and help illustrate how important it is to go beyond Malaya 
and Vietnam when canvassing counterinsurgency experiences and to look at the 
individuals involved, not just their methods.  
1. General George Crook 
 
 
Figure 13.   General George Crook129 
Historians have aptly dubbed General George Crook “the greatest Indian fighter 
in the history of the United States.”  Crook subdued the fierce Apache in the Department 
                                                 
128 Some of the individuals and ideas discussed in this section are discussed in the Military Advisor 
course at the Naval Postgraduate School, taught by Anna Simons.  This section draws on material presented 
in that class. 
129  PBS, http://www.pbs.org/weta/thewest/people/images/crook1.jpg  
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of Arizona, forcing their surrender in 1873.130  In 1875, Crook left his Arizona command 
to take over the Department of the Platte where he defeated the mighty Sioux and their 
legendary chieftains, Red Cloud, Sitting Bull, and Crazy Horse.  In 1882, Crook resumed 
command of the Department of the Arizona to readdress the Apache problem.  In his 
absence, the Apache had quit the reservations and taken to the hills to resume a guerrilla 
war against the whites.131  Crook, once again, brought them to heel. 
Crook was raised on an Ohio farm.  He only happened to attend West Point 
because Robert P. Scheneck, a state representative and a friend of the family, needed to 
fill a vacancy at the school.132  Crook graduated in 1852, near the bottom of his class; 
later, when he did make Major General, he was the lowest-ranking cadet at the time to 
ever rise to that rank.133  Crook had 19 years of experience fighting Indians and enduring 
frontier privations when he took command of the Department of Arizona in 1871.  He 
also had both guerrilla and counter-guerrilla experience fighting for the Union in West 
Virginia during the Civil War.  Indeed, Crook was considered one of the Union’s best 
counterinsurgents.134 
The best insights into General Crook come from a book entitled On the Border 
with Crook.135  On the Border is a seminal ethnographic account written by John G. 
Bourke, a cavalry officer who served 15 years alongside Crook through the Indian wars.  
According to Bourke, Crook was the consummate outdoorsman, an expert at reading 
sign, a sharpshooter, an expert at Indian sign language, and as tough as they come.  As 
Bourke notes, even the Indians admitted that Crook could out-Indian them, and they were 
in awe of how well he understood them and how well he, being a white man, learned 
what they had to teach.  Crook knew his adversaries inside and out and put this to good 
                                                 
130 George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiogrophy, ed. Martin F. Schmitt (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1986), 179. 
131 Crook, General George Crook, 243. 
132, Ibid., xxii. 
133 Ibid., xxiii. 
134 Moyar, A Question of Command, 18. 
135 I highly recommend reading, On the Border.  I would venture to say that until one reads this book, 
his or her knowledge and understanding of America’s Indian wars is incomplete.  This book is a vivid first-
hand account of the major Indian conflicts of the post-Civil War era. 
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stead manipulating tribal rivalries to his advantage, forming tribal alliances, and using 
Indian forces to run hostile tribes to ground.  When Crook made use of Indian scouts and 
allied tribes, he never tried to get them to conform to Western practices of war.  He let 
them fight in their own ways and factored that into his planning.  General Crook was, 
normally, very objective and not emotional in his decision making.  He was capable of 
extreme violence when necessary to subdue hostile Indians and defeat them in battle but, 
upon their surrender, he was always extremely magnanimous and did his best to treat 
them in accord with their own sense of warrior virtue.136 
2. General John “Black Jack” Pershing 
 
Figure 14.   General John Pershing137  
General Pershing is most famous for leading the punitive expedition into Mexico 
after famed bandit Pancho Villa, and for serving as General of the National Army, 
responsible for mobilizing the United States Army for World War I (WWI) and 
commanding it in battle.  General Pershing was promoted to General of the Armies in 
1919 in recognition of his WWI service.  But what really launched Pershing’s career was 
his success as an effective counterinsurgent fighting the Moros on Mindanao and Jolo 
islands in the Philippines from 1899–1903. 
                                                 
136 John G. Bourke, On the Border with Crook (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971). 
137 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:CAPTJPershing.jpg.  
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Pershing grew up in northern Missouri.  He was remembered as a quiet, 
determined young man and it wasn’t until after he left home that people figured out just 
how mischievous he had been.  He worked the family farm as a young man and entered 
West Point much later than most.  Pershing stated that he was 22, just under the 
maximum age limit, but it is believed that he was older and lied about his age.138  
Pershing graduated in 1886 and spent the next five years on the frontier.  He commanded 
a company of Sioux Indian scouts for a time before serving as the commandant of cadets 
at the University of Nebraska from 1891–1895.  After that, he assumed command of a 
troop in the 10th Cavalry, a Black regiment.  Pershing went on to serve as a tactical 
officer at West Point and to fight in the Spanish-American War before his first tour in the 
Philippines.  Working with Indians and Blacks appears to have prepared Pershing for 
working with foreign “Others” before arriving in the Philippines in 1899.   
Pershing spent his first two years in the Philippines as the Adjutant-General of the 
Department of Mindanao-Jolo and handled mostly service support duties.  In 1901, with 
15 years active duty behind him, he assumed command of a combined regiment of 
infantry and cavalry.  Unlike most of his peers, Pershing did not approach the Moro 
insurgency as a military problem, but regarded it as, “…a human problem.”139  In solving 
this human problem, Pershing did not try to bully his way into the Moro communities 
using blunt force.  He was patient and utilized an indirect approach, eventually 
developing relationships with tribal leaders, all the while suffering attacks on his own 
troops.  Other Americans viewed Pershing’s actions as pacifist, but his patience and 
forbearance gained him great leverage within the Moro communities.  Peaceful Moros 
viewed Pershing as having no choice when he later committed to violent action against 
hostile Moro villages.   
Pershing worked hard to create meaningful relationships with the Moro people.  
He operated within their cultural norms and traditions, but was always careful to project 
an image of courage and decisiveness. Pershing did not force results.  He let nature take 
                                                 
138 Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1973), 6.   
139 Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior, 68. 
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its course, but influenced outcomes by seeking friendship rather than confrontation.  He 
identified the sources of Moro fear and mistrust and countered them, thereby reassuring 
the Moros.  Pershing was so successful that he was put in charge of Camp Vicars and its 
attending forces, a job usually reserved for a full colonel—Pershing was but a captain.  
Brigadier General George W. Davis was forced to explain this to the War Department:  
The situation in one respect has been anomalous-the assignment of a 
captain to so large and important command as that of Vicars-but it was in 
my opinion absolutely indispensable that the man to command on the spot 
should possess certain qualities not easy to find combined in one man: 
capacity for command, physical and mental vigor, infinite patience in 
dealing with these fanatical semi-savages, wise discretion, a zealous desire 
to accomplish the work set for him and knowledge of the Moro 
character.140  
3. Carl F. Eifler 
 
                    
Figure 15.   Carl F. Eifler in the PI141 and As Commander of DET 101142 
 
                                                 
140 Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior,, 80–81. 
141 CIA Library, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/fall_winter_2001/graphics/shortephilippi.jpg.  
142 Laytone,  http://laytoneiflergroup.com/images/portrait_mrv1.jpg. 
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Carl Eifler was the first commander of famed Detachment 101 (DET 101), an 
Office of Strategic Services contingent assigned to the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater 
under General Joseph Stillwell, another person of unconventional mind.  Stillwell 
charged Eifler and 101 with conducting intelligence-gathering operations behind 
Japanese lines in Burma and with raising guerrilla forces to harass the enemy.  DET 101 
also branched out into rescuing downed allied pilots and identifying enemy targets for 
allied bombers.  DET 101 arguably became the most successful unconventional unit to 
operate in World War II although much more is made of the Jedburghs and OSS 
operations in France.   
Eifler’s life before DET 101 followed an unusual trajectory.  The picture on the 
left above shows Eifler at age 15 in the Philippines with an Army aerial photography unit.  
Eifler lied about his age to join the Army; he was eventually found out, sent back to the 
United States and discharged at the ripe old age of 17.  Eifler went on to become a Los 
Angeles policeman and after that a customs agent in Mexico.  In 1934, he began tracking 
a group of 400 Japanese Imperial Naval officers stationed in Mexico and an alleged 
Japanese plot to lure Mexico onto Japan’s side in a potential war with America.143  Eifler, 
a member of the Army reserve at the time, sent a report of his findings to his unit’s 
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Stillwell.  Eifler maintained contact with 
Stillwell in the intervening years before World War II.  Stillwell later selected him to 
command DET 101.   
Eifler’s task—to set up a unit that specialized in unconventional warfare—hadn’t 
been done before.  There was no doctrine and there was no playbook.  Eifler immediately 
recruited men that he knew, men he could trust, and men whom he felt were suited to the 
challenge at hand.  Together they made it up as they went along.  Eifler knew his end 
state—help General Stillwell defeat Japanese forces in Burma—and he guided his men in 
their use of imagination and talent.  In today’s parlance, DET 101 could be described as 
an organic, learning organization.  Eifler and his men applied the modified OODA loop 
in everything they did, from resupply and gaining air transport assets to guerrilla combat.  
                                                 
143 Tom Moon, This Grim and Savage Game: OSS and the Beginning of U.S. Covert Operations in 
World War II ( Los Angeles: Burning Gate Press, 1991), 3. 
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Sometimes the cues indicating that a particular course of action was unfit were 
undeniable—the loss of men’s lives when a team of agents was killed or captured by the 
Japanese, for instance.   
Eifler managed the men in his unit according to talent and proper fit.  Not every 
person he recruited was destined to be a behind-the-lines operator.  He recruited some 
men solely for their expertise in areas of support, while he often let  operators select their 
own teams.  Eifler and his staff also drew heavily on Anglo-Burmese and displaced 
Englishmen who had resided in Burma before the Japanese occupation.  He sought out 
subject matter experts and integrated them into the organization.  DET 101 started with 
approximately 25 American officers and NCOs and never had more than a few hundred 
Americans at its zenith, but controlled up to 10,000 Burmese tribesmen in the field.144 
Some of DET 101’s tangible achievements include:145 
Japanese killed (known)       5,428 
Japanese killed or seriously wounded (estimated)  10,000 
Japanese captured              75 
Bridges destroyed              51 
Supplies destroyed            3,000 tons 
Supplies captured            700 tons 
U.S. Air Force personnel rescued           232 











                                                 
144 William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road: the Story of America’s Most 
Successful Guerrilla Force (Boston: Little, Brown, & Company, 1963). 
145 Ibid., 217. 
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4. Edward Lansdale 
 
 
Figure 16.   Edward Lansdale146 
Edward Lansdale, the gregarious and mischievous harmonica-playing maverick, 
is perhaps best known for his role in advising Philippine Minister of Defense, Ramon 
Magsaysay during the Huk Rebellion of the 1950s.  Lansdale’s success in the Philippines 
was so spectacular that it inevitably shadowed the rest of his career.   
Lansdale lived the typical early 20th century American boyhood, growing up in 
Los Angeles, California.  He really wasn’t all that interested school, making it through 
high school with a B average, but he was a voracious reader of history and developed a 
strong work ethic doing odd jobs and tending paper routes.  He participated in ROTC 
during high school and college and found that he liked writing and working on creative 
endeavors like the school paper and yearbook staff.147  Lansdale aspired to be a journalist 
when he graduated from UCLA; however, he attended college at the height of the Great 
Depression and was so preoccupied with trying to pay the bills that he eventually left 
                                                 
146 BibliotecaPleyades,  
http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/secretgoldtreaty/lansdale_picture.jpg . 
147 Lansdale was a notoriously poor shot.  According to Cecil B. Currey in’ Edward Lansdale: The 
Unquiet American, Lansdale never did qualify with a rifle.  It may be that his inability to shoot coupled 
with his other natural abilities drove him toward the creative side of problem solving using his mind and 
developing a penchant for psychological warfare over more traditional methods of using force. 
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school.  Lansdale moved out east for a while, but returned to California and through a 
combination of hard work and good luck made his way into marketing.148  Lansdale 
joined the Army Reserve as a second lieutenant in 1932, but later resigned in disgust and 
disappointment with the Reserves.  Lansdale requested reinstatement of his commission 
in December 1941. 
Lansdale spent World War II working in a supporting role for the OSS, mostly 
stateside.  The OSS leadership quickly assessed that Lansdale had a special talent for 
working with people, especially “other peoples” and exploited his talent to gather 
information from minority groups within the U.S. to help OSS operations abroad.  Much 
of what Lansdale did helped prepare him for the future.  Lansdale was very intuitive, yet 
calculating when dealing with other people.  He first went to the Philippines in 1945 as 
chief of the Analysis Branch, Intelligence Division, for the Armed Forces Western 
Pacific headquarters.149  It was during this tour that he learned to play traditional Filipino 
songs on his harmonica because he figured this was an effective way to get Filipinos to 
open up. 
In assessing the Philippine government and the Huk rebellion in the early 1950s 
Lansdale observed that, given their strength in numbers and material resources, the 
government should have been able to crush the Huks.  As Cecil Currey, his biographer 
writes, “They [Philippine government] had not even come close, however, and Lansdale 
put his finger on the reason: while the Huks were running a revolution, the Philippine 
government was fighting them as though they were formal enemy armed forces.”150  
Rather than simply confronting the Huk rebellion head on, Lansdale asked, “Why are 
they rebelling?”  He made every effort to understand the Huk rebellion from the inside 
out, instead of the outside in. 
Lansdale pioneered the concept of civic action in which the host nation military 
goes out and conducts humanitarian missions and civic projects itself.  Lansdale observed 
                                                 
148 Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American (Washington: Brassey’s, 1998).   
149 Ibid., 32. 
150 Ibid., 82. 
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in the Philippines, and later in Vietnam, that each military compounded its problems 
because of its predatory behavior against the people.  Lansdale believed whole-heartedly 
in the American democratic idea so eloquently captured by Abraham Lincoln in the 
Gettysburg address, “government of the people by the people and for the people.”  
Embedded in this idea, according to Lansdale, was the realization that the military is also 
of the people and for the people and should exist to protect, not prey on them.  Lansdale 
designed his concept of civic action to build a bond between the military and the people, 
to change the people’s view of the military, and to give them a reason to place trust and 
support in the military and not in insurgents.151 
Everywhere Lansdale went he took to the local people.  He traveled talked to 
everyone he met, and in doing so developed a sense of the local situation.  He relished the 
game of competing with the enemy in a people’s war, and was sometimes quite devilish 
about it.  Lansdale once scripted an operation that played on local vampire legends to 
scare the Huks.  A Philippine psywar squad laid an ambush and snatched a lagging Huk 
after his patrol went by.  The squad punctured the Huk’s neck, vampire fashion, and hung 
the corpse upside down on the trail, drained of blood, to be found by his comrades.  After 
finding the hapless Huk the next morning, the entire Huk squadron packed up and left the 
area.152 
D. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER—UNDERSTANDING THROUGH 
WILLIAM AND ROBERT 
1. Why 
The trend common to both the individuals just discussed and William and Robert 
is that they all operated from an enemy-centric perspective.  William and Robert both 
stated explicitly that the frame of reference they used was to figure out how to frustrate 
the enemy’s plans, intentions, and goals—the enemy’s strategy.  William and Robert also 
noted that affecting the enemy’ strategy has to be a constant.  When the enemy is 
proactive and the counterinsurgent is reactive, the counterinsurgent has to consider not 
                                                 
151 Currey, The Unquiet American. 
152 Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York: Fordham University Press, 1972), 72–73. 
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only how to counter the enemy’s immediate moves, but also how to do so without 
contributing to the enemy’s greater end state.  This is akin to Pershing weathering Moro 
attacks until he had built sufficient relationships and inroads into Moro communities; 
Pershing knew the hostile Moros were trying to goad him into indiscriminate action.   
According to William and Robert, counterinsurgents have to evaluate offensive 
efforts in terms of the effects they will have in countering the enemy’s long-term 
strategy.  Lansdale did this when he began proposing the use of civic action in the 
Philippines.  Transforming the Philippine Armed Forces from a predatory organization 
into an organization that served and protected the population undercut the Huks’ strategy 
and their argument that the government was the source of the people’s ills.   
However, what Crook, Pershing, Lansdale, William, and Robert were able to do 
required more than just thinking about the enemy.  It involved understanding the enemy 
and being able to do so cross-culturally.  They developed, as Dr. Simons says, a 
“fingerspitzengefuhl (or fingertip feel) for another society organized significantly 
differently than their own.”153  What’s more, they were able to use their insights to 
operational and strategic level effect.154  Looking specifically at William and Robert, 
their ability to develop a deep understanding of Iraqis in Anbar was a function of their 
ability to orient to the people and their environment and, as a result, to understand events, 
behaviors, etc., in the appropriate context.  One has to ask, though, what enabled them to 
do so?  This question can only be answered, as Gladwell suggests, by unpacking who 
William and Robert are and how they got to where they were when each took over as 
team sergeant of ODA 504. 
William grew up in Charleston, West Virginia—he was a west-sider.  In the 
1970s that meant he grew up rough.  All the west side kids went to the same high school, 
but sub-divided into small gangs of kids—something easy to understand once you have 
driven around the west side of Charleston.  The neighborhoods are built up and around 
the foothills surrounding the commercial and industrial areas of the city that lie on flat 
                                                 
153 Anna Simons, “Unity of Vision: What it is and Why it Matters,” (paper presented at the Inter-
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154 Ibid., 5. 
 113
ground along the Elk River.  Neighborhoods exist in pockets, and kids in each pocket 
tended to coalesce in a clannish way.  As William describes it, “We grew up rough.  We 
were on our own.  You had yourself and your little gang of guys, but that was it.  That 
was all you had.  You didn’t go running to your mom and dad when there was trouble 
back then.  You solved the problem.”155  At that time, “solving the problem,” meant not 
getting beat up, stabbed, or shot at – and if you did, if you were beaten up, stabbed, or 
shot at you bided your time until conditions were right for payback. 
After high school, William played football at a small college and graduated with a 
degree in physical education.  He worked as a laborer for the next few years, and 
sometimes had to resort to poaching just to put food on the table for his family.  William 
joined the Army when he was 25, enlisting as a cavalry scout.  He spent three years at Ft. 
Hood, Texas before attending Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS).  William 
found himself to be incompatible with conventional forces; he was often older, wiser, and 
in possession of more common sense than the officers and non-commissioned officers 
above him.  Thirty years old when he finished the Special Forces Qualification Course (Q 
Course) in October, 1990, William reported to 5th Special Forces Group and immediately 
deployed to join his team in Saudi Arabia, where it was getting ready for Desert Storm. 
Robert grew up in central Washington State.  Robert’s parents divorced when he 
was still quite young.  His mom remarried when Robert was six or seven and shortly after 
that Robert’s stepdad took the family camping in the Cascade Mountains for the 
weekend, a weekend turned into an entire summer as Robert’s stepdad decided that the 
family should stay in the mountains.  Robert fished for his supper and spent nights 
sleeping out in the open.  He taught himself fieldcraft out of necessity as he sought ways 
to make himself even just slightly more comfortable.  Robert’s family returned to a small 
town, and Robert sums up his junior and senior high years this way: “I grew up in a small 
town that had communist-like coaches in charge of everything.  They started a 
conditioning club that started at 0630 each day and we lifted weights and stuff before 
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school.  The coaches constantly assessed the kids for later athletic endeavors.  Our high 
school was good at athletics and there was a lot of discipline.”156 
After high school, Robert spent five years in college.  He played college 
baseball— and drank, a lot.  He finally left school without a degree and joined the Army, 
right at the outset of the Gulf War.  Special Forces accepted E-4 specialists in the early 
1990s and Robert spent only a year in the conventional Army.  According to Robert, he 
was the only motivated soldier in his outfit at Ft. Riley, Kansas.  On making it, he 
promptly submitted his packet to attend SFAS. 
Despite the different paths that got each to 5th Special Forces Group, both William 
and Robert each spent more than a decade on operational detachments traveling 
throughout the Middle East, southwest Asia, and parts of Africa.  It was during these 
years that William and Robert began to separate themselves from their peers.  Most ODA 
members like guns, shooting, close-quarter combat training, and other skills commonly 
associated with being a commando.  The number of SF guys who put forth the time and 
effort to learn a language like Arabic, however, is not very many, not even in 5th Special 
Forces Group.  Yet, in addition to learning Arabic, both William and Robert spent 
countless hours reading and thinking.  William loves Sun Tzu and carried a dog-eared 
copy of his writings with him whenever he deployed.  Robert loves reading about 
Vietnam.  Robert especially likes “real Green Beret stuff,” books about guys out in the 
middle of nowhere working with Montagnards or Nungs and figuring out—on their 
own—how to best the enemy.   
Two other qualities about William and Robert surface in their narratives, William 
and Robert enjoy the game—that is, they relish the idea of getting up in the morning and 
trying to frustrate the enemy.  I would argue that they have a passion for this.  They also 
enjoyed working with Iraqis, and it was evident to other people that William and Robert 
somehow understood the Iraqis better than most.  I have personally heard people 
acknowledge this by saying things like, “William gets it, he’s even more tribal than they 
[Iraqis] are,” or, “Robert can out-Iraqi the Iraqis.”  Within the scope of my military 
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experience, I have never heard statements like these made about anyone else.  Nor have I 
met anyone else who I think could possibly warrant having those statements said about 
them—although, to be sure, there must be other Williams and Roberts out there.    
2. How 
In Chapter I, I suggested that unconventionally minded individuals have a natural 
ability to, as Simons writes, “intuitively think in terms of branches and sequels, and 
therefore don’t need to ask themselves what the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order effects of an 
action might be—they’ve already factored that in without consciously factoring it in.  Or 
they have the ability to see angles from angles that remain obtuse to others.”157  Simons 
drew her insights from accounts written about and, by, figures like Crook and Lansdale.  
Interestingly, in the process of interviewing William and Robert, they unknowingly 
described what she discusses.  They both described imagining or envisioning exactly 
what it was they wanted to achieve.  They built mental models of what Hit and the 
surrounding areas should look like once the insurgency was beaten.  Then, as William 
describes, it was simply a matter of navigating to that point.  In explaining what this 
meant, William further described how he knew certain actions, positive or negative, 
would play out as he tried to navigate toward his goal. 
In the process of navigating, William and Robert constantly looked for cues that 
informed them about the situation and their progress.  For example, William was able to 
identify relevant cues from Sheikh Reshad’s confrontation with the Hit city council that 
others completely missed.  Robert describes being like water adjusting to the will of the 
people, and never getting so far into an unknown situation that we couldn’t back out.  
This, in Gary Klein’s terms, is cue learning.  Cue learning amounts to being able to read 
the environment by detecting patterns (of behavior, events, etc.).  When patterns do not 
fit, when there are mismatches, these often represent decision points, and many times 
offer opportunity.  One of the ODA members described Robert’s cue learning abilities 
this way: 
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Robert will change his mind three or four times on an issue as he is going.  
It isn’t indecision; he is processing the situation and input of clues, etc. 
Robert will not take the time to explain what exactly is going on.  He 
expects you to get it.  If you don’t, then you don’t have a speaking role in 
this movie.  It doesn’t mean you are less valuable or not involved; you are 
just background, you don’t deserve more until you get the big picture.158 
The other thing that surfaced in the course of my interviews is how much William 
and Robert thought in terms of metaphors and analogies to help them understand the 
environment around them, identify cues, and determine courses of action.  The fluid use 
of metaphors and analogies is indicative of synthesis; “finding common features that are 
shared and connected across disciplines or fields of scientific endeavor helps create a new 
pattern, new insights.”159  For example, Robert looked at Hit and saw a sick patient.  Our 
activities on the periphery were successful in isolating and treating certain aspects of the 
patient’s disease or injury, but unless we could operate in time, the patient would die.  
That operation became Shurta Nasir.   
a. Fingerspitzengefuhl 
I have made the case that William and Robert had a fingerspitzengefuhl for 
the situation in Iraq, but what does this really mean?  Among other things, they 
recognized and avoided more than just cross-cultural faux pas.  In The Gamble, Thomas 
Ricks recounts a story in which an American soldier killed an Iraqi policeman.  The 
soldier’s commanders, instead of going straight to the IP’s family to pay restitution, 
abided by local custom and went through a tribal intermediary.  Ricks says that the 
commanders acted as if they were Iraqis.160  This is not, however, fingerspitzengefuhl.   
The best way to understand fingerspitzengefuhl is to refer back to Klein’s 
assessment that accumulating facts and knowledge does not make someone an expert.  
An expert is someone who perceives more.  Fingerspitzengefuhl is the ability to 
                                                 
158 ODA member 2, interview by author, Ft. Campbell, KY, August 21, 2009 
159 Hammond, The Mind of War, 171.  When William or Robert used historical analogies it was 
limited in nature.  They seldom fell into the trap of relying too much on a particular historical lens based on 
apparent similarities. William and Robert also paid attention to difference or contrasts in historical 
analogies used. 
160 Ricks, The Gamble, 219. 
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understand the world and perceive reality in the same ways as do members of another 
culture.  William and Robert were good at factoring in both Iraqi and American cultural 
considerations.  William and Robert also knew when to be Americans.  They actively 
repressed and accentuated their own cultural and personal traits as the situation dictated.  
The effect this seems to have had is that the Iraqis did not recognize William and Robert 
so much for their American-ness or Iraqi-ness, as for their William-ness and Robert-ness. 
b. Uncertainty 
In Blink, Malcolm Gladwell tells the story of Marine General Paul Van 
Riper and a military exercise called Millennium Challenge.  Millennium Challenge was 
scripted to test the military’s efficiency at systems warfare, and at severing the links 
among an adversary’s infrastructure and communications systems in order to paralyze 
him and disrupt his ability to make war.  The Blue Team, the good guys, represented U.S. 
armed forces and were equipped with the latest technology and systems, all designed to 
supposedly lift the fog of war, enabling the Blue Team to have perfect situational 
awareness.  The Red Team, or the bad guys, simulated a rogue Middle Eastern nation and 
was led by General Riper.  The Blue Team failed, catastrophically so.161   
Gladwell makes the case that the Blue Team failed because it overloaded 
itself with irrelevant information.  Essentially, the focus became production of 
information and, to paraphrase Gladwell, commanders became imprisoned by the idea 
that they had to know everything.162  Klein also addresses this phenomenon in Sources of 
Power.  According to Klein, historical data show that the most effective battlefield 
commanders were effective because they accepted the fact that they could not know 
everything and, hence, were not paralyzed by doubt.  Klein also notes that great 
commanders “possessed the ability to shape the battlefield, acting decisively and 
prudently at the same time.”163  
                                                 
161 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink (New York: Back Bay Books/Little, Brown and Company, 2005), 99–
111. 
162 Ibid., 144. 
163 Klein, Sources of Power, 279. 
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The decision-making models presented at the beginning of this chapter 
suggest unconventional thinkers are able to move forward with decision making because 
they continually reorient to the environment/situation.  Unconventional thinkers do not 
wait for complete information.  They know what they want the situation to look like, and 
they use environmental cues to guide their actions as they navigate forward.  Eifler is a 
great example of a man who thrived in an uncertain, ambiguous environment.  He had to; 
he was a pioneer in unconventional warfare.  William and Robert were equally 
comfortable with uncertainty.  A simple unpacking of Robert’s comment, “You don’t 
know exactly where you are going to maneuver to, but you know towards what,” implies 
using cue learning to guide actions.164  As Robert further explains, he made decisions by 
never moving so fast or so far that he couldn’t retract himself, but by moving 
methodically towards his envisioned end state he looked for clues along the way to guide 
him.165 
3. The Supra-Individual 
The effects of unconventional thinking and talent are amplified in small teams.  
According to Klein, teams should be considered intelligent entities.166  Experienced 
teams share a collective consciousness and reality that empowers them over any one 
individual.  This is the inherent structural strength of Special Forces Operational 
Detachments.  A strong team operates by the same organic process as depicted in the 
modified OODA Loop.  A team that has a strong identity, shared understanding of the 
situation, and awareness of its own capabilities—which means that everyone on the team 
knows each other’s strengths and weaknesses—can monitor its own performance and 
divide labor accordingly to maximize performance.167  Such a team is able to draw on the 
                                                 
164 Robert, interview by author, Clarksville, TN, August 20, 2009. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Klein, Sources of Power, 233. 
167 Ibid., 245. 
 119
experiences and strengths of each member in order to understand the operational 
environment and develop new solutions to existing problems.168   
E. SUMMARY 
How William and Robert thought: Both men possessed acute practical 
intelligence, which Malcolm Gladwell defines as knowledge that helps you read 
situations correctly and get what you want.169  Each was visionary. They used mental 
simulation to figure out where they were going. In essence, they could see what they 
wanted the future to look like, and could use that picture to help navigate to it.  A 
consequence of mental simulation is that they thought big, which in turn led them to act 
big.  When it came to working with Iraqis, they could often also see different shades of 
black. 
How William and Robert reacted to the environment: Both men definitely thrived 
in ambiguous, uncertain environments, although each did so in his own way.  
Understanding the situation always came first.  Neither man relied on dramatic action; he 
first sized up each situation, and then acted in a calculated manner.  Both men also had 
different perceptive abilities than those around them.  They knew more while seeing less 
and put that to work shaping the battlefield, or the environment, to their advantage.  
Remaining attuned to the environment was a perpetual process of deliberate re-
orientation.  Each man continually looked for cues and mismatches in the environment to 
guide him and help him identify opportunities 
How William and Robert made decisions: Both men were willing to take risks, 
but always confronted the brutal facts when making decisions.  Doubt that often comes 
with uncertainty did not block their decision-making ability.  Both men recognized that 
the only certainty was that there was uncertainty, and each was comfortable with that.  At 
times, each had the will and confidence to shape the battlefield in order to mitigate  
 
                                                 
168 Team Sergeants like William and Robert recognize this and make use of it.  It would require 
another thesis to explain the uses to which they were able to put ODA 504 and the critical contributions 
made by all the ODA’s members. 
169 Gladwell, Outliers, 101. 
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uncertainty.  But when they couldn’t do this, it didn’t paralyze them.  Their first thoughts 
of the day were never about how to get by, but about how to frustrate the enemy and 
further their own plans. 
How William and Robert led: Both men were modest leaders versus being 
egocentric leaders; it was about the mission, the men, and winning, not themselves.  They 
were optimists, always keeping the faith, but always honest about the situation around 
them.  Both were willing to confront failure, but that didn’t equate to accepting failure.  
William and Robert led according to what I call the “Apache Principle.”  William 
articulated his idea of what determination is by describing Apache Indians who, when 
fighting the whites, would ride their horse until it died, then steal another and keep going.  
The Apache Principle denotes single-minded determination, the ability to do more with 
less, and the will to overcome obstacles in pursuit of a goal. 
 121
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
I request that in our recruiting program we make all of these conditions 
clear to any prospective government employee, so that he comes here with 
no illusions.  It has been my experience that superior people are attracted 
only by challenge.  By setting our standards low and making life soft, we 
have, quite automatically and unconsciously, assured ourselves of 
mediocre people.   
Ambassador Gilbert MacWhite to the Secretary of State, 
in The Ugly American.170 
A. SUMMARY OF IDEAS 
It seems that individuals can be grouped into two different general cognitive 
categories, and those categories exist along a spectrum as shown in Figure 16.  Leonardo 
da Vinci is the ideal example of an unconventional thinker at the far right of the 
spectrum—a genius.  Probably no one in history better exemplifies a person adept at 
creative adaption and synthesis across multiple, seemingly unrelated domains.  Opposite 
of da Vinci is Niccolo Paganini, the violin virtuoso.  Paganini was a one-dimensional 
musical genius.  Similarly, we could compare General Douglas MacArthur and General 
William Westmoreland.  MacArthur was able to conceptualize dramatic military 
maneuvers like the Inchon landings, but also had an intuitive understanding of his 
adversaries, which he more than demonstrated years earlier fighting the Japanese.  Many 
a conventional minded commander would have sacked Emperor Hirohito, but MacArthur 
had the insight to appreciate that leaving the Emperor in place to direct the Japanese 
people was literally the same as getting God on the radio to tell them what to do.  In 
contrast, many would say General William Westmoreland could not adequately 
conceptualize the irregular threat in or to South Vietnam and developed no good way of 
handling his Vietnamese counterparts or redirecting strategy.  Consequently, they would 
place him at the other end of the spectrum. 
                                                 
170 William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American (New York: W. W.  Norton & 
Company, 1958), 268. 
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Even just a short review of unconventional warriors, to include William and 
Robert, suggests that individuals toward the far right of the unconventional spectrum 
have to be considered outliers.  They are gifted thanks to genetic heritage, social and 
cultural legacies, personal intelligence, uncommon common sense, etc.  However, even 
with such gifts, a person’s final place along the spectrum is a product of these multiplied 
by experiences, opportunities, advantages, passion, and hard work.   
Even if a person is advantaged with unconventional thinking and 
fingerspitzengefuhl, success downrange may yet be a consequence of “right place, right, 
time, and right chemistry.”  Consider William and Robert.  The fact that each went to Hit 
when he did was due to fortune as much as design.  Discussions with William, Robert, 
and the ODA members with whom they worked, reflect that all of them believe William 
and Robert to have been especially suited to the environment and circumstances of Hit at 
the very times each was there.  William candidly admits that he doesn’t think he could 
have done what Robert did, and that Robert was the right fit for the situation in Hit at the 
time he was there.  It is also evident that, like Lansdale and Magsaysay, William had 
chemistry with the paramount Sheikh and Robert with the mayor.  These relationships 
each made a difference.   
To be sure, William’s and Robert’s battalion commander did have some influence 
over these events.  The battalion commander recognized William’s talent and experience 
in al Anbar and solicited the Group headquarters to ensure William’s ODA was 
reintroduced into al Anbar in 2005 after Special Forces had been withdrawn.  The 
battalion commander also recognized that Robert was an appropriate fit for William’s 
ODA and to the mission in al Anbar.  The battalion commander made a deliberate 
decision to backfill William with Robert.  The chance involved was that William’s and 
Robert’s destinies happened to overlap in such a way that Robert was available to be 
team sergeant as William was retiring.  
Organizational design theory contends that because organizations have natural 
structures, harmony among the parts is key to organizational success.  At the same time, 
the organization’s overall fit to its operating environment also matters.  There are 
generally four ways to classify operating environments: simple and stable, complex and 
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stable, simple and dynamic, and complex and dynamic.  A simple environment is defined 
by having only a few external interdependent variables, while a complex environment has 
many.  A stable environment undergoes little change, while a dynamic one changes often 
and unpredictably.171 
If different organizational structures are particularly suited to different operational 
environments, one should be able to draw the analogy that people with different cognitive 
profiles are optimally suited to operate in different environments as well.  A conventional 
mind operates optimally in stable, structured environments with rules and conventions to 
guide decision making.  An unconventional mind operates optimally in dynamic, 
complex environments, and thrives on ambiguity and uncertainty.  Individuals with 
unconventional minds likely languish in stable, structured environments.172  Since 
individuals with unconventional minds feel unbound, they are more apt to try to reshape 
their environment to support their efforts at problem solving.  This in turn suggests that 
individuals with unconventional minds have appropriately healthy egos.  Thriving in 
uncertain environments, having the audacity to reject reality and recreate it, and 
possessing the confidence to rely on innovative yet unproven ideas requires a strong 
belief in one’s self.173 
 
Figure 17.   Kinds of Mind 
                                                 
171 Henry Mintzberg, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit," Harvard Business Review (January–
February, 1981), 103–116. 
172 Stories are not uncommon of soldiers, NCOs, and officers who seemed unfit during peacetime or 
in garrison, but excelled in war or during maneuvers. 
173 Mintzberg, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit," 103–116. 
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The simplest summary of the difference between those with conventional and 
unconventional minds is that when conventional thinkers do not know what to do, they 
do what they know.  Unconventional thinkers innovate, adapt, and overcome. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ARMY SPECIAL FORCES 
Here we can draw a parallel to Colin Gray’s argument that strategic genius is rare 
and that strategic talent, although also rare, is more common.174  Talent can be improved, 
but genius is what it is.  This thesis has tried to explain how unconventionally minded 
people think and why they think as they do.  Perhaps the best way to conceptualize 
unconventional thinking is as talent.  The Army defines talent as, “the intersection of 
three dimensions—skills, knowledge, and behaviors—that create an optimal level of 
individual performance, provided the individual is employed within their talent set.”175 
 
Figure 18.   The Dimensions of Talent176 
                                                 
174 Colin Gray, “Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict,” November, 2009, 
v. 
175 Casey Wardynski, David S. Lyle & Michael J. Colarusso, “Talent: Implications for a U.S. Officer 
Corps Strategy,” November, 2009, accessed 12 November 2009 from 
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/, v.  
176 Ibid., 5. 
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There are many different kinds and levels of talent.  Except in rare instances, an 
individual’s threshold for a particular talent is established by how early the talent is 
discovered and how it is subsequently developed.  In terms of irregular warfare, talent at 
the tactical, operational, and strategic levels is not the same and, because a person 
exhibits talent at the tactical level, does not mean he has it at the operational level, and so 
on.  In addition, a person with fingerspitzengefuhl may only possess it for one particular 
culture.  It may very well be that having succeeded in a country or culture, an individual 
will forever use that experience as a lens through which to view situations in other 
countries and cultures.  If that is so, his usefulness is restricted.  This suggests that some 
unconventional minds might be as limited as they are unlimited.  Genius, by definition, 
implies that a person can think intuitively, as Simons describes, at all levels—tactical, 
operational, and strategic and, across cultures. 
1. Evaluating Unconventional Talent 
Fortunately, as Gray notes, we can generally get by on talent.  The biggest 
problem may be recognizing it.  If, as this thesis has suggested and individuals with 
unconventional minds and talent are outliers suited to unknown and unforeseen 
circumstances, the only measure that counts is how they perform in the real world.  The 
only way to evaluate individuals is to thus put them in situations and see how they do.  
The Q Course already does this to an extent.  The Q Course culminates with the 
legendary Robin Sage exercise that places candidates in unconventional warfare 
scenarios and evaluates them on performance.  Instructors assess candidates on whether 
they are good enough or not good enough.  As of yet, there are no markers that can be 
used to identify those who are good enough.  Thus, all Special Forces can really do is 
select out those who demonstrate a lack of ability.  The shortcoming is that Robin Sage 
does not, for example, evaluate candidates’ ability to understand, adapt to, and change the 
reality of the scenario/situation.  The scenario is driven by tasks scripted to evaluate 
candidates on methods, TTPs, and doctrine taught throughout the course.   
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Robin Sage could be improved by devising scenarios that are driven by individual 
and team improvisation in the field.177  Provide teams an end state, vague mission 
statement, and commander’s intent and insert them into the scenario, see how they 
develop the situation and react to cues that develop as a consequence of the teams’ 
actions.  The U.S. has a unique and untapped resource in its American Indian populations 
that might offer an additional unconventional training venue for Robin Sage.178  Eighty-
five percent of the 7,500 residents of the Crow reservation in south-central Montana 
speak Crow as their first language.179  Another option is the Blackfeet reservation.  It 
abuts Glacier National Park and tribal members have been making systematic efforts to 
revive the Blackfoot language since 1987.180  Conducting Robin Sage on these 
reservations would be like conducting FID or unconventional warfare in a foreign 
country, where people speak an unknown tribal language, and thus could be used to 
assess how candidates adapt to uncertainty and ambiguity while interacting with “Others” 
right here in the U.S.A. 181   
It is important to use the Q Course and Robin Sage to identify unconventional 
talent early because talent, to a large extent, is grown—it does not spontaneously appear 
in a mature form years down the road.  Special Forces Groups need to be prepared to 
cultivate incoming talent instead of leaving its development to chance.  Chance is already 
a significant enough factor in the possession of talent as it is. 
 
 
                                                 
177 Scenarios are driven, to a certain extent, by how teams interact with the ‘guerrillas’ or the ‘G 
Chief.’  The G chief will respond in accordance to the team’s behavior, but instructors are still primarily 
looking for how well teams execute principles, concepts, and methods taught in the course.    
178 This idea was presented to me in a conversation with Professor Simons. 
179 “Crow,” Montana Official State Travel Information Site, 
http://indiannations.visitmt.com/crow.shtm (accessed November 15, 2009). 
180 Michelle Nijhuis, “Native American Languages,” Native Americans On-line, http://www.native-
americans-online.com/native-american-language.html (accessed November 15, 2009). 
181 I fully understand that this would initially require additional administrative and logistical pain, and 
that the reservations possibly couldn’t service all of the training ODAs being evaluated in a Robin Sage 
cycle, but I still feel it is worth consideration.  It is also worth consideration by the Groups as a training 
venue. 
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2. Managing Unconventional Talent within the Ranks 
Managing talent in the ranks is mostly a task of creating an environment that 
fosters rather than inhibits the development of talent.  It is therefore easier to think in 
terms of what not to do.   
Individual Special Forces soldiers and ODAs must be made to increase the depth 
and breadth of their individual and collective experience banks. This means that teams 
should be made to do as much for themselves as possible, whether this is training in the 
back forty instead of going to contractor-run training sites or planning and coordinating 
their own pre-mission training.  To deepen their experience bank requires individuals and 
teams to use creativity, develop people skills, innovate, and problem solve.  Making 
teams do more for themselves also becomes its own evaluation tool.  Teams and their 
members can be evaluated according to how well or poorly they rise to these tasks.  
Having passion, a work ethic, creativity, problem solving skills, etc. will surface and 
point to individual and collective talent. 
A large percentage of Special Forces soldiers have joined the Regiment since 
9/11.  These soldiers did not experience the “lean” times in Special Forces when funding 
was minimal and innovation and creative adaptation were vital to making do despite 
resource shortfalls.  An analogy can be drawn to industrial versus service-based 
economies.  The older generation of Special Forces soldiers had to do things on their 
own; they “manufactured their own goods” and because of this, developed their own 
know-how.  Since 9/11, Special Forces and Special Operations Forces (SOF) in general 
have been awash in funding.  Today’s Special Forces soldiers are much more accustomed 
to getting what they want, when they want it, through acquisition channels.  This includes 
paying for vendor training instead of training or cross-training themselves.  A duality 
exists where, in Special Forces today, soldiers may have more and better stuff, to include 
training venues, but practical knowledge and know-how are eroding.  This duality needs 
to be re-balanced. 
“Keeping guys on teams as long as possible” has likewise taken on a new 
meaning.  ‘Possible’ is whatever the system allows – currently, that is typically two to 
three years for instance.  ODA 504 was activated in the fall of 2004 and not fully manned 
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until August 2005.  Now, barely four years later, there is only one original member left 
on the team.  The collective experience bank that developed and brought the team 
successfully through its two tours in Hit is gone, as is the supra-individual the team 
became.  At every level, commanders need to fight to retain their people and to retain 
team integrity.  Individuals and teams realize, develop, and actualize talent as their 
collective experiences deepen.   
Special Forces suffer the same legacy of personnel management that plagues the 
Army: “legacy personnel management tools were designed to align faces and spaces 
rather than talents and competency requirements.”182  Nowhere is this more evident than 
in the management of team sergeants.  Noncommissioned officers are managed like 
officers in that the Army strives to keep them moving on a constant upward trajectory of 
career progression through rank and position.  The consequence is that talent is given less 
time to develop, and when talented individuals epitomize the right fit—like a William or 
a Robert—they are replaced after two years because that is what the system dictates, not 
what the team or unit needs.  Many of the 5th Group teams that took part in the initial 
invasion of Afghanistan had soldiers who had served close to a decade or more on those 
teams; they had veteran team sergeants who had grown up on those teams.  Special 
Forces used to grow its talent.  Special Forces need to make a real effort to return to past 
practices. 
Chemistry counts when managing talent.  ODAs inherently possess their own 
unique team culture or personality and this, in turn, produces team chemistry.  Some 
talents and some individuals complement specific ODAs; others do not.  Truly 
professional soldiers are usually mature enough to ‘soldier’ through a bad fit on a team, 
counting on either the team culture evolving to a better fit or the opportunity to move to a 
team that better fits them.  Overall, the issue of chemistry and fit is self-correcting, but 
ODAs would benefit if more attention were paid to the potential chemistry between key 
personnel like team sergeants and team leaders.  Some commanders take this seriously,  
 
                                                 
182 Paula Broadwell, “The U.S. Army Officer Shortage and Talent Management,” Kings of War, 
http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/10/24/the-u-s-army-officer-shortage-and-talent-managment/ 
(accessed October 28, 2009). 
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but many do not.  Rarer are the commanders who recognize a bad fit and take action to 
correct it.  Team leaders and team sergeants are often left to ‘soldier’ through bad 
chemistry on their own.   
The best litmus test for the right fit of soldiers to teams and teams to missions is 
how much management they require.  The right people and the right teams do not need 
managing; they simply need guidance to harmonize their actions with those of the rest of 
the unit and with the unit commander’s intent.183  The right fit of personnel to teams, and 
teams to missions maximizes talent.  If the right people cannot be found to fill vacant 
leadership positions those positions should be left vacant until the right person comes 
along.  Conversely, because an individual does not fit a team, or a team does not fit a 
mission set, does not automatically mean “bad performers,” it may simply signify there is 
a mismatch.184 
Another function of fitting soldiers to the right job and fitting teams to the right 
mission is making use of passion: “Since intrinsic drives are the strongest, people will 
work most passionately and effectively on projects they choose for themselves.”185  
Special Forces should do a better job of exploiting individuals’ particular passions.  At 
the same time, unconventional thinkers can be challenged, developed, and rewarded in a 
single stroke by utilizing opportunities made available through the Defense Language 
Institute, the Olmstead scholarship program, the Naval Postgraduate School Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) program, the Lawrence program, allied 
service schools, Army Civil Schooling (ACS), etc.  Many junior noncommissioned 
officers and warrant officers hold four-year college degrees.  Degree producing programs 
should be opened to these warrants and to NCOs who have the academic qualifications 
and demonstrate unconventional talents.  There is room for Special Forces to do a better 
job of exploiting passion among its members; leaders need to be creative and the system 
needs to open up opportunities that are currently only available to officers.      
                                                 
183 Collins, Good to Great, 56. 
184 At the same time, everything that doesn’t work shouldn’t be assumed to be the result of a 
mismatch.  Sometimes there are individuals who slip through who should not serve on any team. 
185 Geoff Colvin, Talent is Overrated: What Really Separates World-Class Performers from 
Everybody Else (New York: The Penguin Group, 2008), 194. 
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3. Managing Unconventional Talent in the Field 
Unconventional talent thrives in uncertain and ambiguous environments.  It also 
thrives when it is freed from oppressive command oversight.  Unconventionally minded 
individuals are guided by cues and mismatches in the environment that inform them as 
they go.  This is an iterative process and unconventional minds are at their best when they 
are free to pursue solving problems and exploiting opportunities at a pace they set. 
The urge to command and control . . . is an impediment to creative 
adaption, true insight, imagination, and innovation.  Creating a system that 
seems to respond intuitively to the challenges and opportunities it 
encounters is a far more effective way to proceed.  Such a system 
emphasizes the organic, natural aspects of human relationships and 
interactions rather than the technology, which both connects and separates 
us from each other.186 
The current system demands that concepts of the operation (CONOPs) be submitted 
before ODAs leave their compounds, that multiple storyboards and operational 
summaries be submitted after every event, that there be daily situation reports and almost 
constant oversight at all levels of command.  This is the antithesis of an organic system.  
The current system is not only disruptive of being able to respond to events as they occur 
but, more unforgivably often inhibits the exploitation of opportunity by operators on the 
scene. 
An organic command and control system depends on implicit understanding, 
trust, and harmony.  When it comes to understanding, subordinates must have a thorough 
understanding of the commander’s intent, focus, direction, and what a final unified vision 
of success looks like.  As for trust, commanders have to trust their ODAs.  In terms of 
harmony, as ODAs modify their course of action through innovation, adaptation, 
exploitation of opportunities, and by shaping of the battlefield they must make certain 
that their actions are in keeping with the commander’s focus and direction.  An organic 
command and control system can only work in a unit with a solid culture of discipline.   
A culture of discipline grants ODAs freedom and responsibility within a 
framework formed by the commander’s focus and direction, while also drawing on the 
                                                 
186 Hammond, The Mind of War, 167. 
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ethical standards expected of American soldiers.  ODAs must be disciplined to 
consistently adhere to this framework.187  ODAs must not act like “biker gangs.” 
C. MAKING THE MOST OF UNCONVENTIONAL TALENT 
Talent management is a mindset that goes beyond rhetoric toward a 
holistic and integrated approach to leveraging the greatest competitive 
advantage from people. It also refers to those special strategies an 
organization deploys to recruit, retain and develop its pool of top talent. It 
is key to leveraging a competitive advantage in peace and war.188 
Major-General Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, is chairing a Virtual 
Conference over the next year that examines managing the Army’s officer corps by 
managing talent.  Typically, preservation of Army systems has been more important to 
the institution than practically anything else; this is one consequence of bureaucracy.189  
Ironically, one of the most bureaucratically entrenched systems in the Army is the 
personnel management system.  
Special Forces have often been out in front of the Army in the development of 
new tactics, techniques, and procedures, and in incorporating new technologies into the 
fight.  Special Forces now have the chance to be out front in how it manages its people.  
This will take a deliberate effort, however. 
In her report, “Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Forces Go 
Mainstream,” Jessica Glicken Turnley notes that, “the core value of SOF [Special 
Operations Forces]—the importance of the quality of their people—is at great risk of 
being lost.”190  As USSOCOM tries to organizationally look like other commands it has 
sought greater conformity in order to maintain its legitimacy.  Conformity starts 
structurally, but eventually trickles down from the major command to infect subordinate  
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components.  Officers and non-commissioned officers who more closely represent the 
mainstream will move through the system much more easily, filling command positions 
and others of influence.  
If the core value of SOF is the quality of its people, then the core value of Special 
Forces should be the quality of its unconventionally talented people.  It remains to be 
seen how the Army will begin cataloging talent, but it should be clear that Special Forces 
needs to begin by distinguishing between those who can think unconventionally and to 
what degree, and those who think conventionally.  The unconventional thinkers, the 
“Ameri-cans,” need to be identified now, wherever they are in the chain of command and 
in the force.  Special Forces should not wait for the “system” to come up with a method 
for doing this because whatever the “system” comes up with will be inherently 
conventional. 
This thesis sought to demonstrate that some individuals are uniquely suited to 
conduct counterinsurgency and other irregular warfare activities by virtue of their 
unconventional thinking.  It has also explained what might lead these individuals to think 
more unconventionally than others.  One thing that seems clear is that despite the 
attention paid to counterinsurgency theories and methods, what matters most in a 
counterinsurgency fight, and in irregular warfare in general, are people.  The right people, 
possessing unconventional minds, are “sources of power.”  If Special Forces can 
successfully mitigate organizational pressures to promote and reward conventional 
thinkers above unconventional thinkers, and if Special Forces can identify, develop, 
better utilize, and protect its unconventional thinkers, it will always retain its advantage, 
which is to successfully adapt to changing security environments such as those William, 
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APPENDIX 1: INSURGENT NOTES 
 
The insurgency in Iraq was and is unique due to its amorphous character.  An 
insurgent is a person who takes part in armed rebellion against a constituted authority.  
For this paper, I have only dealt with the Sunni insurgents, which can be divided into four 
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 134
In this thesis. I utilize the terms insurgents, insurgency, resistance, and Al Qaeda 
and Associated Movements (AQAM).  When using the terms “insurgents” or 
“insurgency” I am referencing all of the four categories of Sunni insurgent groups 
identified above.  When I use the term AQAM, I am referring to nationalist salafists and 
jihadist salafists.  When using the term “resistance,” I am primarily speaking of the 1920 
Revolutionary Brigades and any similar organizations.  Baathist and former regime 
elements can also be included in this grouping.   
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APPENDIX 2: COALITION FORCE REGIMENTAL AND 
BATTALION TASK FORCE COMMANDS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIT 
Regimental Command Hit Area of Operations 
3rd ACR (March 2003-February 2004) 3rd ACR (March 2003-February 
2004) 
RCT 7 (March 2004-March 2005) 2–7 Marines (February 2004–
September 2004) 
RCT 2 (March 2005–February 2006) 1–23 Marines (September 2004–April 
2005) 
 3–25 Marines (April 2005–September 
2005) 
 3–1 Marines (September 2005–
October 2005) 
 2–114 FA (October 2005–December 
2005) 
 13th MEU (November 2005–
December 2005) 
 22nd MEU (December 2005–February 
2006) 
RCT 7 (February 2006–January 2007) TF 1–36 (February 2006–February 
2007) 
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